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103
SCAQMD indicated RECLAIM could not have been adopted if there were no
over-allocation of RTCs.25
Table 5. 1 Annual Permit Allocations and Real Emissions of NOx (1994 – 2006)
Annual NOx
Emissions
(tons)
% Change
from 1994
Total NOx
RTCs (tons)
NOx RTCs
Left Over
(tons)
NOx RTCs
Left Over
(%)
1994 25,314 0.0% 40,127 14,813 37%
1995 25,764 1.8% 36,031 10,267 28%
1996 24,796 -2.0% 32,017 7,221 23%
1997 21,786 -13.9% 27,919 6,133 22%
1998 20,982 -17.1% 24,678 3,696 15%
1999 20,775 -17.9% 21,013 238 1.1%
2000 20,491 -19.1% 17,197 -3,294 -19%
2001 15,721 -37.9% 15,693 -28 -0.18%
2002 10,943 -56.8% 14,044 3,101 22%
2003 9,942 -60.7% 12,484 2,542 20%
2004 9,953 -60.7% 12,477 2,524 20%
2005 9,556 -62.3% 12,484 2,928 23%
2006 9,166 -63.8% 12,487 3,321 27%
Source of Data: This table is quoted directly from SCAQMD (2008), Annual RECLAIM Audit Report
for the 2006 Compliance Year, March 7, 2008.
Figure 5. 1. Permit Allocations and Real Emissions of NOx (1994 – 2006)
NOx (1994 – 2006)
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
45,000
19 94
19 95
1996
1997
1998
1999
20 00
2001
2002
20 03
20 04
2005
2006
Year
Emissions
Annual Emissions
Allocation of RTCs
25 Global Warming Emissions Cap and Trade Program Forum --the RECLAIM Example, April 26,
2007, Diamond Bar, CA.
Object Description
| Title | Processes, effects, and the implementation of market-based environmental policy: southern California's experiences with emissions trading |
| Author | Zhan, Xueyong |
| Author email | xzhan@usc.edu; xueyongzhan@gmail.com |
| Degree | Doctor of Philosophy |
| Document type | Dissertation |
| Degree program | Public Administration |
| School | School of Policy, Planning, and Development |
| Date defended/completed | 2008-07-01 |
| Date submitted | 2008 |
| Restricted until | Unrestricted |
| Date published | 2008-10-30 |
| Advisor (committee chair) | Tang, Shui-Yan |
| Advisor (committee member) |
Mazmanian, Daniel A. Henry, Ronald |
| Abstract | This research provides a positive explanation of the implementation processes and effects of market-based environmental policy by conducting a case study on RECLAIM (Regional Clean Air Incentives Market), the first regional emission permits trading program that has been implemented by South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) to address air pollution problems in the Los Angeles air basin since 1994.; Firstly, I developed a game theoretic model of environmental policy implementation. This model integrates theories of administrative rulemaking, policy implementation, institutional rational choice and transaction cost politics. I argue that administrative agency tries to minimize political transaction costs of policy implementation when writing rules.; Based on the formal model, I conducted a quantitative analysis to examine the interactions between SCAQMD and its key stakeholders, such as federal, state and local governments, businesses, and environmental NGOs, during the rulemaking of RECLAIM. I found that SCAQMD is more likely to adopt rule changes suggested by state and federal environmental agencies. This research identifies the dominant role of organized interest groups, the existence of interagency lobbying, and the lack of citizen control over the rulemaking of RECLAIM. Furthermore, I conducted an evaluation of the rules governing the RECLAIM program, and I identify the major distortions of the RECLAIM rules in comparison with an ideal cap-and-trade emissions trading market. Also, I used OLS regression to examine the effects of policy difference on emission level in California between 1990 and 1999. This evaluation fails to reject the null hypothesis that using cap-and-trade (CAT) compared with using command-and-control (CAC) has no different effects on emission of both NOx and SO2 from point sources at the county level in California in the 1990's.; In summary, this research finds that the implementation of emissions trading is political, and interest group politics may distort the regulatory design and implementation of an emissions trading program. While cap-and-trade is promising to better protect our environment and natural resources, its implementation is conditioned by many political and administrative factors. Inadequate rules may come as the results of political compromises, and they may impact the functioning of an emissions trading system. |
| Keyword | emissions trading; rulemaking; RECLAIM; implementation; environmental governance |
| Geographic subject (city or populated place) | Los Angeles |
| Geographic subject (state) | California |
| Coverage date | 1990/2000 |
| Language | English |
| Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
| Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
| Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
| Type | texts |
| Legacy record ID | usctheses-m1719 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Rights | Zhan, Xueyong |
| Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
| Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Filename | etd-Zhan-2335 |
| Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume44/etd-Zhan-2335.pdf |
Description
| Title | Page 114 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Full text | 103 SCAQMD indicated RECLAIM could not have been adopted if there were no over-allocation of RTCs.25 Table 5. 1 Annual Permit Allocations and Real Emissions of NOx (1994 – 2006) Annual NOx Emissions (tons) % Change from 1994 Total NOx RTCs (tons) NOx RTCs Left Over (tons) NOx RTCs Left Over (%) 1994 25,314 0.0% 40,127 14,813 37% 1995 25,764 1.8% 36,031 10,267 28% 1996 24,796 -2.0% 32,017 7,221 23% 1997 21,786 -13.9% 27,919 6,133 22% 1998 20,982 -17.1% 24,678 3,696 15% 1999 20,775 -17.9% 21,013 238 1.1% 2000 20,491 -19.1% 17,197 -3,294 -19% 2001 15,721 -37.9% 15,693 -28 -0.18% 2002 10,943 -56.8% 14,044 3,101 22% 2003 9,942 -60.7% 12,484 2,542 20% 2004 9,953 -60.7% 12,477 2,524 20% 2005 9,556 -62.3% 12,484 2,928 23% 2006 9,166 -63.8% 12,487 3,321 27% Source of Data: This table is quoted directly from SCAQMD (2008), Annual RECLAIM Audit Report for the 2006 Compliance Year, March 7, 2008. Figure 5. 1. Permit Allocations and Real Emissions of NOx (1994 – 2006) NOx (1994 – 2006) 0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 45,000 19 94 19 95 1996 1997 1998 1999 20 00 2001 2002 20 03 20 04 2005 2006 Year Emissions Annual Emissions Allocation of RTCs 25 Global Warming Emissions Cap and Trade Program Forum --the RECLAIM Example, April 26, 2007, Diamond Bar, CA. |
