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206
control from the authorities (Gunn, 2003, p. 405) with parallel (unofficial) Islam functioning outside of the watchful eye of the Soviet government (Ilkhamov, 2001, p. 42).
The Republic of Kazakhstan, a secular state, one that acknowledges the separation of state and church, nevertheless is committed to ensuring the freedom of religious practice among its citizens. Mosques are playing an increasingly important role in retrieving the religious culture of the Kazakhs and shaping their new identity and are being built in large numbers throughout the republic.299 The government does recognize Muslim legacy, with ethnic Kazakh political leadership paying homage to Islamic religious events. Still, by virtue of being raised and indoctrinated in the “evil” nature of politicized religion, the political leadership of Kazakhstan is also very quick to prohibit any forms of political religious organizations or anything deemed to be related to religious extremism. (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2010) On the one hand, Nazarbayev and his government, coached in strict anti-religious and secular Soviet school of administration retain strong disdain for the political role of religion and Islam in particular, thus remaining particularly secular. (Aitken, 2009, pp. 198-200) On the other, Islamic traditions and beliefs are frequently referenced in various public events and official rhetoric. The Islamic identity is rigorously reconstructed in Kazakhstan as the basis of the national identity of the nation – not only by the government but also by the intellectual elite as well. (Rorlich, 2003)
299 Not least because of the Arab funding to that end
Object Description
| Title | Market reforms, foreign direct investment and national identity: Non-national identity of Kazakhstan |
| Author | Zhanalin, Azamat |
| Author email | janalin_a@yahoo.com; zhanalin@gmail.com |
| Degree | Doctor of Philosophy |
| Document type | Dissertation |
| Degree program | International Relations |
| School | College of Letters, Arts and Sciences |
| Date defended/completed | 2011-03-22 |
| Date submitted | 2011 |
| Restricted until | Unrestricted |
| Date published | 2011-04-29 |
| Advisor (committee chair) | English, Robert |
| Advisor (committee member) |
James, Patrick Rorlich, Azade-Ayse |
| Abstract | The present study offers an analysis of the concept of non-national identity in application to the Republic of Kazakhstan as the most likely case. The primary hypothesis is that newly independent states, which are undergoing a rapid transition to market economy and actively pursue integration in the world economy and foreign direct investment, will experience fragmentation of their national identity, defined as non-national identity.; Three sites in Kazakhstan, Almaty, Astana and Aktau, were chosen for the study as representative of the market reforms in the republic as well as the best examples of the country’s pursuit of foreign direct investment and integration into the global economy. The data collected indicates that while Kazakhstan does demonstrate fragmentation of its national identity, it is not necessarily caused by the market reforms and the participation in the global trade. Alternative causal variables such as the Soviet and Russian colonial legacy, intra-ethnic cleavages among the Kazakhs and the prevalence of multi-vector foreign policy were found to contribute to the development of non-national identity of Kazakhstan. The study’s results also suggest that in the last few years, Kazakh identity is experiencing a rather strong revival as well, which may yet counteract the existing factors leading to the emergence of the non-national identity of Kazakhstan. |
| Keyword | identity; nationalism; Kazakhstan; market reforms; globalization; foreign direct investment; national identity; countries in transition; foreign policy; culture; former Soviet Union; Central Asia; patronage networks; energy; oil; post-colonial legacy; nation-state |
| Geographic subject (city or populated place) | Almaty; Astana; Aktau |
| Geographic subject (country) | Kazakhstan |
| Coverage date | 1970/2010 |
| Language | English |
| Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
| Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
| Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
| Type | texts |
| Legacy record ID | usctheses-m3812 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Rights | Zhanalin, Azamat |
| Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
| Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Filename | etd-Zhanalin-4506 |
| Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume51/etd-Zhanalin-4506.pdf |
Description
| Title | Page 212 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Full text | 206 control from the authorities (Gunn, 2003, p. 405) with parallel (unofficial) Islam functioning outside of the watchful eye of the Soviet government (Ilkhamov, 2001, p. 42). The Republic of Kazakhstan, a secular state, one that acknowledges the separation of state and church, nevertheless is committed to ensuring the freedom of religious practice among its citizens. Mosques are playing an increasingly important role in retrieving the religious culture of the Kazakhs and shaping their new identity and are being built in large numbers throughout the republic.299 The government does recognize Muslim legacy, with ethnic Kazakh political leadership paying homage to Islamic religious events. Still, by virtue of being raised and indoctrinated in the “evil” nature of politicized religion, the political leadership of Kazakhstan is also very quick to prohibit any forms of political religious organizations or anything deemed to be related to religious extremism. (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2010) On the one hand, Nazarbayev and his government, coached in strict anti-religious and secular Soviet school of administration retain strong disdain for the political role of religion and Islam in particular, thus remaining particularly secular. (Aitken, 2009, pp. 198-200) On the other, Islamic traditions and beliefs are frequently referenced in various public events and official rhetoric. The Islamic identity is rigorously reconstructed in Kazakhstan as the basis of the national identity of the nation – not only by the government but also by the intellectual elite as well. (Rorlich, 2003) 299 Not least because of the Arab funding to that end |
