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37
The environmental and human cost of the nuclear testing was extremely high and the movement quickly gathered significant support in the Kazakh SSR and elsewhere. However, its leader Olzhas Suleimenov, an ethnic Kazakh, was a member of Communist party and did not seek revival of Kazakh identity, let alone sovereignty, firmly guiding the Nevada-Semipalatinsk toward retaining the union with Russia. (Dave, 2007, p. 91) Therefore, the Kazakhs were unable to develop a strong national movement by the time of independence, failing to utilize the momentum of Zheltoqsan and openness of Perestroika to reassert their identity, culture and language.
In many respects, the situation with national movement in Kazakhstan mirrored that in other republics of Central Asia. Uzbekistan’s Birlik and Erk movements were unable to gather enough support, too, due to the lack of support from above (Olcott M. B., 1994, p. 210) and multiple internal divisions among the Uzbeks from below52 (Gleason, 1993). Thus, even though Uzbekistan was 71% Uzbek (Gleason, 1993, p. 338), like the Kazakhs, they were unable to develop a popular pro-independence movement. The general disinclination of the Central Asian republics and their people to seek independence from the Soviet Union in the late 1980s is demonstrated by the fact that in the 1991 referendum about the preservation of the Union of the Republics, the voters in Central Asian states were overwhelmingly in favor, more so than in Russia, Ukraine and Belorussia. (Nazarov, 2006)
52 Erk was actually established by a Birlik’s splinter faction
Object Description
| Title | Market reforms, foreign direct investment and national identity: Non-national identity of Kazakhstan |
| Author | Zhanalin, Azamat |
| Author email | janalin_a@yahoo.com; zhanalin@gmail.com |
| Degree | Doctor of Philosophy |
| Document type | Dissertation |
| Degree program | International Relations |
| School | College of Letters, Arts and Sciences |
| Date defended/completed | 2011-03-22 |
| Date submitted | 2011 |
| Restricted until | Unrestricted |
| Date published | 2011-04-29 |
| Advisor (committee chair) | English, Robert |
| Advisor (committee member) |
James, Patrick Rorlich, Azade-Ayse |
| Abstract | The present study offers an analysis of the concept of non-national identity in application to the Republic of Kazakhstan as the most likely case. The primary hypothesis is that newly independent states, which are undergoing a rapid transition to market economy and actively pursue integration in the world economy and foreign direct investment, will experience fragmentation of their national identity, defined as non-national identity.; Three sites in Kazakhstan, Almaty, Astana and Aktau, were chosen for the study as representative of the market reforms in the republic as well as the best examples of the country’s pursuit of foreign direct investment and integration into the global economy. The data collected indicates that while Kazakhstan does demonstrate fragmentation of its national identity, it is not necessarily caused by the market reforms and the participation in the global trade. Alternative causal variables such as the Soviet and Russian colonial legacy, intra-ethnic cleavages among the Kazakhs and the prevalence of multi-vector foreign policy were found to contribute to the development of non-national identity of Kazakhstan. The study’s results also suggest that in the last few years, Kazakh identity is experiencing a rather strong revival as well, which may yet counteract the existing factors leading to the emergence of the non-national identity of Kazakhstan. |
| Keyword | identity; nationalism; Kazakhstan; market reforms; globalization; foreign direct investment; national identity; countries in transition; foreign policy; culture; former Soviet Union; Central Asia; patronage networks; energy; oil; post-colonial legacy; nation-state |
| Geographic subject (city or populated place) | Almaty; Astana; Aktau |
| Geographic subject (country) | Kazakhstan |
| Coverage date | 1970/2010 |
| Language | English |
| Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
| Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
| Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
| Type | texts |
| Legacy record ID | usctheses-m3812 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Rights | Zhanalin, Azamat |
| Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
| Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Filename | etd-Zhanalin-4506 |
| Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume51/etd-Zhanalin-4506.pdf |
Description
| Title | Page 43 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Full text | 37 The environmental and human cost of the nuclear testing was extremely high and the movement quickly gathered significant support in the Kazakh SSR and elsewhere. However, its leader Olzhas Suleimenov, an ethnic Kazakh, was a member of Communist party and did not seek revival of Kazakh identity, let alone sovereignty, firmly guiding the Nevada-Semipalatinsk toward retaining the union with Russia. (Dave, 2007, p. 91) Therefore, the Kazakhs were unable to develop a strong national movement by the time of independence, failing to utilize the momentum of Zheltoqsan and openness of Perestroika to reassert their identity, culture and language. In many respects, the situation with national movement in Kazakhstan mirrored that in other republics of Central Asia. Uzbekistan’s Birlik and Erk movements were unable to gather enough support, too, due to the lack of support from above (Olcott M. B., 1994, p. 210) and multiple internal divisions among the Uzbeks from below52 (Gleason, 1993). Thus, even though Uzbekistan was 71% Uzbek (Gleason, 1993, p. 338), like the Kazakhs, they were unable to develop a popular pro-independence movement. The general disinclination of the Central Asian republics and their people to seek independence from the Soviet Union in the late 1980s is demonstrated by the fact that in the 1991 referendum about the preservation of the Union of the Republics, the voters in Central Asian states were overwhelmingly in favor, more so than in Russia, Ukraine and Belorussia. (Nazarov, 2006) 52 Erk was actually established by a Birlik’s splinter faction |
