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89
Moreover, the interaction dynamics between SCAQMD and its stakeholders
seems to be quite different before and after the RECLAIM is formally enacted. Does
the agency face quite different political and policy environment between the two
stages? The answer might be “Yes”. The fourth finding implies that the nature and
level of political resistance during rule formation stage might be different from that in
the rule revision stage when implementation is already initiated. A similar argument
was raised by James Q. Wilson and later interpreted by Avinash K. Dixit:
Agencies accept innovations that improve their ability to perform the existing
and accepted tasks, but changing the tasks in any significant way, or reducing
the autonomy of the agency in carrying them out, is fiercely resisted (Dixit,
1996, p. 25).
In this case, SCAQMD’s responses to public comments are consistent with
Dixit’s argument. Yet its implication may need future empirical investigation. On the
other hand, we can also get some clues from the creation of the U.S. EPA. As argued
by Alfred Marcus:
The creation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970 and the
passage shortly thereafter of statutes giving the new agency broad powers to
reduce pollution were political moves informed by a theory of how to best
prevent a regulatory agency from being ‘captured’ by industry of affiliated
with bureaucratic sloth (Marcus, 1980, p. 267).
SCAQMD’s role in RECLAIM rulemaking illustrates that Marcus’s argument
may also be applied to local environmental agencies, especially to special-purpose
governmental agencies. As a non-elected governmental agency with substantial
special knowledge in emissions trading as well as a strict policy goal of emission
control, SCAQMD has to rely more on their own expertise and to be tough on the
general public during the rulemaking process. This raises an interesting question about
Object Description
| Title | Processes, effects, and the implementation of market-based environmental policy: southern California's experiences with emissions trading |
| Author | Zhan, Xueyong |
| Author email | xzhan@usc.edu; xueyongzhan@gmail.com |
| Degree | Doctor of Philosophy |
| Document type | Dissertation |
| Degree program | Public Administration |
| School | School of Policy, Planning, and Development |
| Date defended/completed | 2008-07-01 |
| Date submitted | 2008 |
| Restricted until | Unrestricted |
| Date published | 2008-10-30 |
| Advisor (committee chair) | Tang, Shui-Yan |
| Advisor (committee member) |
Mazmanian, Daniel A. Henry, Ronald |
| Abstract | This research provides a positive explanation of the implementation processes and effects of market-based environmental policy by conducting a case study on RECLAIM (Regional Clean Air Incentives Market), the first regional emission permits trading program that has been implemented by South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) to address air pollution problems in the Los Angeles air basin since 1994.; Firstly, I developed a game theoretic model of environmental policy implementation. This model integrates theories of administrative rulemaking, policy implementation, institutional rational choice and transaction cost politics. I argue that administrative agency tries to minimize political transaction costs of policy implementation when writing rules.; Based on the formal model, I conducted a quantitative analysis to examine the interactions between SCAQMD and its key stakeholders, such as federal, state and local governments, businesses, and environmental NGOs, during the rulemaking of RECLAIM. I found that SCAQMD is more likely to adopt rule changes suggested by state and federal environmental agencies. This research identifies the dominant role of organized interest groups, the existence of interagency lobbying, and the lack of citizen control over the rulemaking of RECLAIM. Furthermore, I conducted an evaluation of the rules governing the RECLAIM program, and I identify the major distortions of the RECLAIM rules in comparison with an ideal cap-and-trade emissions trading market. Also, I used OLS regression to examine the effects of policy difference on emission level in California between 1990 and 1999. This evaluation fails to reject the null hypothesis that using cap-and-trade (CAT) compared with using command-and-control (CAC) has no different effects on emission of both NOx and SO2 from point sources at the county level in California in the 1990's.; In summary, this research finds that the implementation of emissions trading is political, and interest group politics may distort the regulatory design and implementation of an emissions trading program. While cap-and-trade is promising to better protect our environment and natural resources, its implementation is conditioned by many political and administrative factors. Inadequate rules may come as the results of political compromises, and they may impact the functioning of an emissions trading system. |
| Keyword | emissions trading; rulemaking; RECLAIM; implementation; environmental governance |
| Geographic subject (city or populated place) | Los Angeles |
| Geographic subject (state) | California |
| Coverage date | 1990/2000 |
| Language | English |
| Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
| Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
| Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
| Type | texts |
| Legacy record ID | usctheses-m1719 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Rights | Zhan, Xueyong |
| Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
| Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Filename | etd-Zhan-2335 |
| Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume44/etd-Zhan-2335.pdf |
Description
| Title | Page 100 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Full text | 89 Moreover, the interaction dynamics between SCAQMD and its stakeholders seems to be quite different before and after the RECLAIM is formally enacted. Does the agency face quite different political and policy environment between the two stages? The answer might be “Yes”. The fourth finding implies that the nature and level of political resistance during rule formation stage might be different from that in the rule revision stage when implementation is already initiated. A similar argument was raised by James Q. Wilson and later interpreted by Avinash K. Dixit: Agencies accept innovations that improve their ability to perform the existing and accepted tasks, but changing the tasks in any significant way, or reducing the autonomy of the agency in carrying them out, is fiercely resisted (Dixit, 1996, p. 25). In this case, SCAQMD’s responses to public comments are consistent with Dixit’s argument. Yet its implication may need future empirical investigation. On the other hand, we can also get some clues from the creation of the U.S. EPA. As argued by Alfred Marcus: The creation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970 and the passage shortly thereafter of statutes giving the new agency broad powers to reduce pollution were political moves informed by a theory of how to best prevent a regulatory agency from being ‘captured’ by industry of affiliated with bureaucratic sloth (Marcus, 1980, p. 267). SCAQMD’s role in RECLAIM rulemaking illustrates that Marcus’s argument may also be applied to local environmental agencies, especially to special-purpose governmental agencies. As a non-elected governmental agency with substantial special knowledge in emissions trading as well as a strict policy goal of emission control, SCAQMD has to rely more on their own expertise and to be tough on the general public during the rulemaking process. This raises an interesting question about |
