Page 56 |
Save page Remove page | Previous | 56 of 229 | Next |
|
small (250x250 max)
medium (500x500 max)
Large (1000x1000 max)
Extra Large
large ( > 500x500)
Full Resolution
All (PDF)
|
This page
All
|
47
in the realist tradition examine why military allies trade more than non-allies
(Mansfield and Bronson 1997, Gowa 1994, Gowa and Mansfield 1993, Gowa and
Mansfield 2004, Long 2003). Realists assert that trade with allies is more common
because trade can be expected to strengthen military capabilities and it is preferable
to enhance the military capabilities of allies rather than adversaries who might
employ newly acquired military strength against trade partners. Mansfield and
Pevehouse (2000) find that trade agreements are more typical among allies. Kathy
L. Powers (2006) examines regional economic institutions to find that military
alliance obligations deter militarized disputes. Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V.
Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff (2000) model and test how variation in regime type
affects decisions pertaining to trade barriers. Their findings show that democracies
set lower trade barriers with other democracies than with autocracies. In that
democracies tend not to fight other democracies, it would seem that trade barriers
reflect concerns with relative power.
Empirical results tend to support both theoretical traditions yet fail to offer
insight into the proliferation of RTAs because the research ignores the self-selection
bias and simultaneity issues associated with RTAs resulting from the fact that states
participating in RTAs do so only with the expectation that it produces a net benefit.
Realists contend that allies trade whereas liberals assert that trade advances
allegiance. A compelling empirical examination of the liberal position would
demonstrate that one-time adversaries evolved into allies as a result of trade. Post
WWII Europe may offer the most compelling case study of this effect. Confirmation
Object Description
| Title | Riding the wave: an interdisciplinary approach to understanding the popularity of RTA notifications to the GATT/WTO |
| Author | McClough, David Andrew |
| Author email | mcclough@usc.edu; dmcclou@bgsu.edu |
| Degree | Doctor of Philosophy |
| Document type | Dissertation |
| Degree program | Political Economy & Public Policy |
| School | College of Letters, Arts and Sciences |
| Date defended/completed | 2008-08-07 |
| Date submitted | 2008 |
| Restricted until | Unrestricted |
| Date published | 2008-10-18 |
| Advisor (committee chair) | Katada, Saori N. |
| Advisor (committee member) |
Nugent, Jeffrey B. Cartier, Carolyn |
| Abstract | The proliferation of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) notified to the GATT/WTO since the early 1980s deviates from the long-term trend and reflects participation of nearly every member of the United Nations. This dissertation seeks to explain the current wave of RTA notifications by supplementing the economic model of supply and demand with diffusion theory. Application of the supply and demand model is useful in distinguishing between changes in demand and changes insupply of RTAs. This distinction is seldom emphasized in the current literature examining RTAs. Recent applications of diffusion theory in the discipline of international relations offer a unique opportunity to include a dynamic force in the static analysis of the supply and demand model. Empirical analysis assesses the fit of the RTA diffusion pattern by comparing the RTA diffusion pattern to a cumulative standard normal distribution. The analysis indicates that the diffusion pattern of RTAs resembles the diffusion of an innovation through a social system.; The implication of this finding is that the adoption of an RTA as trade policy is not made independently of the decision by other states. Indeed, the analysis suggests interdependency between states. Further empirical analysis explores economic and political variables that may explain the decision to adopt the RTA as trade policy. The empirical analysis is unique in that survival analysis is utilized to assess the variation in duration to adopt an initial RTA since the early 1980s. A central discovery is that regional designation explains the variation in duration to adopt an initial RTA. Multiple regression analysis confirms the results generated using survival analysis and support the assertion that the proliferation of RTAs likely reflects changes in both the demand for RTAs and the supply of RTAs. This dissertation concludes by considering implications for the WTO resulting from the increase in RTA notifications. |
| Keyword | trade agreements |
| Coverage date | after 1980 |
| Language | English |
| Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
| Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
| Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
| Type | texts |
| Legacy record ID | usctheses-m1675 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Rights | McClough, David Andrew |
| Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
| Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Filename | etd-McClough-2338 |
| Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume32/etd-McClough-2338.pdf |
Description
| Title | Page 56 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Full text | 47 in the realist tradition examine why military allies trade more than non-allies (Mansfield and Bronson 1997, Gowa 1994, Gowa and Mansfield 1993, Gowa and Mansfield 2004, Long 2003). Realists assert that trade with allies is more common because trade can be expected to strengthen military capabilities and it is preferable to enhance the military capabilities of allies rather than adversaries who might employ newly acquired military strength against trade partners. Mansfield and Pevehouse (2000) find that trade agreements are more typical among allies. Kathy L. Powers (2006) examines regional economic institutions to find that military alliance obligations deter militarized disputes. Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff (2000) model and test how variation in regime type affects decisions pertaining to trade barriers. Their findings show that democracies set lower trade barriers with other democracies than with autocracies. In that democracies tend not to fight other democracies, it would seem that trade barriers reflect concerns with relative power. Empirical results tend to support both theoretical traditions yet fail to offer insight into the proliferation of RTAs because the research ignores the self-selection bias and simultaneity issues associated with RTAs resulting from the fact that states participating in RTAs do so only with the expectation that it produces a net benefit. Realists contend that allies trade whereas liberals assert that trade advances allegiance. A compelling empirical examination of the liberal position would demonstrate that one-time adversaries evolved into allies as a result of trade. Post WWII Europe may offer the most compelling case study of this effect. Confirmation |
