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141
The schedule included deadlines for implementing each provision in the plan, and a
tracking system to monitor the progress.72
There are 180 individual action items assigned to division commanders
(Baitx 2008). The Mayor and City Council were asked to and approved the plan,
which was then published for dissemination to the community and other stakeholders
(RPD 2004). This put the RPD and City leadership on record, and in the judgment,
as agreeing to continue the reforms for several years after the end of the injunction
(Verdugo 2008; Brann 2008). After the dissolution of the consent decree, Chief
Leach transformed the Attorney General Compliance Task Force, which was
responsible for coordinating the implementation of the stipulated judgment, into the
Audit and Compliance Bureau to coordinate the implementation of the Strategic
Plan. The plan, the responsibility schedule, and the community and Council
approval created an effective accountability system.
This was a clever and skillful achievement by the AG’s Office and supported
by Chief Leach, who was highly invested in the continuation of the reforms. The
initial rationale by the AG’s Office for demanding a consent decree was to ensure
that changes in the AG, City Council, Police Chief or City Manager would not affect
the reforms. The strategic plan served as a compact between the entire community
of Riverside, ensuring that implementation of the police reforms would last longer
that the AG’s involvement in Riverside, thus giving the reforms more time to take
hold and solidify. The unwinding of the reforms became more difficult with the
72 The process is regularly charted and monitored on an extensive spreadsheet dubbed “the Matrix.”
Object Description
| Title | Policing accountability: an empirical investigation of state-sponsored police reform in Riverside, California |
| Author | Gomez, Jose Adolfo |
| Author email | jagclash@yahoo.com; jgomez@treasurer.ca.gov |
| Degree | Doctor of Philosophy |
| Document type | Dissertation |
| Degree program | Political Science |
| School | College of Letters, Arts and Sciences |
| Date defended/completed | 2008-08-01 |
| Date submitted | 2008 |
| Restricted until | Restricted until 13 Oct. 2010. |
| Date published | 2010-10-13 |
| Advisor (committee chair) | Renteln, Alison Dundes |
| Advisor (committee member) |
Newland, Chester A. Wong, Janelle S. |
| Abstract | The police have the ability to detain, arrest, and use force when necessary. Police accountability is thus of paramount concern to the public. Numerous examples of police misconduct, including cases of excessive force, brutality, and corruption, appear regularly via the news media. These incidents often evidence systemic organizational problems in law enforcement agencies. Scholars have observed that attempts at police reform have placed too much emphasis on individuals behaving badly, rather than on the systemic problems of the police department.; Beginning in the second half of the 1990s, federal and state Attorneys General began employing institutional reform litigation, in the form of consent decrees, to reform law enforcement agencies and enhance police accountability. The consent decrees were crafted to address systemic organizational dysfunction in local police departments. The United States Department of Justice (USDOJ) conducted most of these reform interventions. However, a notable exception was the settlement agreement between the Attorney General of the State of California and the City of Riverside, California.; There has been little research on the efficacy of these efforts to rehabilitate law enforcement agencies. This analysis is a case study of the effectiveness of the institutional reform intervention by the California Attorney General into the Riverside Police Department (RPD). The detailed examination revealed that the intervention produced constructive changes in the way the RPD conducts its business. The RPD became more professional, effective, transparent and accountable as it implemented the provisions of the consent decree, demonstrating that institutional reform litigation can result in meaningful police reform. The shadow of the law was ever present, encouraging an ethos of cooperation and exerting pressure for meaningful organizational change. The Riverside experience suggests that a facilitative oversight style produces constructive collaboration between the parties, improving the likelihood of durable police reform. Moreover, consent decrees to correct systemic police misconduct should not be the exclusive purview of the USDOJ. State Attorneys General can effectively initiate police reform and in some cases state intervention is a more appropriate alternative. |
| Keyword | institutional reform; police reform; police accountability; state attorney's general; police misconduct; organizational change; consent decrees |
| Geographic subject (city or populated place) | Riverside |
| Geographic subject (state) | California |
| Coverage date | 1993/2008 |
| Language | English |
| Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
| Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
| Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
| Type | texts |
| Legacy record ID | usctheses-m1664 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Rights | Gomez, Jose Adolfo |
| Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
| Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Filename | etd-Gomez-2358 |
| Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume29/etd-Gomez-2358.pdf |
Description
| Title | Page 153 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Full text | 141 The schedule included deadlines for implementing each provision in the plan, and a tracking system to monitor the progress.72 There are 180 individual action items assigned to division commanders (Baitx 2008). The Mayor and City Council were asked to and approved the plan, which was then published for dissemination to the community and other stakeholders (RPD 2004). This put the RPD and City leadership on record, and in the judgment, as agreeing to continue the reforms for several years after the end of the injunction (Verdugo 2008; Brann 2008). After the dissolution of the consent decree, Chief Leach transformed the Attorney General Compliance Task Force, which was responsible for coordinating the implementation of the stipulated judgment, into the Audit and Compliance Bureau to coordinate the implementation of the Strategic Plan. The plan, the responsibility schedule, and the community and Council approval created an effective accountability system. This was a clever and skillful achievement by the AG’s Office and supported by Chief Leach, who was highly invested in the continuation of the reforms. The initial rationale by the AG’s Office for demanding a consent decree was to ensure that changes in the AG, City Council, Police Chief or City Manager would not affect the reforms. The strategic plan served as a compact between the entire community of Riverside, ensuring that implementation of the police reforms would last longer that the AG’s involvement in Riverside, thus giving the reforms more time to take hold and solidify. The unwinding of the reforms became more difficult with the 72 The process is regularly charted and monitored on an extensive spreadsheet dubbed “the Matrix.” |
