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103 programs. The most noteworthy differences between SES and SES-type programs will be examined. The role of principal-agent theory and problems to explain these differences and the behavioral implications of imperfect information on the P-A relationship are the subject of the section that follows. Major Theme One: Organizational structure differences between SES and SES-type after school tutoring programs account for the principal-agent problems of divergent objectives and information asymmetry that are at the root of how these two programs differ. Organizational Structure: The Root of P-A Differences between SES and SES-type Programs At the Federal level, an official from the U.S. Department of Education commented on their surprise at how difficult it was for outside SES providers and traditionally monopolistic school districts to work together to provide after school tutoring. If the principal-agent relationship can be described as one of social interaction, then the SES-type program is structurally preferred to that of the SES program. With its use of outside SES providers, the principal-agent problems that parents and school districts (principals) face in SES programs increase the challenge of decision making under the uncertainty with imperfect information and goal alignment of principal and agent. This structural challenge is further complicated by the addition of dozens of potential SES providers (agents) that the parents must discern and choose from. The odds of an adverse selection increase for parents in schools with SES programs.
Object Description
Title | Organizational relationships in supplemental educational services (SES) and SES-type programs |
Author | Tan, Thomas Anthony |
Author email | diandtom@sbcglobal.net; thomas_tan@jusd.k12.ca.us |
Degree | Doctor of Education |
Document type | Dissertation |
Degree program | Education (Leadership) |
School | Rossier School of Education |
Date defended/completed | 2008-08-07 |
Date submitted | 2008 |
Restricted until | Unrestricted |
Date published | 2008-10-08 |
Advisor (committee chair) | Hentschke, Guilbert C. |
Advisor (committee member) |
Datnow, Amanda Mafi, Gabriela |
Abstract | The Center for Education Policy (CEP, 2007) released a July 2007 NCLB report examining the effectiveness of assistance to schools that have been unable to achieve state defined student Proficiency goals for two consecutive years. This academic tutoring assistance known as Supplemental Educational Services (SES) was deemed to be important or very important by less than 10% of the districts surveyed.; How can we explain differences in outside of the school day academic tutoring programs that are mandated (SES programs under NCLB) and those that are willingly provided (SES-type programs by schools)? These differences in programs can be studied and understood through what economists call "principal-agent" theory to study the relationships among the participants. The principal-agent (P-A) theory had its origins in the study of the problems that arise when objectives of a principal and agent diverge. The purpose of the study is to understand the P-A related performance problems among the participants in Supplemental Educational Services (SES). This study will examine the P-A organizational relationships within the three primary SES and SES-type school program elements – individualized instruction, provider accountability, and student participation. The three research questions that were developed to guide this study are: 1. How does the principal-agent relationship explain what instructional strategies and practices are used by SES and SES-type providers in out of school hours programs? 2. How does the principal-agent relationship explain how SES and SES-type providers are accountable for student learning? 3. How does the principal-agent relationship explain how SES and SES-type providers manage student participation?; In comparing SES and SES-type after school tutoring organizations, data analysis revealed that principal-agent problems in Title I schools required to provide SES were greater than those Title I SES-type schools that willingly provided after school tutoring. The six major findings of this study found principal-agent problems in the areas of SES organizational barriers, beliefs in tutoring effectiveness, sub optimization of SES, non-performance based competition among SES providers, and relationships among parents, tutors, and educators.; Recommendations for successful SES implementation and improvement of current practice to address these principal-agent problems included increasing the outreach to parents, using an SES provider report card to rank provider performance, improved sharing of existing student data between school districts and SES providers, expanding the pool of students who could benefit from SES tutoring, and improving communications and coordination through an SES provider-school district advisory council. Suggestions for future research include comparing SES implementations in coastal vs. inland California school districts, study of student motivation in after school tutoring, greater cooperation between SES providers and school districts, and the effectiveness of comprehensive vs. academic after school tutoring. |
Keyword | principal; agent; education; elementary; k12; nclb; supplemental; educational; services; SES; tutoring |
Geographic subject (state) | California |
Coverage date | 2007/2008 |
Language | English |
Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
Type | texts |
Legacy record ID | usctheses-m1643 |
Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
Rights | Tan, Thomas Anthony |
Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
Filename | etd-Tan-2371 |
Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume26/etd-Tan-2371.pdf |
Description
Title | Page 109 |
Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
Full text | 103 programs. The most noteworthy differences between SES and SES-type programs will be examined. The role of principal-agent theory and problems to explain these differences and the behavioral implications of imperfect information on the P-A relationship are the subject of the section that follows. Major Theme One: Organizational structure differences between SES and SES-type after school tutoring programs account for the principal-agent problems of divergent objectives and information asymmetry that are at the root of how these two programs differ. Organizational Structure: The Root of P-A Differences between SES and SES-type Programs At the Federal level, an official from the U.S. Department of Education commented on their surprise at how difficult it was for outside SES providers and traditionally monopolistic school districts to work together to provide after school tutoring. If the principal-agent relationship can be described as one of social interaction, then the SES-type program is structurally preferred to that of the SES program. With its use of outside SES providers, the principal-agent problems that parents and school districts (principals) face in SES programs increase the challenge of decision making under the uncertainty with imperfect information and goal alignment of principal and agent. This structural challenge is further complicated by the addition of dozens of potential SES providers (agents) that the parents must discern and choose from. The odds of an adverse selection increase for parents in schools with SES programs. |