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108
state or nation because RECLAIM is too tough”30. Drury et al. (1999) criticize that
under the rule of the RECLAIM program, the industrial participant “decides whether
to reduce emissions or to use pollution credits” (Drury et al, 1999, p. 281), and they
argue that citizens who are negatively influenced by the emissions traded into their
communities can do little because the industry has the “right” of emission (RTCs), and
it is more difficult for communities to monitor the emission activities of the industrial
facilities in market-based environmental governance (Drury et al., 1999). Therefore,
technological innovation may be difficult if industrial participants are sensitive to
neither prices nor public pressures. The lack of citizen participation in RECLAIM may
have reduced the legitimacy of RECLAIM. Since conceptually emission credits are
not defined as private goods but “public bads”, the involvement of citizen participation
may be necessary for a more democratic process of implementation, which may ensure
both environmental justice and effectiveness. However, one senior official of
SCAQMD admits that the radical position of NGOs usually “leaves no room for
negotiations”.31
In contrast to the position of some environmental NGOs, EPA, California Air
Resources Board, and SCAQMD continue to support the implementation of
RECLAIM. They believe that RECLAIM has really improved air quality. For
example, the Annual RECLAIM Audit Report for the 2002 Compliance Year of the
SCAQMD stated that “there is no toxic impact due to the implementation of the
RECLAIM program” (SCAQMD, 2004, p. 5).
30 Interviewee from Coalition For Clean Air.
31 Interviewee from SCAQMD.
Object Description
| Title | Processes, effects, and the implementation of market-based environmental policy: southern California's experiences with emissions trading |
| Author | Zhan, Xueyong |
| Author email | xzhan@usc.edu; xueyongzhan@gmail.com |
| Degree | Doctor of Philosophy |
| Document type | Dissertation |
| Degree program | Public Administration |
| School | School of Policy, Planning, and Development |
| Date defended/completed | 2008-07-01 |
| Date submitted | 2008 |
| Restricted until | Unrestricted |
| Date published | 2008-10-30 |
| Advisor (committee chair) | Tang, Shui-Yan |
| Advisor (committee member) |
Mazmanian, Daniel A. Henry, Ronald |
| Abstract | This research provides a positive explanation of the implementation processes and effects of market-based environmental policy by conducting a case study on RECLAIM (Regional Clean Air Incentives Market), the first regional emission permits trading program that has been implemented by South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) to address air pollution problems in the Los Angeles air basin since 1994.; Firstly, I developed a game theoretic model of environmental policy implementation. This model integrates theories of administrative rulemaking, policy implementation, institutional rational choice and transaction cost politics. I argue that administrative agency tries to minimize political transaction costs of policy implementation when writing rules.; Based on the formal model, I conducted a quantitative analysis to examine the interactions between SCAQMD and its key stakeholders, such as federal, state and local governments, businesses, and environmental NGOs, during the rulemaking of RECLAIM. I found that SCAQMD is more likely to adopt rule changes suggested by state and federal environmental agencies. This research identifies the dominant role of organized interest groups, the existence of interagency lobbying, and the lack of citizen control over the rulemaking of RECLAIM. Furthermore, I conducted an evaluation of the rules governing the RECLAIM program, and I identify the major distortions of the RECLAIM rules in comparison with an ideal cap-and-trade emissions trading market. Also, I used OLS regression to examine the effects of policy difference on emission level in California between 1990 and 1999. This evaluation fails to reject the null hypothesis that using cap-and-trade (CAT) compared with using command-and-control (CAC) has no different effects on emission of both NOx and SO2 from point sources at the county level in California in the 1990's.; In summary, this research finds that the implementation of emissions trading is political, and interest group politics may distort the regulatory design and implementation of an emissions trading program. While cap-and-trade is promising to better protect our environment and natural resources, its implementation is conditioned by many political and administrative factors. Inadequate rules may come as the results of political compromises, and they may impact the functioning of an emissions trading system. |
| Keyword | emissions trading; rulemaking; RECLAIM; implementation; environmental governance |
| Geographic subject (city or populated place) | Los Angeles |
| Geographic subject (state) | California |
| Coverage date | 1990/2000 |
| Language | English |
| Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
| Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
| Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
| Type | texts |
| Legacy record ID | usctheses-m1719 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Rights | Zhan, Xueyong |
| Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
| Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Filename | etd-Zhan-2335 |
| Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume44/etd-Zhan-2335.pdf |
Description
| Title | Page 119 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Full text | 108 state or nation because RECLAIM is too tough”30. Drury et al. (1999) criticize that under the rule of the RECLAIM program, the industrial participant “decides whether to reduce emissions or to use pollution credits” (Drury et al, 1999, p. 281), and they argue that citizens who are negatively influenced by the emissions traded into their communities can do little because the industry has the “right” of emission (RTCs), and it is more difficult for communities to monitor the emission activities of the industrial facilities in market-based environmental governance (Drury et al., 1999). Therefore, technological innovation may be difficult if industrial participants are sensitive to neither prices nor public pressures. The lack of citizen participation in RECLAIM may have reduced the legitimacy of RECLAIM. Since conceptually emission credits are not defined as private goods but “public bads”, the involvement of citizen participation may be necessary for a more democratic process of implementation, which may ensure both environmental justice and effectiveness. However, one senior official of SCAQMD admits that the radical position of NGOs usually “leaves no room for negotiations”.31 In contrast to the position of some environmental NGOs, EPA, California Air Resources Board, and SCAQMD continue to support the implementation of RECLAIM. They believe that RECLAIM has really improved air quality. For example, the Annual RECLAIM Audit Report for the 2002 Compliance Year of the SCAQMD stated that “there is no toxic impact due to the implementation of the RECLAIM program” (SCAQMD, 2004, p. 5). 30 Interviewee from Coalition For Clean Air. 31 Interviewee from SCAQMD. |
