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114
5.4.3 Data
In this research, I use county-level data of 58 counties of California where the
emission of NOx and SO2 from point sources was regulated by either RECLAIM or
command-and-control instruments between 1990 and 1999. A specific description of
the time and geographic coverage of this research is presented in Table 5.3.
Table 5. 3 Geographical and Period Coverage of This Research
Geographic
Area
County
1990
to
1993
1994
to
1999
RECLAIM area
(4 counties)
Los Angeles,
Orange,
Riverside,
San Bernardino
CAC CAT
Non-RECLAIM
area
(54 counties)
Alameda, Alpine, Amador, Butte, Calaveras, Colusa, Contra
Costa, Del Norte, El Dorado, Fresno, Glenn, Humboldt,
Imperial, Inyo, Kern, Kings, Lake, Lassen, Madera, Marin,
Mariposa, Mendocino, Merced, Modoc, Mono, Monterey,
Napa, Nevada, Placer, Plumas, Sacramento, San Benito ,
San Diego , San Francisco , San Joaquin , San Luis
Obispo , San Mateo, Santa Barbara, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz,
Shasta, Sierra, Siskiyou, Solano, Sonoma, Stanislaus, Sutter,
Tehama, Trinity, Tulare, Tuolumne, Ventura, Yolo, Yuba.
CAC CAC
Pollutants: Nitrogen Oxides, Sulfur Dioxide
CAC: Command-and-control
CAT: Cap-and-trade
Data sources
(1) Annual emission level of SO2 and NOx
The annual emissions of SO2 and NOx from point sources at the county-level
are taken from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. These data were obtained
from EPA's National Emission Inventory (NEI) and National Emissions Trend (NET)
database, which are used by the U.S. EPA to provide online annual data of sulfur
dioxide and nitrogen dioxide emission from both point sources and area sources of
Object Description
| Title | Processes, effects, and the implementation of market-based environmental policy: southern California's experiences with emissions trading |
| Author | Zhan, Xueyong |
| Author email | xzhan@usc.edu; xueyongzhan@gmail.com |
| Degree | Doctor of Philosophy |
| Document type | Dissertation |
| Degree program | Public Administration |
| School | School of Policy, Planning, and Development |
| Date defended/completed | 2008-07-01 |
| Date submitted | 2008 |
| Restricted until | Unrestricted |
| Date published | 2008-10-30 |
| Advisor (committee chair) | Tang, Shui-Yan |
| Advisor (committee member) |
Mazmanian, Daniel A. Henry, Ronald |
| Abstract | This research provides a positive explanation of the implementation processes and effects of market-based environmental policy by conducting a case study on RECLAIM (Regional Clean Air Incentives Market), the first regional emission permits trading program that has been implemented by South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) to address air pollution problems in the Los Angeles air basin since 1994.; Firstly, I developed a game theoretic model of environmental policy implementation. This model integrates theories of administrative rulemaking, policy implementation, institutional rational choice and transaction cost politics. I argue that administrative agency tries to minimize political transaction costs of policy implementation when writing rules.; Based on the formal model, I conducted a quantitative analysis to examine the interactions between SCAQMD and its key stakeholders, such as federal, state and local governments, businesses, and environmental NGOs, during the rulemaking of RECLAIM. I found that SCAQMD is more likely to adopt rule changes suggested by state and federal environmental agencies. This research identifies the dominant role of organized interest groups, the existence of interagency lobbying, and the lack of citizen control over the rulemaking of RECLAIM. Furthermore, I conducted an evaluation of the rules governing the RECLAIM program, and I identify the major distortions of the RECLAIM rules in comparison with an ideal cap-and-trade emissions trading market. Also, I used OLS regression to examine the effects of policy difference on emission level in California between 1990 and 1999. This evaluation fails to reject the null hypothesis that using cap-and-trade (CAT) compared with using command-and-control (CAC) has no different effects on emission of both NOx and SO2 from point sources at the county level in California in the 1990's.; In summary, this research finds that the implementation of emissions trading is political, and interest group politics may distort the regulatory design and implementation of an emissions trading program. While cap-and-trade is promising to better protect our environment and natural resources, its implementation is conditioned by many political and administrative factors. Inadequate rules may come as the results of political compromises, and they may impact the functioning of an emissions trading system. |
| Keyword | emissions trading; rulemaking; RECLAIM; implementation; environmental governance |
| Geographic subject (city or populated place) | Los Angeles |
| Geographic subject (state) | California |
| Coverage date | 1990/2000 |
| Language | English |
| Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
| Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
| Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
| Type | texts |
| Legacy record ID | usctheses-m1719 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Rights | Zhan, Xueyong |
| Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
| Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Filename | etd-Zhan-2335 |
| Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume44/etd-Zhan-2335.pdf |
Description
| Title | Page 125 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Full text | 114 5.4.3 Data In this research, I use county-level data of 58 counties of California where the emission of NOx and SO2 from point sources was regulated by either RECLAIM or command-and-control instruments between 1990 and 1999. A specific description of the time and geographic coverage of this research is presented in Table 5.3. Table 5. 3 Geographical and Period Coverage of This Research Geographic Area County 1990 to 1993 1994 to 1999 RECLAIM area (4 counties) Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino CAC CAT Non-RECLAIM area (54 counties) Alameda, Alpine, Amador, Butte, Calaveras, Colusa, Contra Costa, Del Norte, El Dorado, Fresno, Glenn, Humboldt, Imperial, Inyo, Kern, Kings, Lake, Lassen, Madera, Marin, Mariposa, Mendocino, Merced, Modoc, Mono, Monterey, Napa, Nevada, Placer, Plumas, Sacramento, San Benito , San Diego , San Francisco , San Joaquin , San Luis Obispo , San Mateo, Santa Barbara, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Shasta, Sierra, Siskiyou, Solano, Sonoma, Stanislaus, Sutter, Tehama, Trinity, Tulare, Tuolumne, Ventura, Yolo, Yuba. CAC CAC Pollutants: Nitrogen Oxides, Sulfur Dioxide CAC: Command-and-control CAT: Cap-and-trade Data sources (1) Annual emission level of SO2 and NOx The annual emissions of SO2 and NOx from point sources at the county-level are taken from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. These data were obtained from EPA's National Emission Inventory (NEI) and National Emissions Trend (NET) database, which are used by the U.S. EPA to provide online annual data of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide emission from both point sources and area sources of |
