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34
outcomes. While examples of parochial, private and charter school competitors
exist, the local school system is generally characterized by the lack of competition.
Finally, the nature of education may attract people who enter the profession for
idealistic reasons or the opportunity to improve the lives of children. The presence
of motivated agents, driven by factors other than profit, is a unique distinguishing
factor in education.
These characteristics, that are common to K-12 public education, can result in
conflicting agreements on process and outcomes. As summarized by Dixit, “To sum
up, the system of public education is a multi-task, multi-principal, multi-period, near-monopoly
organization with vague and poorly observable goals” (Dixit, 2002). This
background lays the foundation for study of P-A organizational relationships when
outside SES tutoring providers interact with K-12 public education. Dixit (2002)
comments that performance based solutions may be inappropriate and even naïve in
a government agency such as education. This study will help with the understanding
of the role of SES competition and performance incentives where idealism and
professionalism have traditionally been the primary motivators for educators in K-12
public education.
Professors Hentchke and Wohlstetter (2004) from the University of Southern
California and Ferris (1992) describe the five types of accountability problems in
educational P-A relationships as 1) adverse selection, 2) divergent objectives, 3)
information asymmetry, 4) weak incentives, and 5) limited decision rights problems.
Adverse selection describes the situation where principals do not have complete
Object Description
| Title | Organizational relationships in supplemental educational services (SES) and SES-type programs |
| Author | Tan, Thomas Anthony |
| Author email | diandtom@sbcglobal.net; thomas_tan@jusd.k12.ca.us |
| Degree | Doctor of Education |
| Document type | Dissertation |
| Degree program | Education (Leadership) |
| School | Rossier School of Education |
| Date defended/completed | 2008-08-07 |
| Date submitted | 2008 |
| Restricted until | Unrestricted |
| Date published | 2008-10-08 |
| Advisor (committee chair) | Hentschke, Guilbert C. |
| Advisor (committee member) |
Datnow, Amanda Mafi, Gabriela |
| Abstract | The Center for Education Policy (CEP, 2007) released a July 2007 NCLB report examining the effectiveness of assistance to schools that have been unable to achieve state defined student Proficiency goals for two consecutive years. This academic tutoring assistance known as Supplemental Educational Services (SES) was deemed to be important or very important by less than 10% of the districts surveyed.; How can we explain differences in outside of the school day academic tutoring programs that are mandated (SES programs under NCLB) and those that are willingly provided (SES-type programs by schools)? These differences in programs can be studied and understood through what economists call "principal-agent" theory to study the relationships among the participants. The principal-agent (P-A) theory had its origins in the study of the problems that arise when objectives of a principal and agent diverge. The purpose of the study is to understand the P-A related performance problems among the participants in Supplemental Educational Services (SES). This study will examine the P-A organizational relationships within the three primary SES and SES-type school program elements – individualized instruction, provider accountability, and student participation. The three research questions that were developed to guide this study are: 1. How does the principal-agent relationship explain what instructional strategies and practices are used by SES and SES-type providers in out of school hours programs? 2. How does the principal-agent relationship explain how SES and SES-type providers are accountable for student learning? 3. How does the principal-agent relationship explain how SES and SES-type providers manage student participation?; In comparing SES and SES-type after school tutoring organizations, data analysis revealed that principal-agent problems in Title I schools required to provide SES were greater than those Title I SES-type schools that willingly provided after school tutoring. The six major findings of this study found principal-agent problems in the areas of SES organizational barriers, beliefs in tutoring effectiveness, sub optimization of SES, non-performance based competition among SES providers, and relationships among parents, tutors, and educators.; Recommendations for successful SES implementation and improvement of current practice to address these principal-agent problems included increasing the outreach to parents, using an SES provider report card to rank provider performance, improved sharing of existing student data between school districts and SES providers, expanding the pool of students who could benefit from SES tutoring, and improving communications and coordination through an SES provider-school district advisory council. Suggestions for future research include comparing SES implementations in coastal vs. inland California school districts, study of student motivation in after school tutoring, greater cooperation between SES providers and school districts, and the effectiveness of comprehensive vs. academic after school tutoring. |
| Keyword | principal; agent; education; elementary; k12; nclb; supplemental; educational; services; SES; tutoring |
| Geographic subject (state) | California |
| Coverage date | 2007/2008 |
| Language | English |
| Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
| Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
| Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
| Type | texts |
| Legacy record ID | usctheses-m1643 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Rights | Tan, Thomas Anthony |
| Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
| Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Filename | etd-Tan-2371 |
| Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume26/etd-Tan-2371.pdf |
Description
| Title | Page 40 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Full text | 34 outcomes. While examples of parochial, private and charter school competitors exist, the local school system is generally characterized by the lack of competition. Finally, the nature of education may attract people who enter the profession for idealistic reasons or the opportunity to improve the lives of children. The presence of motivated agents, driven by factors other than profit, is a unique distinguishing factor in education. These characteristics, that are common to K-12 public education, can result in conflicting agreements on process and outcomes. As summarized by Dixit, “To sum up, the system of public education is a multi-task, multi-principal, multi-period, near-monopoly organization with vague and poorly observable goals” (Dixit, 2002). This background lays the foundation for study of P-A organizational relationships when outside SES tutoring providers interact with K-12 public education. Dixit (2002) comments that performance based solutions may be inappropriate and even naïve in a government agency such as education. This study will help with the understanding of the role of SES competition and performance incentives where idealism and professionalism have traditionally been the primary motivators for educators in K-12 public education. Professors Hentchke and Wohlstetter (2004) from the University of Southern California and Ferris (1992) describe the five types of accountability problems in educational P-A relationships as 1) adverse selection, 2) divergent objectives, 3) information asymmetry, 4) weak incentives, and 5) limited decision rights problems. Adverse selection describes the situation where principals do not have complete |
