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77
Manager John Holmes worried about the RPD’s complaints, “We are a city of
250,000 people, . . . I started wondering why we were having so few [complaints]”
(Thacher 1998, 7). During Fortier’s time as chief, complaints increased. Complaints
again declined after Carroll became chief (19-20).
The decline in complaints during the last several years of Fortier’s tenure as
Chief may have been the result of an orchestrated campaign against his policies and
leadership by the Riverside Police Officers Association (RPOA), the union
representing officers (Ichinaga 2000, 19-20; Thacher 1998). Fortier’s authority and
influence waned during this time. He explained in an interview with the Attorney
General’s Office that “officers were no longer feeling accountable during this
period” (Ichinaga 2000, 20). Complaints continued to decline after Carroll became
Chief and the stings stopped. A Captain explained to investigators that under Carroll
“commanders did not follow the policy” (19). Sergeants ignored the policy as well.
When the random stings ended, officers and their supervisors knew that there was
little chance violations to the complaint policy would be exposed. Further, Carroll
“personally overrode and violated the complaint policy” and “used his authority to
direct Internal Affairs investigations not to be done on some complaints” (19).
Investigators also found that complaints, particularly those dealing with
discrimination, were “inconsistent in terms of thoroughness, objectivity, and
compliance with the guidelines set forth in the RPD’s Conduct and Performance
Manual” (21).
public attempting to file a complaint to determine whether the complaint will be appropriately
processed and investigated.
Object Description
| Title | Policing accountability: an empirical investigation of state-sponsored police reform in Riverside, California |
| Author | Gomez, Jose Adolfo |
| Author email | jagclash@yahoo.com; jgomez@treasurer.ca.gov |
| Degree | Doctor of Philosophy |
| Document type | Dissertation |
| Degree program | Political Science |
| School | College of Letters, Arts and Sciences |
| Date defended/completed | 2008-08-01 |
| Date submitted | 2008 |
| Restricted until | Restricted until 13 Oct. 2010. |
| Date published | 2010-10-13 |
| Advisor (committee chair) | Renteln, Alison Dundes |
| Advisor (committee member) |
Newland, Chester A. Wong, Janelle S. |
| Abstract | The police have the ability to detain, arrest, and use force when necessary. Police accountability is thus of paramount concern to the public. Numerous examples of police misconduct, including cases of excessive force, brutality, and corruption, appear regularly via the news media. These incidents often evidence systemic organizational problems in law enforcement agencies. Scholars have observed that attempts at police reform have placed too much emphasis on individuals behaving badly, rather than on the systemic problems of the police department.; Beginning in the second half of the 1990s, federal and state Attorneys General began employing institutional reform litigation, in the form of consent decrees, to reform law enforcement agencies and enhance police accountability. The consent decrees were crafted to address systemic organizational dysfunction in local police departments. The United States Department of Justice (USDOJ) conducted most of these reform interventions. However, a notable exception was the settlement agreement between the Attorney General of the State of California and the City of Riverside, California.; There has been little research on the efficacy of these efforts to rehabilitate law enforcement agencies. This analysis is a case study of the effectiveness of the institutional reform intervention by the California Attorney General into the Riverside Police Department (RPD). The detailed examination revealed that the intervention produced constructive changes in the way the RPD conducts its business. The RPD became more professional, effective, transparent and accountable as it implemented the provisions of the consent decree, demonstrating that institutional reform litigation can result in meaningful police reform. The shadow of the law was ever present, encouraging an ethos of cooperation and exerting pressure for meaningful organizational change. The Riverside experience suggests that a facilitative oversight style produces constructive collaboration between the parties, improving the likelihood of durable police reform. Moreover, consent decrees to correct systemic police misconduct should not be the exclusive purview of the USDOJ. State Attorneys General can effectively initiate police reform and in some cases state intervention is a more appropriate alternative. |
| Keyword | institutional reform; police reform; police accountability; state attorney's general; police misconduct; organizational change; consent decrees |
| Geographic subject (city or populated place) | Riverside |
| Geographic subject (state) | California |
| Coverage date | 1993/2008 |
| Language | English |
| Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
| Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
| Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
| Type | texts |
| Legacy record ID | usctheses-m1664 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Rights | Gomez, Jose Adolfo |
| Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
| Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Filename | etd-Gomez-2358 |
| Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume29/etd-Gomez-2358.pdf |
Description
| Title | Page 89 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Full text | 77 Manager John Holmes worried about the RPD’s complaints, “We are a city of 250,000 people, . . . I started wondering why we were having so few [complaints]” (Thacher 1998, 7). During Fortier’s time as chief, complaints increased. Complaints again declined after Carroll became chief (19-20). The decline in complaints during the last several years of Fortier’s tenure as Chief may have been the result of an orchestrated campaign against his policies and leadership by the Riverside Police Officers Association (RPOA), the union representing officers (Ichinaga 2000, 19-20; Thacher 1998). Fortier’s authority and influence waned during this time. He explained in an interview with the Attorney General’s Office that “officers were no longer feeling accountable during this period” (Ichinaga 2000, 20). Complaints continued to decline after Carroll became Chief and the stings stopped. A Captain explained to investigators that under Carroll “commanders did not follow the policy” (19). Sergeants ignored the policy as well. When the random stings ended, officers and their supervisors knew that there was little chance violations to the complaint policy would be exposed. Further, Carroll “personally overrode and violated the complaint policy” and “used his authority to direct Internal Affairs investigations not to be done on some complaints” (19). Investigators also found that complaints, particularly those dealing with discrimination, were “inconsistent in terms of thoroughness, objectivity, and compliance with the guidelines set forth in the RPD’s Conduct and Performance Manual” (21). public attempting to file a complaint to determine whether the complaint will be appropriately processed and investigated. |
