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186
northern Kazakhstan with Russia. (Olcott M. , 2010, p. 76) If the north were to secede to Russia, the other parts of country could have followed the suit, as Turkmenistan had a claim for Mangystau, Uzbekistan for part of southern Kazakhstan and China – for parts of eastern Kazakhstan.
253 The Kazakhs risked losing their homeland once again.
It was imperative for the government of Kazakhstan not only to counteract the separatist tendencies in the Russian-dominated north of the republic but also to protect its nascent sovereignty and, indeed, to insure the survival of the state. Moving the capital and ensuing relocation of personnel, attracting labor migration from the Kazakh dominated south into the growing city would lessen the probability of secession or maybe even change the ethnic composition of the northern regions. This would reinforce the claim to sovereignty and give the regime time needed to resolve the border diputes.
Of course, the government of Kazakhstan and Nazarbayev who positioned himself as the champion of inter-ethnic stability and cooperation from the moment he gained power, could never have made these concerns public.254 Yet, it is quite clear that most of the official explanations do not stand the test of time. First of all, Almaty continues to expand even though it is no longer the capital of the republic. Thanks to the economic power it has accumulated, it continues to grow at the record pace even though not as fast as Astana or even Mangystau, it would have been able to accommodate the
253 All of these territorial claims and disputes were not resolved until a few years after the capital has been moved. (Amanzholova, Atanov, & Turarbekov, 2006)
254 Nazarbayev does acknowledge the various criticisms and unofficial explanations for the move and yet neither denies nor confirms their validity (Nazarbayev N. , 2006, pp. 345-348)
Object Description
| Title | Market reforms, foreign direct investment and national identity: Non-national identity of Kazakhstan |
| Author | Zhanalin, Azamat |
| Author email | janalin_a@yahoo.com; zhanalin@gmail.com |
| Degree | Doctor of Philosophy |
| Document type | Dissertation |
| Degree program | International Relations |
| School | College of Letters, Arts and Sciences |
| Date defended/completed | 2011-03-22 |
| Date submitted | 2011 |
| Restricted until | Unrestricted |
| Date published | 2011-04-29 |
| Advisor (committee chair) | English, Robert |
| Advisor (committee member) |
James, Patrick Rorlich, Azade-Ayse |
| Abstract | The present study offers an analysis of the concept of non-national identity in application to the Republic of Kazakhstan as the most likely case. The primary hypothesis is that newly independent states, which are undergoing a rapid transition to market economy and actively pursue integration in the world economy and foreign direct investment, will experience fragmentation of their national identity, defined as non-national identity.; Three sites in Kazakhstan, Almaty, Astana and Aktau, were chosen for the study as representative of the market reforms in the republic as well as the best examples of the country’s pursuit of foreign direct investment and integration into the global economy. The data collected indicates that while Kazakhstan does demonstrate fragmentation of its national identity, it is not necessarily caused by the market reforms and the participation in the global trade. Alternative causal variables such as the Soviet and Russian colonial legacy, intra-ethnic cleavages among the Kazakhs and the prevalence of multi-vector foreign policy were found to contribute to the development of non-national identity of Kazakhstan. The study’s results also suggest that in the last few years, Kazakh identity is experiencing a rather strong revival as well, which may yet counteract the existing factors leading to the emergence of the non-national identity of Kazakhstan. |
| Keyword | identity; nationalism; Kazakhstan; market reforms; globalization; foreign direct investment; national identity; countries in transition; foreign policy; culture; former Soviet Union; Central Asia; patronage networks; energy; oil; post-colonial legacy; nation-state |
| Geographic subject (city or populated place) | Almaty; Astana; Aktau |
| Geographic subject (country) | Kazakhstan |
| Coverage date | 1970/2010 |
| Language | English |
| Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
| Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
| Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
| Type | texts |
| Legacy record ID | usctheses-m3812 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Rights | Zhanalin, Azamat |
| Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
| Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Filename | etd-Zhanalin-4506 |
| Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume51/etd-Zhanalin-4506.pdf |
Description
| Title | Page 192 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Full text | 186 northern Kazakhstan with Russia. (Olcott M. , 2010, p. 76) If the north were to secede to Russia, the other parts of country could have followed the suit, as Turkmenistan had a claim for Mangystau, Uzbekistan for part of southern Kazakhstan and China – for parts of eastern Kazakhstan. 253 The Kazakhs risked losing their homeland once again. It was imperative for the government of Kazakhstan not only to counteract the separatist tendencies in the Russian-dominated north of the republic but also to protect its nascent sovereignty and, indeed, to insure the survival of the state. Moving the capital and ensuing relocation of personnel, attracting labor migration from the Kazakh dominated south into the growing city would lessen the probability of secession or maybe even change the ethnic composition of the northern regions. This would reinforce the claim to sovereignty and give the regime time needed to resolve the border diputes. Of course, the government of Kazakhstan and Nazarbayev who positioned himself as the champion of inter-ethnic stability and cooperation from the moment he gained power, could never have made these concerns public.254 Yet, it is quite clear that most of the official explanations do not stand the test of time. First of all, Almaty continues to expand even though it is no longer the capital of the republic. Thanks to the economic power it has accumulated, it continues to grow at the record pace even though not as fast as Astana or even Mangystau, it would have been able to accommodate the 253 All of these territorial claims and disputes were not resolved until a few years after the capital has been moved. (Amanzholova, Atanov, & Turarbekov, 2006) 254 Nazarbayev does acknowledge the various criticisms and unofficial explanations for the move and yet neither denies nor confirms their validity (Nazarbayev N. , 2006, pp. 345-348) |
