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57
elite behavior
66 and as such presents a puzzle in analyzing the process of fragmentation of national identity in Kazakhstan.
It could be explained from the non-nation state perspective. The concept of non-nation state in this context refers to the idea that the spread of globalization introduces the rules of market relations into the very core of identity formation, supplanting mythical, genealogical, constructed sense of community with purely rational-choice relations based on economic and political payoffs that transcend ethnic and sub-ethnic allegiances. In other words, ethnicity becomes more of a corporate enterprise rather than an “imagined community,” i.e. nation. (Anderson, 1991) The basic shared values and perceptions of such a community are substituted or constructed in terms of market economic values rather than those of common identity and cultural preferences. This is not a duplication of rational choice theory, but rather a challenge that market economy presents to national identity in newly independent states in the era of globalization, as Migdal’s article suggests. (2004) That is, the rationality of market economy is in itself a set of norms and values that are being transposed on the communal identity in Kazakhstan.
This resonates with Uslaner’s analysis of moralized and strategic trust. (2002) In Uslaner’s terms, what Kazakhstan is experiencing now is the decline of moralistic trust due to the transition to market economy and attendant growth of economic inequality,
66 There are a few explanations that attempt to address this seemingly strange contestation within patronage networks rather than from outside – see Hale (2005), Junisbai & Junisbai (2005), but none of these seem to be satisfactory: Hale’s “lame-duck syndrome” of a weak and unpopular president does not apply in Kazakhstan, and Junisbai and Junisbai’s emergence of pro-democratic beliefs among members of the patronage networks seem to be counter-intuitive since elite opposition is more likely to be trying to rearrange these networks rather than undermine them.
Object Description
| Title | Market reforms, foreign direct investment and national identity: Non-national identity of Kazakhstan |
| Author | Zhanalin, Azamat |
| Author email | janalin_a@yahoo.com; zhanalin@gmail.com |
| Degree | Doctor of Philosophy |
| Document type | Dissertation |
| Degree program | International Relations |
| School | College of Letters, Arts and Sciences |
| Date defended/completed | 2011-03-22 |
| Date submitted | 2011 |
| Restricted until | Unrestricted |
| Date published | 2011-04-29 |
| Advisor (committee chair) | English, Robert |
| Advisor (committee member) |
James, Patrick Rorlich, Azade-Ayse |
| Abstract | The present study offers an analysis of the concept of non-national identity in application to the Republic of Kazakhstan as the most likely case. The primary hypothesis is that newly independent states, which are undergoing a rapid transition to market economy and actively pursue integration in the world economy and foreign direct investment, will experience fragmentation of their national identity, defined as non-national identity.; Three sites in Kazakhstan, Almaty, Astana and Aktau, were chosen for the study as representative of the market reforms in the republic as well as the best examples of the country’s pursuit of foreign direct investment and integration into the global economy. The data collected indicates that while Kazakhstan does demonstrate fragmentation of its national identity, it is not necessarily caused by the market reforms and the participation in the global trade. Alternative causal variables such as the Soviet and Russian colonial legacy, intra-ethnic cleavages among the Kazakhs and the prevalence of multi-vector foreign policy were found to contribute to the development of non-national identity of Kazakhstan. The study’s results also suggest that in the last few years, Kazakh identity is experiencing a rather strong revival as well, which may yet counteract the existing factors leading to the emergence of the non-national identity of Kazakhstan. |
| Keyword | identity; nationalism; Kazakhstan; market reforms; globalization; foreign direct investment; national identity; countries in transition; foreign policy; culture; former Soviet Union; Central Asia; patronage networks; energy; oil; post-colonial legacy; nation-state |
| Geographic subject (city or populated place) | Almaty; Astana; Aktau |
| Geographic subject (country) | Kazakhstan |
| Coverage date | 1970/2010 |
| Language | English |
| Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
| Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
| Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
| Type | texts |
| Legacy record ID | usctheses-m3812 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Rights | Zhanalin, Azamat |
| Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
| Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Filename | etd-Zhanalin-4506 |
| Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume51/etd-Zhanalin-4506.pdf |
Description
| Title | Page 63 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Full text | 57 elite behavior 66 and as such presents a puzzle in analyzing the process of fragmentation of national identity in Kazakhstan. It could be explained from the non-nation state perspective. The concept of non-nation state in this context refers to the idea that the spread of globalization introduces the rules of market relations into the very core of identity formation, supplanting mythical, genealogical, constructed sense of community with purely rational-choice relations based on economic and political payoffs that transcend ethnic and sub-ethnic allegiances. In other words, ethnicity becomes more of a corporate enterprise rather than an “imagined community,” i.e. nation. (Anderson, 1991) The basic shared values and perceptions of such a community are substituted or constructed in terms of market economic values rather than those of common identity and cultural preferences. This is not a duplication of rational choice theory, but rather a challenge that market economy presents to national identity in newly independent states in the era of globalization, as Migdal’s article suggests. (2004) That is, the rationality of market economy is in itself a set of norms and values that are being transposed on the communal identity in Kazakhstan. This resonates with Uslaner’s analysis of moralized and strategic trust. (2002) In Uslaner’s terms, what Kazakhstan is experiencing now is the decline of moralistic trust due to the transition to market economy and attendant growth of economic inequality, 66 There are a few explanations that attempt to address this seemingly strange contestation within patronage networks rather than from outside – see Hale (2005), Junisbai & Junisbai (2005), but none of these seem to be satisfactory: Hale’s “lame-duck syndrome” of a weak and unpopular president does not apply in Kazakhstan, and Junisbai and Junisbai’s emergence of pro-democratic beliefs among members of the patronage networks seem to be counter-intuitive since elite opposition is more likely to be trying to rearrange these networks rather than undermine them. |
