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42
broken windows concept of cracking down on minor infractions—squeegeeing,
panhandling, subway fare beating, and graffiti – that bring disorder and lead to more
serious crimes if left unchecked (Walker 1999, 172).
During Bratton’s tenure as police commissioner, subway felonies declined
75% and robberies 64% (Kelling and Coles 1996, 152), while murder rates
plummeted to a 30-year low (Walker 1999, 172). Some commentators contend that
this tough enforcement policy resulted in the sharp reduction in crime (Kelling and
Coles 1996, 155; Bratton and Knobler 1998, 156). In discussing New York’s
crackdown on fare evasion, Bratton claims that mobilizing a “Bust Bus” – a “mobile
district station” where arrests could be made on the spot – reduced not just the actual
crime of fare evasion, but had a broader ameliorative effect (Bratton and Knobler
1998, 155).
And so crime, disorder and fare evasion began to go down . . . . We had
reduced fare evasion, motivated the cops, streamlined the arrest process, and
increased police productivity; we had involved the public, increased their
attention, and won their approval; we had controlled disorder and achieved a
decrease in crime. All from arresting people for a buck-fifteen crime. We
were proving the Broken Windows theory (156).
However, opponents of this zero-tolerance policy claim that NYPD’s methods led to
spikes in public complaints and several well-publicized instances of extreme police
brutality, such as the torture of Abner Louima and the forty-one shot killing of
Amadou Diallo. Further, most major cities experienced reductions in crime during
the same period (Walker 1999, 172-173).
Object Description
| Title | Policing accountability: an empirical investigation of state-sponsored police reform in Riverside, California |
| Author | Gomez, Jose Adolfo |
| Author email | jagclash@yahoo.com; jgomez@treasurer.ca.gov |
| Degree | Doctor of Philosophy |
| Document type | Dissertation |
| Degree program | Political Science |
| School | College of Letters, Arts and Sciences |
| Date defended/completed | 2008-08-01 |
| Date submitted | 2008 |
| Restricted until | Restricted until 13 Oct. 2010. |
| Date published | 2010-10-13 |
| Advisor (committee chair) | Renteln, Alison Dundes |
| Advisor (committee member) |
Newland, Chester A. Wong, Janelle S. |
| Abstract | The police have the ability to detain, arrest, and use force when necessary. Police accountability is thus of paramount concern to the public. Numerous examples of police misconduct, including cases of excessive force, brutality, and corruption, appear regularly via the news media. These incidents often evidence systemic organizational problems in law enforcement agencies. Scholars have observed that attempts at police reform have placed too much emphasis on individuals behaving badly, rather than on the systemic problems of the police department.; Beginning in the second half of the 1990s, federal and state Attorneys General began employing institutional reform litigation, in the form of consent decrees, to reform law enforcement agencies and enhance police accountability. The consent decrees were crafted to address systemic organizational dysfunction in local police departments. The United States Department of Justice (USDOJ) conducted most of these reform interventions. However, a notable exception was the settlement agreement between the Attorney General of the State of California and the City of Riverside, California.; There has been little research on the efficacy of these efforts to rehabilitate law enforcement agencies. This analysis is a case study of the effectiveness of the institutional reform intervention by the California Attorney General into the Riverside Police Department (RPD). The detailed examination revealed that the intervention produced constructive changes in the way the RPD conducts its business. The RPD became more professional, effective, transparent and accountable as it implemented the provisions of the consent decree, demonstrating that institutional reform litigation can result in meaningful police reform. The shadow of the law was ever present, encouraging an ethos of cooperation and exerting pressure for meaningful organizational change. The Riverside experience suggests that a facilitative oversight style produces constructive collaboration between the parties, improving the likelihood of durable police reform. Moreover, consent decrees to correct systemic police misconduct should not be the exclusive purview of the USDOJ. State Attorneys General can effectively initiate police reform and in some cases state intervention is a more appropriate alternative. |
| Keyword | institutional reform; police reform; police accountability; state attorney's general; police misconduct; organizational change; consent decrees |
| Geographic subject (city or populated place) | Riverside |
| Geographic subject (state) | California |
| Coverage date | 1993/2008 |
| Language | English |
| Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
| Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
| Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
| Type | texts |
| Legacy record ID | usctheses-m1664 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Rights | Gomez, Jose Adolfo |
| Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
| Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Filename | etd-Gomez-2358 |
| Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume29/etd-Gomez-2358.pdf |
Description
| Title | Page 54 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Full text | 42 broken windows concept of cracking down on minor infractions—squeegeeing, panhandling, subway fare beating, and graffiti – that bring disorder and lead to more serious crimes if left unchecked (Walker 1999, 172). During Bratton’s tenure as police commissioner, subway felonies declined 75% and robberies 64% (Kelling and Coles 1996, 152), while murder rates plummeted to a 30-year low (Walker 1999, 172). Some commentators contend that this tough enforcement policy resulted in the sharp reduction in crime (Kelling and Coles 1996, 155; Bratton and Knobler 1998, 156). In discussing New York’s crackdown on fare evasion, Bratton claims that mobilizing a “Bust Bus” – a “mobile district station” where arrests could be made on the spot – reduced not just the actual crime of fare evasion, but had a broader ameliorative effect (Bratton and Knobler 1998, 155). And so crime, disorder and fare evasion began to go down . . . . We had reduced fare evasion, motivated the cops, streamlined the arrest process, and increased police productivity; we had involved the public, increased their attention, and won their approval; we had controlled disorder and achieved a decrease in crime. All from arresting people for a buck-fifteen crime. We were proving the Broken Windows theory (156). However, opponents of this zero-tolerance policy claim that NYPD’s methods led to spikes in public complaints and several well-publicized instances of extreme police brutality, such as the torture of Abner Louima and the forty-one shot killing of Amadou Diallo. Further, most major cities experienced reductions in crime during the same period (Walker 1999, 172-173). |
