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219
both predominantly Kazakh (almost 70% in 2009) and its population is split unevenly between the two Hordes, Middle and Great.
Such a cleavage between two major groupings of Kazakhs may have a negative effect on national identity or political stability. The government officials, however, do not see it that way and there is absolutely no debate in public discourse in the country about political or economic role of the Hordes (Amrekulov, 2000) except in historical or cultural context. Astana is intended to overcome any such divisions and so far, it has been successful at masking the Horde competition for resources.318 Alternatively, the Hordes may truly not matter in terms of identity formation – after all, even Nazarbayev coming from the Great Horde married a Middle Horde woman319 and even the act of moving the capital to the territory of the Middle Horde and entailing migration of the Great Horde to the north might be signaling an attempt at erasing the differences. Besides, it is also evident that economically the Hordes do not matter: the richest people in Kazakhstan are not all ethnic Kazakh so it does not seem that the intra-ethnic Kazakh affiliations play a role in achieving ultimate economic payoff, what matters is the relationship with the patronage network headed by Nazarbayev which controls access to pretty much all economic assets in the country. (Olcott M. , 2010, pp. 88-89, 187-188)
As a matter of fact, a writer, literature specialist and sitting Senator emphasized a set of different (non-tribal and non-Horde related) cleavages among the Kazakhs, which
318 As noted in Chapter 1, the Russian and Soviet colonial policies caused much of such rivalry for shrinking resources among the Kazakhs in the past, as well.
319 Practice of exogamy is one of the most fundamental traditions of the Kazakh nomads
Object Description
| Title | Market reforms, foreign direct investment and national identity: Non-national identity of Kazakhstan |
| Author | Zhanalin, Azamat |
| Author email | janalin_a@yahoo.com; zhanalin@gmail.com |
| Degree | Doctor of Philosophy |
| Document type | Dissertation |
| Degree program | International Relations |
| School | College of Letters, Arts and Sciences |
| Date defended/completed | 2011-03-22 |
| Date submitted | 2011 |
| Restricted until | Unrestricted |
| Date published | 2011-04-29 |
| Advisor (committee chair) | English, Robert |
| Advisor (committee member) |
James, Patrick Rorlich, Azade-Ayse |
| Abstract | The present study offers an analysis of the concept of non-national identity in application to the Republic of Kazakhstan as the most likely case. The primary hypothesis is that newly independent states, which are undergoing a rapid transition to market economy and actively pursue integration in the world economy and foreign direct investment, will experience fragmentation of their national identity, defined as non-national identity.; Three sites in Kazakhstan, Almaty, Astana and Aktau, were chosen for the study as representative of the market reforms in the republic as well as the best examples of the country’s pursuit of foreign direct investment and integration into the global economy. The data collected indicates that while Kazakhstan does demonstrate fragmentation of its national identity, it is not necessarily caused by the market reforms and the participation in the global trade. Alternative causal variables such as the Soviet and Russian colonial legacy, intra-ethnic cleavages among the Kazakhs and the prevalence of multi-vector foreign policy were found to contribute to the development of non-national identity of Kazakhstan. The study’s results also suggest that in the last few years, Kazakh identity is experiencing a rather strong revival as well, which may yet counteract the existing factors leading to the emergence of the non-national identity of Kazakhstan. |
| Keyword | identity; nationalism; Kazakhstan; market reforms; globalization; foreign direct investment; national identity; countries in transition; foreign policy; culture; former Soviet Union; Central Asia; patronage networks; energy; oil; post-colonial legacy; nation-state |
| Geographic subject (city or populated place) | Almaty; Astana; Aktau |
| Geographic subject (country) | Kazakhstan |
| Coverage date | 1970/2010 |
| Language | English |
| Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
| Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
| Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
| Type | texts |
| Legacy record ID | usctheses-m3812 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Rights | Zhanalin, Azamat |
| Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
| Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Filename | etd-Zhanalin-4506 |
| Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume51/etd-Zhanalin-4506.pdf |
Description
| Title | Page 225 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Full text | 219 both predominantly Kazakh (almost 70% in 2009) and its population is split unevenly between the two Hordes, Middle and Great. Such a cleavage between two major groupings of Kazakhs may have a negative effect on national identity or political stability. The government officials, however, do not see it that way and there is absolutely no debate in public discourse in the country about political or economic role of the Hordes (Amrekulov, 2000) except in historical or cultural context. Astana is intended to overcome any such divisions and so far, it has been successful at masking the Horde competition for resources.318 Alternatively, the Hordes may truly not matter in terms of identity formation – after all, even Nazarbayev coming from the Great Horde married a Middle Horde woman319 and even the act of moving the capital to the territory of the Middle Horde and entailing migration of the Great Horde to the north might be signaling an attempt at erasing the differences. Besides, it is also evident that economically the Hordes do not matter: the richest people in Kazakhstan are not all ethnic Kazakh so it does not seem that the intra-ethnic Kazakh affiliations play a role in achieving ultimate economic payoff, what matters is the relationship with the patronage network headed by Nazarbayev which controls access to pretty much all economic assets in the country. (Olcott M. , 2010, pp. 88-89, 187-188) As a matter of fact, a writer, literature specialist and sitting Senator emphasized a set of different (non-tribal and non-Horde related) cleavages among the Kazakhs, which 318 As noted in Chapter 1, the Russian and Soviet colonial policies caused much of such rivalry for shrinking resources among the Kazakhs in the past, as well. 319 Practice of exogamy is one of the most fundamental traditions of the Kazakh nomads |
