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36
Illustrative of the principal-agent conflicts in SES are the differing objectives and
incentives among the players as detailed by Hess and Finn (2007). One group views
SES as a first step to full voucher program and sees competition for students as a
force that can drive low performing Title I schools to improve. Yet another faction
views SES as a vehicle to deliver extra instruction to students in low performing
schools in a way that does not punish the school or students. Finally, SES is seen as
a budding industry for profit and non-profit providers alike to deliver tutoring
services to at-risk students.
While all groups will work to claim the moral high ground of doing what is
best for students, even in this tightly delimited example, the multiple incentives of
profit, competition and student achievement can be seen pulling SES in multiple
directions. In contrast to the lack of cooperation, Sappington (1991) in his
exploration of incentives in principal-agent relationships makes two observations
that are relevant in our principal-agent analysis of Title I schools with required SES
and voluntary SES. The first is that the number of principals may explain the actions
of the agents. For example, while an SES provider agent may be funded from
federal Title I funds and apply to the state to become an approved provider, the agent
must work locally with the district for local support and facilities if needed. The
second aspect of the problem is how most studies of incentive problems avoid issues
such as worker loyalty and pride that can be critical to the success of an enterprise.
This opens the door to study how people and systems perform when
intrinsically and extrinsically motivated to provide SES. Will one SES or SES-Type
Object Description
| Title | Organizational relationships in supplemental educational services (SES) and SES-type programs |
| Author | Tan, Thomas Anthony |
| Author email | diandtom@sbcglobal.net; thomas_tan@jusd.k12.ca.us |
| Degree | Doctor of Education |
| Document type | Dissertation |
| Degree program | Education (Leadership) |
| School | Rossier School of Education |
| Date defended/completed | 2008-08-07 |
| Date submitted | 2008 |
| Restricted until | Unrestricted |
| Date published | 2008-10-08 |
| Advisor (committee chair) | Hentschke, Guilbert C. |
| Advisor (committee member) |
Datnow, Amanda Mafi, Gabriela |
| Abstract | The Center for Education Policy (CEP, 2007) released a July 2007 NCLB report examining the effectiveness of assistance to schools that have been unable to achieve state defined student Proficiency goals for two consecutive years. This academic tutoring assistance known as Supplemental Educational Services (SES) was deemed to be important or very important by less than 10% of the districts surveyed.; How can we explain differences in outside of the school day academic tutoring programs that are mandated (SES programs under NCLB) and those that are willingly provided (SES-type programs by schools)? These differences in programs can be studied and understood through what economists call "principal-agent" theory to study the relationships among the participants. The principal-agent (P-A) theory had its origins in the study of the problems that arise when objectives of a principal and agent diverge. The purpose of the study is to understand the P-A related performance problems among the participants in Supplemental Educational Services (SES). This study will examine the P-A organizational relationships within the three primary SES and SES-type school program elements – individualized instruction, provider accountability, and student participation. The three research questions that were developed to guide this study are: 1. How does the principal-agent relationship explain what instructional strategies and practices are used by SES and SES-type providers in out of school hours programs? 2. How does the principal-agent relationship explain how SES and SES-type providers are accountable for student learning? 3. How does the principal-agent relationship explain how SES and SES-type providers manage student participation?; In comparing SES and SES-type after school tutoring organizations, data analysis revealed that principal-agent problems in Title I schools required to provide SES were greater than those Title I SES-type schools that willingly provided after school tutoring. The six major findings of this study found principal-agent problems in the areas of SES organizational barriers, beliefs in tutoring effectiveness, sub optimization of SES, non-performance based competition among SES providers, and relationships among parents, tutors, and educators.; Recommendations for successful SES implementation and improvement of current practice to address these principal-agent problems included increasing the outreach to parents, using an SES provider report card to rank provider performance, improved sharing of existing student data between school districts and SES providers, expanding the pool of students who could benefit from SES tutoring, and improving communications and coordination through an SES provider-school district advisory council. Suggestions for future research include comparing SES implementations in coastal vs. inland California school districts, study of student motivation in after school tutoring, greater cooperation between SES providers and school districts, and the effectiveness of comprehensive vs. academic after school tutoring. |
| Keyword | principal; agent; education; elementary; k12; nclb; supplemental; educational; services; SES; tutoring |
| Geographic subject (state) | California |
| Coverage date | 2007/2008 |
| Language | English |
| Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
| Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
| Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
| Type | texts |
| Legacy record ID | usctheses-m1643 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Rights | Tan, Thomas Anthony |
| Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
| Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Filename | etd-Tan-2371 |
| Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume26/etd-Tan-2371.pdf |
Description
| Title | Page 42 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Full text | 36 Illustrative of the principal-agent conflicts in SES are the differing objectives and incentives among the players as detailed by Hess and Finn (2007). One group views SES as a first step to full voucher program and sees competition for students as a force that can drive low performing Title I schools to improve. Yet another faction views SES as a vehicle to deliver extra instruction to students in low performing schools in a way that does not punish the school or students. Finally, SES is seen as a budding industry for profit and non-profit providers alike to deliver tutoring services to at-risk students. While all groups will work to claim the moral high ground of doing what is best for students, even in this tightly delimited example, the multiple incentives of profit, competition and student achievement can be seen pulling SES in multiple directions. In contrast to the lack of cooperation, Sappington (1991) in his exploration of incentives in principal-agent relationships makes two observations that are relevant in our principal-agent analysis of Title I schools with required SES and voluntary SES. The first is that the number of principals may explain the actions of the agents. For example, while an SES provider agent may be funded from federal Title I funds and apply to the state to become an approved provider, the agent must work locally with the district for local support and facilities if needed. The second aspect of the problem is how most studies of incentive problems avoid issues such as worker loyalty and pride that can be critical to the success of an enterprise. This opens the door to study how people and systems perform when intrinsically and extrinsically motivated to provide SES. Will one SES or SES-Type |
