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68
30-31). The most significant investigatory finding was the presence of a
dysfunctional organizational culture, deficient in supervision and accountability.
The culture dissuaded officers from reporting officer misconduct by a “pattern of
intimidation, retribution, and harassment, some of it illegal” (5).
Examples cited in the investigative report described the harassment of a
whistleblower, the cover-up of relevant evidence pertaining to the Tyisha Miller
shooting, and retaliatory threats against officers who report misconduct. For
exposing police misconduct, one whistleblower was regularly denied backup
assistance when requested (a common practice when an officer breaks the “code of
silence”29), potentially jeopardizing that officer’s safety. In addition, the officer
received frequent hang-up telephone calls, stink bombs were detonated in his vehicle
and front yard, a dead frog was placed in his vehicle, and he struggled to
communicate over the police radio as other officers spoke over him,30 again
endangering the officer’s safety (16-17).
In addition, the Lieutenant who brought to light the racial slurs that were
uttered immediately following the Miller shooting, and who cooperated with the
District Attorney’s investigators, experienced retaliatory acts of violence including
29 Also referred to as the “Blue Code of Silence,” the “Blue Wall of Silence,” and the “Thin Blue
Line.” According to Samuel Walker, “For decades, experts on police misconduct have argued that the
greatest single obstacle to investigating alleged misconduct incidents and achieving accountability is
the refusal of other officers to cooperate with investigations. This includes investigations related to
citizen complaints, internal police department investigations, and criminal investigations by
prosecutors. The so-called ‘code of silence’ involves four distinct actions: not reporting misconduct
by other officers, falsely claiming not to have seen the events in question, actively lying to
investigators, and colluding with other officers to create a cover story” (Walker 2005, 82).
30 Officers refer to this as being “covered” or “covering.”
Object Description
| Title | Policing accountability: an empirical investigation of state-sponsored police reform in Riverside, California |
| Author | Gomez, Jose Adolfo |
| Author email | jagclash@yahoo.com; jgomez@treasurer.ca.gov |
| Degree | Doctor of Philosophy |
| Document type | Dissertation |
| Degree program | Political Science |
| School | College of Letters, Arts and Sciences |
| Date defended/completed | 2008-08-01 |
| Date submitted | 2008 |
| Restricted until | Restricted until 13 Oct. 2010. |
| Date published | 2010-10-13 |
| Advisor (committee chair) | Renteln, Alison Dundes |
| Advisor (committee member) |
Newland, Chester A. Wong, Janelle S. |
| Abstract | The police have the ability to detain, arrest, and use force when necessary. Police accountability is thus of paramount concern to the public. Numerous examples of police misconduct, including cases of excessive force, brutality, and corruption, appear regularly via the news media. These incidents often evidence systemic organizational problems in law enforcement agencies. Scholars have observed that attempts at police reform have placed too much emphasis on individuals behaving badly, rather than on the systemic problems of the police department.; Beginning in the second half of the 1990s, federal and state Attorneys General began employing institutional reform litigation, in the form of consent decrees, to reform law enforcement agencies and enhance police accountability. The consent decrees were crafted to address systemic organizational dysfunction in local police departments. The United States Department of Justice (USDOJ) conducted most of these reform interventions. However, a notable exception was the settlement agreement between the Attorney General of the State of California and the City of Riverside, California.; There has been little research on the efficacy of these efforts to rehabilitate law enforcement agencies. This analysis is a case study of the effectiveness of the institutional reform intervention by the California Attorney General into the Riverside Police Department (RPD). The detailed examination revealed that the intervention produced constructive changes in the way the RPD conducts its business. The RPD became more professional, effective, transparent and accountable as it implemented the provisions of the consent decree, demonstrating that institutional reform litigation can result in meaningful police reform. The shadow of the law was ever present, encouraging an ethos of cooperation and exerting pressure for meaningful organizational change. The Riverside experience suggests that a facilitative oversight style produces constructive collaboration between the parties, improving the likelihood of durable police reform. Moreover, consent decrees to correct systemic police misconduct should not be the exclusive purview of the USDOJ. State Attorneys General can effectively initiate police reform and in some cases state intervention is a more appropriate alternative. |
| Keyword | institutional reform; police reform; police accountability; state attorney's general; police misconduct; organizational change; consent decrees |
| Geographic subject (city or populated place) | Riverside |
| Geographic subject (state) | California |
| Coverage date | 1993/2008 |
| Language | English |
| Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
| Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
| Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
| Type | texts |
| Legacy record ID | usctheses-m1664 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Rights | Gomez, Jose Adolfo |
| Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
| Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Filename | etd-Gomez-2358 |
| Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume29/etd-Gomez-2358.pdf |
Description
| Title | Page 80 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Full text | 68 30-31). The most significant investigatory finding was the presence of a dysfunctional organizational culture, deficient in supervision and accountability. The culture dissuaded officers from reporting officer misconduct by a “pattern of intimidation, retribution, and harassment, some of it illegal” (5). Examples cited in the investigative report described the harassment of a whistleblower, the cover-up of relevant evidence pertaining to the Tyisha Miller shooting, and retaliatory threats against officers who report misconduct. For exposing police misconduct, one whistleblower was regularly denied backup assistance when requested (a common practice when an officer breaks the “code of silence”29), potentially jeopardizing that officer’s safety. In addition, the officer received frequent hang-up telephone calls, stink bombs were detonated in his vehicle and front yard, a dead frog was placed in his vehicle, and he struggled to communicate over the police radio as other officers spoke over him,30 again endangering the officer’s safety (16-17). In addition, the Lieutenant who brought to light the racial slurs that were uttered immediately following the Miller shooting, and who cooperated with the District Attorney’s investigators, experienced retaliatory acts of violence including 29 Also referred to as the “Blue Code of Silence,” the “Blue Wall of Silence,” and the “Thin Blue Line.” According to Samuel Walker, “For decades, experts on police misconduct have argued that the greatest single obstacle to investigating alleged misconduct incidents and achieving accountability is the refusal of other officers to cooperate with investigations. This includes investigations related to citizen complaints, internal police department investigations, and criminal investigations by prosecutors. The so-called ‘code of silence’ involves four distinct actions: not reporting misconduct by other officers, falsely claiming not to have seen the events in question, actively lying to investigators, and colluding with other officers to create a cover story” (Walker 2005, 82). 30 Officers refer to this as being “covered” or “covering.” |
