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209 necessarily introduces new topics and preferences to the multilateral process. RTAs offer an opportunity to pursue additional trade liberalization without incurring the costs of multilateral negotiations. The future implication is, of course, that the pendulum will swing back in favor of multilateralism when the expected benefits associated with trade liberalization through RTAs no longer exceed the expected costs. Multilateral negotiations offer the potential for economies of scale that RTAs cannot provide. The popularity of supply and demand for RTAs can be expected to persist as long as the benefits exceed the costs. Perhaps most significantly is the costs associated with RTA adoption. If states are permitted to negotiate RTAs that violate the terms of Article XXIV, there is little reason to expect the popularity of RTAs to decline and only diminishing returns will stop the process. However, if the WTO were to enforce the terms of Article XXIV, the costs associated with trade liberalization would increase, resulting in a decrease in the supply of RTAs. In the end it is the inability or unwillingness of the WTO to enforce Article XXIV that makes possible the proliferation of RTAs as innovative RTAs ignoring the terms of Article XXIV. By reducing the costs associated with trade liberalization, the WTO is facilitating RTA formation.
Object Description
Title | Riding the wave: an interdisciplinary approach to understanding the popularity of RTA notifications to the GATT/WTO |
Author | McClough, David Andrew |
Author email | mcclough@usc.edu; dmcclou@bgsu.edu |
Degree | Doctor of Philosophy |
Document type | Dissertation |
Degree program | Political Economy & Public Policy |
School | College of Letters, Arts and Sciences |
Date defended/completed | 2008-08-07 |
Date submitted | 2008 |
Restricted until | Unrestricted |
Date published | 2008-10-18 |
Advisor (committee chair) | Katada, Saori N. |
Advisor (committee member) |
Nugent, Jeffrey B. Cartier, Carolyn |
Abstract | The proliferation of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) notified to the GATT/WTO since the early 1980s deviates from the long-term trend and reflects participation of nearly every member of the United Nations. This dissertation seeks to explain the current wave of RTA notifications by supplementing the economic model of supply and demand with diffusion theory. Application of the supply and demand model is useful in distinguishing between changes in demand and changes insupply of RTAs. This distinction is seldom emphasized in the current literature examining RTAs. Recent applications of diffusion theory in the discipline of international relations offer a unique opportunity to include a dynamic force in the static analysis of the supply and demand model. Empirical analysis assesses the fit of the RTA diffusion pattern by comparing the RTA diffusion pattern to a cumulative standard normal distribution. The analysis indicates that the diffusion pattern of RTAs resembles the diffusion of an innovation through a social system.; The implication of this finding is that the adoption of an RTA as trade policy is not made independently of the decision by other states. Indeed, the analysis suggests interdependency between states. Further empirical analysis explores economic and political variables that may explain the decision to adopt the RTA as trade policy. The empirical analysis is unique in that survival analysis is utilized to assess the variation in duration to adopt an initial RTA since the early 1980s. A central discovery is that regional designation explains the variation in duration to adopt an initial RTA. Multiple regression analysis confirms the results generated using survival analysis and support the assertion that the proliferation of RTAs likely reflects changes in both the demand for RTAs and the supply of RTAs. This dissertation concludes by considering implications for the WTO resulting from the increase in RTA notifications. |
Keyword | trade agreements |
Coverage date | after 1980 |
Language | English |
Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
Type | texts |
Legacy record ID | usctheses-m1675 |
Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
Rights | McClough, David Andrew |
Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
Filename | etd-McClough-2338 |
Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume32/etd-McClough-2338.pdf |
Description
Title | Page 218 |
Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
Full text | 209 necessarily introduces new topics and preferences to the multilateral process. RTAs offer an opportunity to pursue additional trade liberalization without incurring the costs of multilateral negotiations. The future implication is, of course, that the pendulum will swing back in favor of multilateralism when the expected benefits associated with trade liberalization through RTAs no longer exceed the expected costs. Multilateral negotiations offer the potential for economies of scale that RTAs cannot provide. The popularity of supply and demand for RTAs can be expected to persist as long as the benefits exceed the costs. Perhaps most significantly is the costs associated with RTA adoption. If states are permitted to negotiate RTAs that violate the terms of Article XXIV, there is little reason to expect the popularity of RTAs to decline and only diminishing returns will stop the process. However, if the WTO were to enforce the terms of Article XXIV, the costs associated with trade liberalization would increase, resulting in a decrease in the supply of RTAs. In the end it is the inability or unwillingness of the WTO to enforce Article XXIV that makes possible the proliferation of RTAs as innovative RTAs ignoring the terms of Article XXIV. By reducing the costs associated with trade liberalization, the WTO is facilitating RTA formation. |