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127
using load-based GHG Emissions Cap (Burtraw, 2007), yet this may cause more
challenges to regulatory agencies when they have to regulate emissions or electricity
generated in other states. Also, political resistance from businesses and other groups
who have serious concerns on job security will be significant. For example, AB 32
Implementation Group, an online interest group coalition representing more than 140
small and large businesses in California, has tried to express their concerns over
governmental actions and to lobby the Governor and regulatory agencies through
various channels, and one of their major concerns is implementation costs42. Thus,
California’s commitment to GHG emission reductions may be conditioned by the
problems of emission leakage, free rider and high implementation costs. All these
issues may impose huge political challenges to the implementation of AB 32.
There are also agency collaboration challenges to California. Currently,
California Environmental Protection Agency is charged with the implementation task
of AB 32 and the rulemaking of the cap-and-trade program. Yet the implementation of
AB 32 or a cap-and-trade program will heavily interfere with other existing
regulations, such as energy efficiency, renewable energy, vehicle emission standards,
etc. On the other hand, a cap-and-trade program will also involve many regulatory
agencies, such as California Energy Commission, California Public Utilities
Commission, California Department of Transportation, etc. Moreover, if load-based
cap-and-trade scheme and offset mechanism are integrated into this program, the
regulatory agency has to regulate emissions happening in other states or other
countries. Indeed, the implementation of a cap-and-trade program imposes a great
42 http://www.ab32ig.com/index.htm
Object Description
| Title | Processes, effects, and the implementation of market-based environmental policy: southern California's experiences with emissions trading |
| Author | Zhan, Xueyong |
| Author email | xzhan@usc.edu; xueyongzhan@gmail.com |
| Degree | Doctor of Philosophy |
| Document type | Dissertation |
| Degree program | Public Administration |
| School | School of Policy, Planning, and Development |
| Date defended/completed | 2008-07-01 |
| Date submitted | 2008 |
| Restricted until | Unrestricted |
| Date published | 2008-10-30 |
| Advisor (committee chair) | Tang, Shui-Yan |
| Advisor (committee member) |
Mazmanian, Daniel A. Henry, Ronald |
| Abstract | This research provides a positive explanation of the implementation processes and effects of market-based environmental policy by conducting a case study on RECLAIM (Regional Clean Air Incentives Market), the first regional emission permits trading program that has been implemented by South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) to address air pollution problems in the Los Angeles air basin since 1994.; Firstly, I developed a game theoretic model of environmental policy implementation. This model integrates theories of administrative rulemaking, policy implementation, institutional rational choice and transaction cost politics. I argue that administrative agency tries to minimize political transaction costs of policy implementation when writing rules.; Based on the formal model, I conducted a quantitative analysis to examine the interactions between SCAQMD and its key stakeholders, such as federal, state and local governments, businesses, and environmental NGOs, during the rulemaking of RECLAIM. I found that SCAQMD is more likely to adopt rule changes suggested by state and federal environmental agencies. This research identifies the dominant role of organized interest groups, the existence of interagency lobbying, and the lack of citizen control over the rulemaking of RECLAIM. Furthermore, I conducted an evaluation of the rules governing the RECLAIM program, and I identify the major distortions of the RECLAIM rules in comparison with an ideal cap-and-trade emissions trading market. Also, I used OLS regression to examine the effects of policy difference on emission level in California between 1990 and 1999. This evaluation fails to reject the null hypothesis that using cap-and-trade (CAT) compared with using command-and-control (CAC) has no different effects on emission of both NOx and SO2 from point sources at the county level in California in the 1990's.; In summary, this research finds that the implementation of emissions trading is political, and interest group politics may distort the regulatory design and implementation of an emissions trading program. While cap-and-trade is promising to better protect our environment and natural resources, its implementation is conditioned by many political and administrative factors. Inadequate rules may come as the results of political compromises, and they may impact the functioning of an emissions trading system. |
| Keyword | emissions trading; rulemaking; RECLAIM; implementation; environmental governance |
| Geographic subject (city or populated place) | Los Angeles |
| Geographic subject (state) | California |
| Coverage date | 1990/2000 |
| Language | English |
| Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
| Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
| Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
| Type | texts |
| Legacy record ID | usctheses-m1719 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Rights | Zhan, Xueyong |
| Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
| Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Filename | etd-Zhan-2335 |
| Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume44/etd-Zhan-2335.pdf |
Description
| Title | Page 138 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Full text | 127 using load-based GHG Emissions Cap (Burtraw, 2007), yet this may cause more challenges to regulatory agencies when they have to regulate emissions or electricity generated in other states. Also, political resistance from businesses and other groups who have serious concerns on job security will be significant. For example, AB 32 Implementation Group, an online interest group coalition representing more than 140 small and large businesses in California, has tried to express their concerns over governmental actions and to lobby the Governor and regulatory agencies through various channels, and one of their major concerns is implementation costs42. Thus, California’s commitment to GHG emission reductions may be conditioned by the problems of emission leakage, free rider and high implementation costs. All these issues may impose huge political challenges to the implementation of AB 32. There are also agency collaboration challenges to California. Currently, California Environmental Protection Agency is charged with the implementation task of AB 32 and the rulemaking of the cap-and-trade program. Yet the implementation of AB 32 or a cap-and-trade program will heavily interfere with other existing regulations, such as energy efficiency, renewable energy, vehicle emission standards, etc. On the other hand, a cap-and-trade program will also involve many regulatory agencies, such as California Energy Commission, California Public Utilities Commission, California Department of Transportation, etc. Moreover, if load-based cap-and-trade scheme and offset mechanism are integrated into this program, the regulatory agency has to regulate emissions happening in other states or other countries. Indeed, the implementation of a cap-and-trade program imposes a great 42 http://www.ab32ig.com/index.htm |
