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147
Stavins, Robert N. (2007), Comments on the Recommendations of the Market
Advisory Committee to the California Air Resources Board:
Recommendations for Designing a Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade System for
California.
Stavins, Robert N. (1998), What Can We Learn From the Grand Policy Experiment?
Lessons From SO2 Allowance Trading, Journal of Economic Perspectives,
Vol. 12, 69-88.
Stavins, Robert N. (1996), Correlated Uncertainty and Policy Instrument Choice,
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 30, 218-232.
Stavins, Robert N. (1995), Transaction Costs and Tradable Permits, Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 29, 133-148.
Stern, David. I., Michael S. Common, and Edward B. Barbier (1996), Economic
Growth and Environmental Degradation: the Environmental Kuznets Curve
and Sustainable Development, World Development, Vol. 24, 1151-1160.
Stern, David. I., and Michael S. Common (2001), Is There an Environmental Kuznets
Curve for Sulfur?, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
Vol. 41, 162-178.
Steunenberg, Bernard (1996), Agent Discretion, Regulatory Policymaking, and
Different Institutional Arrangements, Public Choice, 86, 309-339.
Stevens, Brandt (2002), A Dynamic Analysis of the Marketable Permits Approach to
Global Warming Policy: A Comparison of Spatial and Temporal Flexibility,
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 44, 45-69.
Stevens, Brandt, and Adam Rose (2002), A Dynamic Analysis of the Marketable
Permits Approach to Global Warming Policy: A Comparison of Spatial and
Temporal Flexibility, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
Vol. 44, 45-69.
Stigler, George (1971), The Economic Theory of Regulation, Bell Journal of
Economics and Management Science, Vol. 2, 3-21.
Stranlund, John K., Carlos A. Chavez, and Barry C. Field (2002), Enforcing
Emissions Trading Programs: Theory, Practice, and Performance, Policy
Studies Journal, Vol. 30, 343-461.
Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard (1999), U.S. Interest Groups Prefer Emission Trading: A
New Perspective, Public Choice, Vol. 101, 109-128.
Thompson, Dale B. (2000), Political Obstacles to the Implementation of Emissions
Markets: Lessons from RECLAIM, Natural Resources Journal, Vol. 40,
645-697.
Tietenberg, Tom H. (2006), Emissions Trading: Principles and Practice, Second
Edition, Washington, DC: Resource for the Future.
Object Description
| Title | Processes, effects, and the implementation of market-based environmental policy: southern California's experiences with emissions trading |
| Author | Zhan, Xueyong |
| Author email | xzhan@usc.edu; xueyongzhan@gmail.com |
| Degree | Doctor of Philosophy |
| Document type | Dissertation |
| Degree program | Public Administration |
| School | School of Policy, Planning, and Development |
| Date defended/completed | 2008-07-01 |
| Date submitted | 2008 |
| Restricted until | Unrestricted |
| Date published | 2008-10-30 |
| Advisor (committee chair) | Tang, Shui-Yan |
| Advisor (committee member) |
Mazmanian, Daniel A. Henry, Ronald |
| Abstract | This research provides a positive explanation of the implementation processes and effects of market-based environmental policy by conducting a case study on RECLAIM (Regional Clean Air Incentives Market), the first regional emission permits trading program that has been implemented by South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) to address air pollution problems in the Los Angeles air basin since 1994.; Firstly, I developed a game theoretic model of environmental policy implementation. This model integrates theories of administrative rulemaking, policy implementation, institutional rational choice and transaction cost politics. I argue that administrative agency tries to minimize political transaction costs of policy implementation when writing rules.; Based on the formal model, I conducted a quantitative analysis to examine the interactions between SCAQMD and its key stakeholders, such as federal, state and local governments, businesses, and environmental NGOs, during the rulemaking of RECLAIM. I found that SCAQMD is more likely to adopt rule changes suggested by state and federal environmental agencies. This research identifies the dominant role of organized interest groups, the existence of interagency lobbying, and the lack of citizen control over the rulemaking of RECLAIM. Furthermore, I conducted an evaluation of the rules governing the RECLAIM program, and I identify the major distortions of the RECLAIM rules in comparison with an ideal cap-and-trade emissions trading market. Also, I used OLS regression to examine the effects of policy difference on emission level in California between 1990 and 1999. This evaluation fails to reject the null hypothesis that using cap-and-trade (CAT) compared with using command-and-control (CAC) has no different effects on emission of both NOx and SO2 from point sources at the county level in California in the 1990's.; In summary, this research finds that the implementation of emissions trading is political, and interest group politics may distort the regulatory design and implementation of an emissions trading program. While cap-and-trade is promising to better protect our environment and natural resources, its implementation is conditioned by many political and administrative factors. Inadequate rules may come as the results of political compromises, and they may impact the functioning of an emissions trading system. |
| Keyword | emissions trading; rulemaking; RECLAIM; implementation; environmental governance |
| Geographic subject (city or populated place) | Los Angeles |
| Geographic subject (state) | California |
| Coverage date | 1990/2000 |
| Language | English |
| Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
| Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
| Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
| Type | texts |
| Legacy record ID | usctheses-m1719 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Rights | Zhan, Xueyong |
| Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
| Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Filename | etd-Zhan-2335 |
| Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume44/etd-Zhan-2335.pdf |
Description
| Title | Page 158 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Full text | 147 Stavins, Robert N. (2007), Comments on the Recommendations of the Market Advisory Committee to the California Air Resources Board: Recommendations for Designing a Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade System for California. Stavins, Robert N. (1998), What Can We Learn From the Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons From SO2 Allowance Trading, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12, 69-88. Stavins, Robert N. (1996), Correlated Uncertainty and Policy Instrument Choice, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 30, 218-232. Stavins, Robert N. (1995), Transaction Costs and Tradable Permits, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 29, 133-148. Stern, David. I., Michael S. Common, and Edward B. Barbier (1996), Economic Growth and Environmental Degradation: the Environmental Kuznets Curve and Sustainable Development, World Development, Vol. 24, 1151-1160. Stern, David. I., and Michael S. Common (2001), Is There an Environmental Kuznets Curve for Sulfur?, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 41, 162-178. Steunenberg, Bernard (1996), Agent Discretion, Regulatory Policymaking, and Different Institutional Arrangements, Public Choice, 86, 309-339. Stevens, Brandt (2002), A Dynamic Analysis of the Marketable Permits Approach to Global Warming Policy: A Comparison of Spatial and Temporal Flexibility, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 44, 45-69. Stevens, Brandt, and Adam Rose (2002), A Dynamic Analysis of the Marketable Permits Approach to Global Warming Policy: A Comparison of Spatial and Temporal Flexibility, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 44, 45-69. Stigler, George (1971), The Economic Theory of Regulation, Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, Vol. 2, 3-21. Stranlund, John K., Carlos A. Chavez, and Barry C. Field (2002), Enforcing Emissions Trading Programs: Theory, Practice, and Performance, Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 30, 343-461. Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard (1999), U.S. Interest Groups Prefer Emission Trading: A New Perspective, Public Choice, Vol. 101, 109-128. Thompson, Dale B. (2000), Political Obstacles to the Implementation of Emissions Markets: Lessons from RECLAIM, Natural Resources Journal, Vol. 40, 645-697. Tietenberg, Tom H. (2006), Emissions Trading: Principles and Practice, Second Edition, Washington, DC: Resource for the Future. |
