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131
The forwarding of misconduct cases to local prosecutors is extremely rare.
Prosecutors and local law enforcement are reluctant to initiate criminal prosecutions,
given their shared interests and close working relationships. Indeed, criminal
prosecutions can give rise to or bolster civil lawsuits against a city (Walker 2005, 34-
35; Human Rights Watch 1998, 8; Cheh 1996, 252). In addition, it is not uncommon
for high-ranking officials to escape accountability.63
One of the key goals of the RPD reforms was management accountability.
The actions of the police department in response to this critical incident were
exemplary, showing a significant change in organizational culture by all levels of the
organization. Officers and leadership exhibited integrity and courage in exposing the
misdeeds. The response to the incident sent a message to the organization that it was
permissible to come forward with evidence of police misconduct, and that officers,
even managers, would be held accountable. It should also be noted that during the
duration of the consent decree, the Police Chief referred at least four additional
cases, unrelated to the above, of alleged misconduct to the District Attorney. Again,
this is atypical.
63 A recent example is the Abu Ghraib prison scandal where U.S. soldiers abused Iraqi prisoners. No
commanding officers were court-marshaled as a result of the scandal. Nine enlisted soldiers, none
higher than a staff sergeant, were court-marshaled. Most received prison sentences ranging from six
months to ten years.
Object Description
| Title | Policing accountability: an empirical investigation of state-sponsored police reform in Riverside, California |
| Author | Gomez, Jose Adolfo |
| Author email | jagclash@yahoo.com; jgomez@treasurer.ca.gov |
| Degree | Doctor of Philosophy |
| Document type | Dissertation |
| Degree program | Political Science |
| School | College of Letters, Arts and Sciences |
| Date defended/completed | 2008-08-01 |
| Date submitted | 2008 |
| Restricted until | Restricted until 13 Oct. 2010. |
| Date published | 2010-10-13 |
| Advisor (committee chair) | Renteln, Alison Dundes |
| Advisor (committee member) |
Newland, Chester A. Wong, Janelle S. |
| Abstract | The police have the ability to detain, arrest, and use force when necessary. Police accountability is thus of paramount concern to the public. Numerous examples of police misconduct, including cases of excessive force, brutality, and corruption, appear regularly via the news media. These incidents often evidence systemic organizational problems in law enforcement agencies. Scholars have observed that attempts at police reform have placed too much emphasis on individuals behaving badly, rather than on the systemic problems of the police department.; Beginning in the second half of the 1990s, federal and state Attorneys General began employing institutional reform litigation, in the form of consent decrees, to reform law enforcement agencies and enhance police accountability. The consent decrees were crafted to address systemic organizational dysfunction in local police departments. The United States Department of Justice (USDOJ) conducted most of these reform interventions. However, a notable exception was the settlement agreement between the Attorney General of the State of California and the City of Riverside, California.; There has been little research on the efficacy of these efforts to rehabilitate law enforcement agencies. This analysis is a case study of the effectiveness of the institutional reform intervention by the California Attorney General into the Riverside Police Department (RPD). The detailed examination revealed that the intervention produced constructive changes in the way the RPD conducts its business. The RPD became more professional, effective, transparent and accountable as it implemented the provisions of the consent decree, demonstrating that institutional reform litigation can result in meaningful police reform. The shadow of the law was ever present, encouraging an ethos of cooperation and exerting pressure for meaningful organizational change. The Riverside experience suggests that a facilitative oversight style produces constructive collaboration between the parties, improving the likelihood of durable police reform. Moreover, consent decrees to correct systemic police misconduct should not be the exclusive purview of the USDOJ. State Attorneys General can effectively initiate police reform and in some cases state intervention is a more appropriate alternative. |
| Keyword | institutional reform; police reform; police accountability; state attorney's general; police misconduct; organizational change; consent decrees |
| Geographic subject (city or populated place) | Riverside |
| Geographic subject (state) | California |
| Coverage date | 1993/2008 |
| Language | English |
| Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
| Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
| Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
| Type | texts |
| Legacy record ID | usctheses-m1664 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Rights | Gomez, Jose Adolfo |
| Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
| Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Filename | etd-Gomez-2358 |
| Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume29/etd-Gomez-2358.pdf |
Description
| Title | Page 143 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Full text | 131 The forwarding of misconduct cases to local prosecutors is extremely rare. Prosecutors and local law enforcement are reluctant to initiate criminal prosecutions, given their shared interests and close working relationships. Indeed, criminal prosecutions can give rise to or bolster civil lawsuits against a city (Walker 2005, 34- 35; Human Rights Watch 1998, 8; Cheh 1996, 252). In addition, it is not uncommon for high-ranking officials to escape accountability.63 One of the key goals of the RPD reforms was management accountability. The actions of the police department in response to this critical incident were exemplary, showing a significant change in organizational culture by all levels of the organization. Officers and leadership exhibited integrity and courage in exposing the misdeeds. The response to the incident sent a message to the organization that it was permissible to come forward with evidence of police misconduct, and that officers, even managers, would be held accountable. It should also be noted that during the duration of the consent decree, the Police Chief referred at least four additional cases, unrelated to the above, of alleged misconduct to the District Attorney. Again, this is atypical. 63 A recent example is the Abu Ghraib prison scandal where U.S. soldiers abused Iraqi prisoners. No commanding officers were court-marshaled as a result of the scandal. Nine enlisted soldiers, none higher than a staff sergeant, were court-marshaled. Most received prison sentences ranging from six months to ten years. |
