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101 Duration of GATT and WTO Rounds 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 Durat ion (years) No. Participation Countries Figure 5: Duration of GATT and WTO Rounds The resulting Pearson correlation coefficient (0.988) is statistically significant (p = .000), confirming the observed strong positive correlation between duration and the number of GATT/WTO members. A second test correlates the change in members with the change in duration. Again, the resulting Pearson correlation coefficient (.831) is statistically significant (p = .001), confirming the observed strong positive correlation between duration and the number of members. These findings inspire the question: Does GATT/WTO membership growth stimulate RTA participation? Implied is the idea that RTA participation increases as cost associated with longer duration of multilateral trade negotiations increases. It is important to reiterate that the breadth of RTA participation motivates, in part, this study so, it is most appropriate to examine how change in the GATT/WTO membership relates to initial, first time, participation in an RTA. Economic theory predicts that a rational actor facing a resource constraint will allocate scarce
Object Description
Title | Riding the wave: an interdisciplinary approach to understanding the popularity of RTA notifications to the GATT/WTO |
Author | McClough, David Andrew |
Author email | mcclough@usc.edu; dmcclou@bgsu.edu |
Degree | Doctor of Philosophy |
Document type | Dissertation |
Degree program | Political Economy & Public Policy |
School | College of Letters, Arts and Sciences |
Date defended/completed | 2008-08-07 |
Date submitted | 2008 |
Restricted until | Unrestricted |
Date published | 2008-10-18 |
Advisor (committee chair) | Katada, Saori N. |
Advisor (committee member) |
Nugent, Jeffrey B. Cartier, Carolyn |
Abstract | The proliferation of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) notified to the GATT/WTO since the early 1980s deviates from the long-term trend and reflects participation of nearly every member of the United Nations. This dissertation seeks to explain the current wave of RTA notifications by supplementing the economic model of supply and demand with diffusion theory. Application of the supply and demand model is useful in distinguishing between changes in demand and changes insupply of RTAs. This distinction is seldom emphasized in the current literature examining RTAs. Recent applications of diffusion theory in the discipline of international relations offer a unique opportunity to include a dynamic force in the static analysis of the supply and demand model. Empirical analysis assesses the fit of the RTA diffusion pattern by comparing the RTA diffusion pattern to a cumulative standard normal distribution. The analysis indicates that the diffusion pattern of RTAs resembles the diffusion of an innovation through a social system.; The implication of this finding is that the adoption of an RTA as trade policy is not made independently of the decision by other states. Indeed, the analysis suggests interdependency between states. Further empirical analysis explores economic and political variables that may explain the decision to adopt the RTA as trade policy. The empirical analysis is unique in that survival analysis is utilized to assess the variation in duration to adopt an initial RTA since the early 1980s. A central discovery is that regional designation explains the variation in duration to adopt an initial RTA. Multiple regression analysis confirms the results generated using survival analysis and support the assertion that the proliferation of RTAs likely reflects changes in both the demand for RTAs and the supply of RTAs. This dissertation concludes by considering implications for the WTO resulting from the increase in RTA notifications. |
Keyword | trade agreements |
Coverage date | after 1980 |
Language | English |
Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
Type | texts |
Legacy record ID | usctheses-m1675 |
Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
Rights | McClough, David Andrew |
Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
Filename | etd-McClough-2338 |
Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume32/etd-McClough-2338.pdf |
Description
Title | Page 110 |
Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
Full text | 101 Duration of GATT and WTO Rounds 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 Durat ion (years) No. Participation Countries Figure 5: Duration of GATT and WTO Rounds The resulting Pearson correlation coefficient (0.988) is statistically significant (p = .000), confirming the observed strong positive correlation between duration and the number of GATT/WTO members. A second test correlates the change in members with the change in duration. Again, the resulting Pearson correlation coefficient (.831) is statistically significant (p = .001), confirming the observed strong positive correlation between duration and the number of members. These findings inspire the question: Does GATT/WTO membership growth stimulate RTA participation? Implied is the idea that RTA participation increases as cost associated with longer duration of multilateral trade negotiations increases. It is important to reiterate that the breadth of RTA participation motivates, in part, this study so, it is most appropriate to examine how change in the GATT/WTO membership relates to initial, first time, participation in an RTA. Economic theory predicts that a rational actor facing a resource constraint will allocate scarce |