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109
While theoretically a well-functioning emissions trading system can create
strong incentives for technological innovation, permits saving, and active trading, in
reality key stakeholders may impact the design and the performance of emissions
trading. RECLAIM’s experiences have highlighted the vulnerability of environmental
market to interest group politics. When the prices of RTCs are low, the industrial
participants do not actively participate in emissions trading or adopt new technology.
When the prices of RTCs are high, industrial participants will try to lobby the
government to increase the cap. Thus, an environmental market is subject to political
manipulation by special interest politics.
5.4 Assessing the Effectiveness: A Quantitative Approach
The purpose of this section is to use an alternative approach to examine the
effects of RECLAIM on SOx and NOx compliance in the Southern California.
RECLAIM originally attempted to reduce 83% of the emission of NOx and 65% of the
emission of SOx in a ten year frame from 1994 to 2003 (Mazmanian, 1999). As shown
in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2, annual emissions of NOx and SO2 from RECLAIM
facilities have gradually declined since the implementation in 1994. By the end of
2003, emissions of NOx is 60.7% off the 1994 level, and emissions of SOx is 46.7%
off the 1994 level. In the year of 2006, emissions of NOx is 63.8% off the 1994 level,
and emissions of SOx is 50.5% off the 1994 level. While these numbers are significant,
they have not achieved the original goal. Also, during the year 2000 and 2001,
emissions of NOx exceeded the allocation by 19% and 0.18%, respectively.
Object Description
| Title | Processes, effects, and the implementation of market-based environmental policy: southern California's experiences with emissions trading |
| Author | Zhan, Xueyong |
| Author email | xzhan@usc.edu; xueyongzhan@gmail.com |
| Degree | Doctor of Philosophy |
| Document type | Dissertation |
| Degree program | Public Administration |
| School | School of Policy, Planning, and Development |
| Date defended/completed | 2008-07-01 |
| Date submitted | 2008 |
| Restricted until | Unrestricted |
| Date published | 2008-10-30 |
| Advisor (committee chair) | Tang, Shui-Yan |
| Advisor (committee member) |
Mazmanian, Daniel A. Henry, Ronald |
| Abstract | This research provides a positive explanation of the implementation processes and effects of market-based environmental policy by conducting a case study on RECLAIM (Regional Clean Air Incentives Market), the first regional emission permits trading program that has been implemented by South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) to address air pollution problems in the Los Angeles air basin since 1994.; Firstly, I developed a game theoretic model of environmental policy implementation. This model integrates theories of administrative rulemaking, policy implementation, institutional rational choice and transaction cost politics. I argue that administrative agency tries to minimize political transaction costs of policy implementation when writing rules.; Based on the formal model, I conducted a quantitative analysis to examine the interactions between SCAQMD and its key stakeholders, such as federal, state and local governments, businesses, and environmental NGOs, during the rulemaking of RECLAIM. I found that SCAQMD is more likely to adopt rule changes suggested by state and federal environmental agencies. This research identifies the dominant role of organized interest groups, the existence of interagency lobbying, and the lack of citizen control over the rulemaking of RECLAIM. Furthermore, I conducted an evaluation of the rules governing the RECLAIM program, and I identify the major distortions of the RECLAIM rules in comparison with an ideal cap-and-trade emissions trading market. Also, I used OLS regression to examine the effects of policy difference on emission level in California between 1990 and 1999. This evaluation fails to reject the null hypothesis that using cap-and-trade (CAT) compared with using command-and-control (CAC) has no different effects on emission of both NOx and SO2 from point sources at the county level in California in the 1990's.; In summary, this research finds that the implementation of emissions trading is political, and interest group politics may distort the regulatory design and implementation of an emissions trading program. While cap-and-trade is promising to better protect our environment and natural resources, its implementation is conditioned by many political and administrative factors. Inadequate rules may come as the results of political compromises, and they may impact the functioning of an emissions trading system. |
| Keyword | emissions trading; rulemaking; RECLAIM; implementation; environmental governance |
| Geographic subject (city or populated place) | Los Angeles |
| Geographic subject (state) | California |
| Coverage date | 1990/2000 |
| Language | English |
| Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
| Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
| Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
| Type | texts |
| Legacy record ID | usctheses-m1719 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Rights | Zhan, Xueyong |
| Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
| Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Filename | etd-Zhan-2335 |
| Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume44/etd-Zhan-2335.pdf |
Description
| Title | Page 120 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Full text | 109 While theoretically a well-functioning emissions trading system can create strong incentives for technological innovation, permits saving, and active trading, in reality key stakeholders may impact the design and the performance of emissions trading. RECLAIM’s experiences have highlighted the vulnerability of environmental market to interest group politics. When the prices of RTCs are low, the industrial participants do not actively participate in emissions trading or adopt new technology. When the prices of RTCs are high, industrial participants will try to lobby the government to increase the cap. Thus, an environmental market is subject to political manipulation by special interest politics. 5.4 Assessing the Effectiveness: A Quantitative Approach The purpose of this section is to use an alternative approach to examine the effects of RECLAIM on SOx and NOx compliance in the Southern California. RECLAIM originally attempted to reduce 83% of the emission of NOx and 65% of the emission of SOx in a ten year frame from 1994 to 2003 (Mazmanian, 1999). As shown in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2, annual emissions of NOx and SO2 from RECLAIM facilities have gradually declined since the implementation in 1994. By the end of 2003, emissions of NOx is 60.7% off the 1994 level, and emissions of SOx is 46.7% off the 1994 level. In the year of 2006, emissions of NOx is 63.8% off the 1994 level, and emissions of SOx is 50.5% off the 1994 level. While these numbers are significant, they have not achieved the original goal. Also, during the year 2000 and 2001, emissions of NOx exceeded the allocation by 19% and 0.18%, respectively. |
