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110 Previous research on RECLAIM’s effectiveness has focused on the facilities covered by RECLAIM (EPA, 2004, Harrison, 2005); yet the validity of previous evaluations may be challenged by the fact that the number of facilities covered by RECLAIM is not constant over these years. For example, the original RECLAIM universe has 394 facilities in 1994; yet from 1994 trough June 30, 2005, 107 new facilities were added into the universe while 69 were excluded, and 128 facilities ceased operation. 32 Thus, an evaluation of RECLAIM needs to address a more reliable definition of the unit of analysis. In this research, I choose to focus on the total emissions from all point sources,33 which include both RECLAIM facilities and non-RECLAIM facilities. I ask the question whether the implementation of RECLAIM has helped achieve the goal of emissions reduction from point sources in Los Angeles air basin, compared with emissions from point sources at counties in the State of California where emission of SO2 and NOx are not covered by the emissions trading system. Since point sources are usually the major target of environmental policy, such a treatment may have important implications. However, it is also important to note here that while 32 Source: SCAQMD (2008), Annual RECLAIM Audit Report for the 2006 Compliance Year, March 7, 2008. 33 As defined by the EPA, point sources are those “emit or have the potential to emit at least 10 tons per year of any one hazardous air pollutants, or at least 25 tons per year of a combination of hazardous air pollutants”; area sources are “stationary sources that do not exceed the thresholds for major source designation. They emit less than 10 tons per year of a single hazardous air pollutant and less than 25 tons per year of all hazardous air pollutants combined.” For details, see the website of Environmental Protection Agency, http://www.epa.gov/air/data/neidb.html.
Object Description
Title | Processes, effects, and the implementation of market-based environmental policy: southern California's experiences with emissions trading |
Author | Zhan, Xueyong |
Author email | xzhan@usc.edu; xueyongzhan@gmail.com |
Degree | Doctor of Philosophy |
Document type | Dissertation |
Degree program | Public Administration |
School | School of Policy, Planning, and Development |
Date defended/completed | 2008-07-01 |
Date submitted | 2008 |
Restricted until | Unrestricted |
Date published | 2008-10-30 |
Advisor (committee chair) | Tang, Shui-Yan |
Advisor (committee member) |
Mazmanian, Daniel A. Henry, Ronald |
Abstract | This research provides a positive explanation of the implementation processes and effects of market-based environmental policy by conducting a case study on RECLAIM (Regional Clean Air Incentives Market), the first regional emission permits trading program that has been implemented by South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) to address air pollution problems in the Los Angeles air basin since 1994.; Firstly, I developed a game theoretic model of environmental policy implementation. This model integrates theories of administrative rulemaking, policy implementation, institutional rational choice and transaction cost politics. I argue that administrative agency tries to minimize political transaction costs of policy implementation when writing rules.; Based on the formal model, I conducted a quantitative analysis to examine the interactions between SCAQMD and its key stakeholders, such as federal, state and local governments, businesses, and environmental NGOs, during the rulemaking of RECLAIM. I found that SCAQMD is more likely to adopt rule changes suggested by state and federal environmental agencies. This research identifies the dominant role of organized interest groups, the existence of interagency lobbying, and the lack of citizen control over the rulemaking of RECLAIM. Furthermore, I conducted an evaluation of the rules governing the RECLAIM program, and I identify the major distortions of the RECLAIM rules in comparison with an ideal cap-and-trade emissions trading market. Also, I used OLS regression to examine the effects of policy difference on emission level in California between 1990 and 1999. This evaluation fails to reject the null hypothesis that using cap-and-trade (CAT) compared with using command-and-control (CAC) has no different effects on emission of both NOx and SO2 from point sources at the county level in California in the 1990's.; In summary, this research finds that the implementation of emissions trading is political, and interest group politics may distort the regulatory design and implementation of an emissions trading program. While cap-and-trade is promising to better protect our environment and natural resources, its implementation is conditioned by many political and administrative factors. Inadequate rules may come as the results of political compromises, and they may impact the functioning of an emissions trading system. |
Keyword | emissions trading; rulemaking; RECLAIM; implementation; environmental governance |
Geographic subject (city or populated place) | Los Angeles |
Geographic subject (state) | California |
Coverage date | 1990/2000 |
Language | English |
Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
Type | texts |
Legacy record ID | usctheses-m1719 |
Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
Rights | Zhan, Xueyong |
Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
Filename | etd-Zhan-2335 |
Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume44/etd-Zhan-2335.pdf |
Description
Title | Page 121 |
Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
Full text | 110 Previous research on RECLAIM’s effectiveness has focused on the facilities covered by RECLAIM (EPA, 2004, Harrison, 2005); yet the validity of previous evaluations may be challenged by the fact that the number of facilities covered by RECLAIM is not constant over these years. For example, the original RECLAIM universe has 394 facilities in 1994; yet from 1994 trough June 30, 2005, 107 new facilities were added into the universe while 69 were excluded, and 128 facilities ceased operation. 32 Thus, an evaluation of RECLAIM needs to address a more reliable definition of the unit of analysis. In this research, I choose to focus on the total emissions from all point sources,33 which include both RECLAIM facilities and non-RECLAIM facilities. I ask the question whether the implementation of RECLAIM has helped achieve the goal of emissions reduction from point sources in Los Angeles air basin, compared with emissions from point sources at counties in the State of California where emission of SO2 and NOx are not covered by the emissions trading system. Since point sources are usually the major target of environmental policy, such a treatment may have important implications. However, it is also important to note here that while 32 Source: SCAQMD (2008), Annual RECLAIM Audit Report for the 2006 Compliance Year, March 7, 2008. 33 As defined by the EPA, point sources are those “emit or have the potential to emit at least 10 tons per year of any one hazardous air pollutants, or at least 25 tons per year of a combination of hazardous air pollutants”; area sources are “stationary sources that do not exceed the thresholds for major source designation. They emit less than 10 tons per year of a single hazardous air pollutant and less than 25 tons per year of all hazardous air pollutants combined.” For details, see the website of Environmental Protection Agency, http://www.epa.gov/air/data/neidb.html. |