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Table 12: GATT Rounds: Dates, Duration, Issues, Participants
Round Start Duration Principal Issue(s) Number of Participants
Geneva April 1947 7 mos. Tariffs 23
Annecy April 1949 5 mos. Tariffs 13
Torquay Sept. 1950 8 mos. Tariffs 38
Geneva Jan. 1956 5 mos. Tariffs, admission Japan 26
Dillon Sept. 1960 11 mos. Tariffs 26
Kennedy May 1964 37 mos. Tariffs, anti-dumping 62
Tokyo Sept. 1973 74 mos. Tariffs, NTBs, framework 99
Uruguay Sept. 1986 87 mos. Tariffs, NTBs, services, dispute 125
Doha Nov. 2001 72 + mos. Tariffs, NTBs, labor standards, 151
NTBs: Nontariff barriers
Table 12 reveals positive relationships between the number of members and
the duration of each round of negotiations as well as the number of issues and the
duration of each round. The key institutional factor to consider is the presence of
consensus voting rules, which promoted equity and initially ensured compromise
among members of the GATT. The charter membership of the GATT consisted of
relatively rich, like-minded states that anticipated benefits associated with mutual
trade liberalization. Given voluntary participation and the mission of the GATT,
progress in tariff reduction followed relatively quickly and easily for this small and
reasonably homogeneous group of states. For GATT members, the expected
marginal benefits exceeded the expected marginal costs associated with multilateral
trade negotiations. Over time, however, expansion of the membership necessarily
increased the diversity of preferences participating in multilateral trade negotiations.
Mancur Olson (1965) articulates the challenges to collective action as group size
increases, while Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler (1996) offer a microeconomic
Object Description
| Title | Riding the wave: an interdisciplinary approach to understanding the popularity of RTA notifications to the GATT/WTO |
| Author | McClough, David Andrew |
| Author email | mcclough@usc.edu; dmcclou@bgsu.edu |
| Degree | Doctor of Philosophy |
| Document type | Dissertation |
| Degree program | Political Economy & Public Policy |
| School | College of Letters, Arts and Sciences |
| Date defended/completed | 2008-08-07 |
| Date submitted | 2008 |
| Restricted until | Unrestricted |
| Date published | 2008-10-18 |
| Advisor (committee chair) | Katada, Saori N. |
| Advisor (committee member) |
Nugent, Jeffrey B. Cartier, Carolyn |
| Abstract | The proliferation of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) notified to the GATT/WTO since the early 1980s deviates from the long-term trend and reflects participation of nearly every member of the United Nations. This dissertation seeks to explain the current wave of RTA notifications by supplementing the economic model of supply and demand with diffusion theory. Application of the supply and demand model is useful in distinguishing between changes in demand and changes insupply of RTAs. This distinction is seldom emphasized in the current literature examining RTAs. Recent applications of diffusion theory in the discipline of international relations offer a unique opportunity to include a dynamic force in the static analysis of the supply and demand model. Empirical analysis assesses the fit of the RTA diffusion pattern by comparing the RTA diffusion pattern to a cumulative standard normal distribution. The analysis indicates that the diffusion pattern of RTAs resembles the diffusion of an innovation through a social system.; The implication of this finding is that the adoption of an RTA as trade policy is not made independently of the decision by other states. Indeed, the analysis suggests interdependency between states. Further empirical analysis explores economic and political variables that may explain the decision to adopt the RTA as trade policy. The empirical analysis is unique in that survival analysis is utilized to assess the variation in duration to adopt an initial RTA since the early 1980s. A central discovery is that regional designation explains the variation in duration to adopt an initial RTA. Multiple regression analysis confirms the results generated using survival analysis and support the assertion that the proliferation of RTAs likely reflects changes in both the demand for RTAs and the supply of RTAs. This dissertation concludes by considering implications for the WTO resulting from the increase in RTA notifications. |
| Keyword | trade agreements |
| Coverage date | after 1980 |
| Language | English |
| Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
| Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
| Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
| Type | texts |
| Legacy record ID | usctheses-m1675 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Rights | McClough, David Andrew |
| Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
| Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Filename | etd-McClough-2338 |
| Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume32/etd-McClough-2338.pdf |
Description
| Title | Page 103 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Full text | 94 Table 12: GATT Rounds: Dates, Duration, Issues, Participants Round Start Duration Principal Issue(s) Number of Participants Geneva April 1947 7 mos. Tariffs 23 Annecy April 1949 5 mos. Tariffs 13 Torquay Sept. 1950 8 mos. Tariffs 38 Geneva Jan. 1956 5 mos. Tariffs, admission Japan 26 Dillon Sept. 1960 11 mos. Tariffs 26 Kennedy May 1964 37 mos. Tariffs, anti-dumping 62 Tokyo Sept. 1973 74 mos. Tariffs, NTBs, framework 99 Uruguay Sept. 1986 87 mos. Tariffs, NTBs, services, dispute 125 Doha Nov. 2001 72 + mos. Tariffs, NTBs, labor standards, 151 NTBs: Nontariff barriers Table 12 reveals positive relationships between the number of members and the duration of each round of negotiations as well as the number of issues and the duration of each round. The key institutional factor to consider is the presence of consensus voting rules, which promoted equity and initially ensured compromise among members of the GATT. The charter membership of the GATT consisted of relatively rich, like-minded states that anticipated benefits associated with mutual trade liberalization. Given voluntary participation and the mission of the GATT, progress in tariff reduction followed relatively quickly and easily for this small and reasonably homogeneous group of states. For GATT members, the expected marginal benefits exceeded the expected marginal costs associated with multilateral trade negotiations. Over time, however, expansion of the membership necessarily increased the diversity of preferences participating in multilateral trade negotiations. Mancur Olson (1965) articulates the challenges to collective action as group size increases, while Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler (1996) offer a microeconomic |
