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1
Chapter One: Introduction
In Stackelberg games, one player, the leader, commits to a strategy publicly before the remaining players, the followers, make their decision [7]. These types of commitments are necessary for security agents in a number of domains, pertaining to attacker-defender scenarios [1, 2, 11, 15] and Stackelberg games are well-suited to appropriately model these commitments [14, 16]. For example, in airport settings there may be eight terminals serving passengers, as at LAX, but only five bomb sniffing canine units to patrol the terminals. In such a scenario, the canine units are the first one to decide on randomizing their patrolling over the eight terminals. Meanwhile, adversaries may conduct surveillance to act according to this committed strategy of the canine units.
It is a well-known fact that game-theoretic approaches make an assumption of perfect rationality which induces errors in the prediction of human behavior for multi-agent decision making problems [3, 5]. Various models are being developed and studied in order to account for the variations in human behavior from the initial assumption of perfect rationality. Behavioral game theory and cognitive science are both fully devoted to this domain. The multi-agent systems community has shown growing interest in adopting these models for decision-making and providing advice to human decision-makers [6, 26]. There has been profound work in improving the computational models of human behavior, especially in the field of security games [27]. Stackelberg games have been able to handle these needs in the best way possible [14, 16, 17, 18].
Object Description
| Title | Computational model of human behavior in security games with varying number of targets |
| Author | Goenka, Mohit |
| Author email | mgoenka@usc.edu; mohitgoenka@gmail.com |
| Degree | Master of Science |
| Document type | Thesis |
| Degree program | Computer Science |
| School | Viterbi School of Engineering |
| Date defended/completed | 2011-03-30 |
| Date submitted | 2011 |
| Restricted until | Unrestricted |
| Date published | 2011-04-19 |
| Advisor (committee chair) | Tambe, Milind |
| Advisor (committee member) |
John, Richard S. Maheswaran, Rajiv T. |
| Abstract | Security is one of the biggest concerns all around the world. There are only a limited number of resources that can be allocated in security coverage. Terrorists can exploit any pattern of monitoring deployed by the security personnel. It becomes important to make the security pattern unpredictable and randomized. In such a scenario, the security forces can be randomized using algorithms based on Stackelberg games.; Stackelberg games have recently gained significant importance in deployment for real world security. Game-theoretic techniques make a standard assumption that adversaries' actions are perfectly rational. It is a challenging task to account for human behavior in such circumstances.; What becomes more challenging in applying game-theoretic techniques to real-world security problems is the standard assumption that the adversary is perfectly rational in responding to security forces' strategy, which can be unrealistic for human adversaries. Different models in the form of PT, PT-Attract, COBRA, DOBSS and QRE have already been proposed to address the scenario in settings with fixed number of targets. My work focuses on the evaluation of these models when the number of targets is varied, giving rise to an entirely new problem set. |
| Keyword | artificial intelligence; behavioral sciences; game theory; human behavior; COBRA; DOBSS; PT; PT-Attract; QRE; Stackelberg |
| Language | English |
| Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
| Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
| Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
| Type | texts |
| Legacy record ID | usctheses-m3757 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Rights | Goenka, Mohit |
| Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
| Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Filename | etd-Goenka-4204 |
| Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume62/etd-Goenka-4204.pdf |
Description
| Title | Page 16 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Full text | 1 Chapter One: Introduction In Stackelberg games, one player, the leader, commits to a strategy publicly before the remaining players, the followers, make their decision [7]. These types of commitments are necessary for security agents in a number of domains, pertaining to attacker-defender scenarios [1, 2, 11, 15] and Stackelberg games are well-suited to appropriately model these commitments [14, 16]. For example, in airport settings there may be eight terminals serving passengers, as at LAX, but only five bomb sniffing canine units to patrol the terminals. In such a scenario, the canine units are the first one to decide on randomizing their patrolling over the eight terminals. Meanwhile, adversaries may conduct surveillance to act according to this committed strategy of the canine units. It is a well-known fact that game-theoretic approaches make an assumption of perfect rationality which induces errors in the prediction of human behavior for multi-agent decision making problems [3, 5]. Various models are being developed and studied in order to account for the variations in human behavior from the initial assumption of perfect rationality. Behavioral game theory and cognitive science are both fully devoted to this domain. The multi-agent systems community has shown growing interest in adopting these models for decision-making and providing advice to human decision-makers [6, 26]. There has been profound work in improving the computational models of human behavior, especially in the field of security games [27]. Stackelberg games have been able to handle these needs in the best way possible [14, 16, 17, 18]. |
