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20
success on election day, and thus preserve the machine’s control over the spoils of
victory:
Empowered to preserve order at the polls, the patrolmen decided whether or
not to eject repeaters from the lines, protect voters from thugs, and respond to
complaints by poll watchers and ballot clerks. If the officers abused their
authority, the citizenry had little or no recourse: the local judges were usually
in sympathy with the organization. . . . Whoever dominated the police could
assign to the polls hundreds of tough, well-armed, if not necessarily well-disciplined
men, whose jobs, the politicians reminded them, depended on the
outcome. (20)
Police officer recruitment and selection during the political era was
predicated on a candidate’s links to the local political organization (Walker 1999,
24). As Walker notes, “Illiteracy, poor health, chronic drunkenness, or a criminal
record were no barriers to a job as a police officer” (Walker 1998, 55). The only
requirement was loyalty to the political machine and frequently cash, as
demonstrated by the $300 required by Tammany Hall in order to be hired as a police
officer, $1,600 to be promoted to sergeant, and $12,000 to $15,000 for promotion to
captain (Walker 1998, 62; Fogelson 1977, 29; Berman 1987). Since police
employment was a significant source of patronage, utilized to reward or punish,
police officers could be dismissed at any time. Occasionally, following elections, the
new group in power would replace a sizable number of the police force (Walker
1998, 55; Walker 1999, 24). However, because officers often earned double that of
industrial laborers, police work was highly sought after by the working class of large
cities (Walker 1999, 24).
Object Description
| Title | Policing accountability: an empirical investigation of state-sponsored police reform in Riverside, California |
| Author | Gomez, Jose Adolfo |
| Author email | jagclash@yahoo.com; jgomez@treasurer.ca.gov |
| Degree | Doctor of Philosophy |
| Document type | Dissertation |
| Degree program | Political Science |
| School | College of Letters, Arts and Sciences |
| Date defended/completed | 2008-08-01 |
| Date submitted | 2008 |
| Restricted until | Restricted until 13 Oct. 2010. |
| Date published | 2010-10-13 |
| Advisor (committee chair) | Renteln, Alison Dundes |
| Advisor (committee member) |
Newland, Chester A. Wong, Janelle S. |
| Abstract | The police have the ability to detain, arrest, and use force when necessary. Police accountability is thus of paramount concern to the public. Numerous examples of police misconduct, including cases of excessive force, brutality, and corruption, appear regularly via the news media. These incidents often evidence systemic organizational problems in law enforcement agencies. Scholars have observed that attempts at police reform have placed too much emphasis on individuals behaving badly, rather than on the systemic problems of the police department.; Beginning in the second half of the 1990s, federal and state Attorneys General began employing institutional reform litigation, in the form of consent decrees, to reform law enforcement agencies and enhance police accountability. The consent decrees were crafted to address systemic organizational dysfunction in local police departments. The United States Department of Justice (USDOJ) conducted most of these reform interventions. However, a notable exception was the settlement agreement between the Attorney General of the State of California and the City of Riverside, California.; There has been little research on the efficacy of these efforts to rehabilitate law enforcement agencies. This analysis is a case study of the effectiveness of the institutional reform intervention by the California Attorney General into the Riverside Police Department (RPD). The detailed examination revealed that the intervention produced constructive changes in the way the RPD conducts its business. The RPD became more professional, effective, transparent and accountable as it implemented the provisions of the consent decree, demonstrating that institutional reform litigation can result in meaningful police reform. The shadow of the law was ever present, encouraging an ethos of cooperation and exerting pressure for meaningful organizational change. The Riverside experience suggests that a facilitative oversight style produces constructive collaboration between the parties, improving the likelihood of durable police reform. Moreover, consent decrees to correct systemic police misconduct should not be the exclusive purview of the USDOJ. State Attorneys General can effectively initiate police reform and in some cases state intervention is a more appropriate alternative. |
| Keyword | institutional reform; police reform; police accountability; state attorney's general; police misconduct; organizational change; consent decrees |
| Geographic subject (city or populated place) | Riverside |
| Geographic subject (state) | California |
| Coverage date | 1993/2008 |
| Language | English |
| Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
| Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
| Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
| Type | texts |
| Legacy record ID | usctheses-m1664 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Rights | Gomez, Jose Adolfo |
| Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
| Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Filename | etd-Gomez-2358 |
| Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume29/etd-Gomez-2358.pdf |
Description
| Title | Page 32 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Full text | 20 success on election day, and thus preserve the machine’s control over the spoils of victory: Empowered to preserve order at the polls, the patrolmen decided whether or not to eject repeaters from the lines, protect voters from thugs, and respond to complaints by poll watchers and ballot clerks. If the officers abused their authority, the citizenry had little or no recourse: the local judges were usually in sympathy with the organization. . . . Whoever dominated the police could assign to the polls hundreds of tough, well-armed, if not necessarily well-disciplined men, whose jobs, the politicians reminded them, depended on the outcome. (20) Police officer recruitment and selection during the political era was predicated on a candidate’s links to the local political organization (Walker 1999, 24). As Walker notes, “Illiteracy, poor health, chronic drunkenness, or a criminal record were no barriers to a job as a police officer” (Walker 1998, 55). The only requirement was loyalty to the political machine and frequently cash, as demonstrated by the $300 required by Tammany Hall in order to be hired as a police officer, $1,600 to be promoted to sergeant, and $12,000 to $15,000 for promotion to captain (Walker 1998, 62; Fogelson 1977, 29; Berman 1987). Since police employment was a significant source of patronage, utilized to reward or punish, police officers could be dismissed at any time. Occasionally, following elections, the new group in power would replace a sizable number of the police force (Walker 1998, 55; Walker 1999, 24). However, because officers often earned double that of industrial laborers, police work was highly sought after by the working class of large cities (Walker 1999, 24). |
