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businesses, environmental groups, and governmental agencies from local, state and
federal levels. It seems that individual citizen participation does not happen a lot in
this process. Second, the agency has bias towards different groups. While comments
from governmental agencies are more likely to lead to rule changes or agency actions
in rulemaking, comments from businesses and NGOs are relatively disfavored. Stated
differently, this special-purpose government is not easily captured by either businesses
or NGOs. Third, as suggested by the sign and significance of variable “Market” in
Model B2 and B3, it seems that SCAQMD was attentive to market-oriented
suggestions. Finally, the sign of “Stage” suggests that SCAQMD was less likely to
change the rules during the rule revision stage.
The second finding is especially intriguing. The allegation (Drury et al., 1999)
that businesses are favored by SCAQMD is not supported by this research. Unlike
previous studies on rulemaking (Yackee and Yackee, 2006), this research fails to
identify that regulators have a favorable bias towards business groups during
rulemaking, an argument strongly supported by traditional capture theory. This
research also confirms Thompson’s finding that environmental groups are not favored
by SCAQMD (Thompson, 2000). This research concurs with Kamieniecki’s finding
that environmental agency has not been significantly impacted by business groups
during the rulemaking process (Kamieniecki, 2006).
Also, as suggested by the third empirical finding, when there are conflicts
between democratic principle and market principle, this implementation agency has
chosen to defend the market principle, which is the foundation of emissions trading
systems. This is a fact that economists may want to applaud.
Object Description
| Title | Processes, effects, and the implementation of market-based environmental policy: southern California's experiences with emissions trading |
| Author | Zhan, Xueyong |
| Author email | xzhan@usc.edu; xueyongzhan@gmail.com |
| Degree | Doctor of Philosophy |
| Document type | Dissertation |
| Degree program | Public Administration |
| School | School of Policy, Planning, and Development |
| Date defended/completed | 2008-07-01 |
| Date submitted | 2008 |
| Restricted until | Unrestricted |
| Date published | 2008-10-30 |
| Advisor (committee chair) | Tang, Shui-Yan |
| Advisor (committee member) |
Mazmanian, Daniel A. Henry, Ronald |
| Abstract | This research provides a positive explanation of the implementation processes and effects of market-based environmental policy by conducting a case study on RECLAIM (Regional Clean Air Incentives Market), the first regional emission permits trading program that has been implemented by South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) to address air pollution problems in the Los Angeles air basin since 1994.; Firstly, I developed a game theoretic model of environmental policy implementation. This model integrates theories of administrative rulemaking, policy implementation, institutional rational choice and transaction cost politics. I argue that administrative agency tries to minimize political transaction costs of policy implementation when writing rules.; Based on the formal model, I conducted a quantitative analysis to examine the interactions between SCAQMD and its key stakeholders, such as federal, state and local governments, businesses, and environmental NGOs, during the rulemaking of RECLAIM. I found that SCAQMD is more likely to adopt rule changes suggested by state and federal environmental agencies. This research identifies the dominant role of organized interest groups, the existence of interagency lobbying, and the lack of citizen control over the rulemaking of RECLAIM. Furthermore, I conducted an evaluation of the rules governing the RECLAIM program, and I identify the major distortions of the RECLAIM rules in comparison with an ideal cap-and-trade emissions trading market. Also, I used OLS regression to examine the effects of policy difference on emission level in California between 1990 and 1999. This evaluation fails to reject the null hypothesis that using cap-and-trade (CAT) compared with using command-and-control (CAC) has no different effects on emission of both NOx and SO2 from point sources at the county level in California in the 1990's.; In summary, this research finds that the implementation of emissions trading is political, and interest group politics may distort the regulatory design and implementation of an emissions trading program. While cap-and-trade is promising to better protect our environment and natural resources, its implementation is conditioned by many political and administrative factors. Inadequate rules may come as the results of political compromises, and they may impact the functioning of an emissions trading system. |
| Keyword | emissions trading; rulemaking; RECLAIM; implementation; environmental governance |
| Geographic subject (city or populated place) | Los Angeles |
| Geographic subject (state) | California |
| Coverage date | 1990/2000 |
| Language | English |
| Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
| Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
| Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
| Type | texts |
| Legacy record ID | usctheses-m1719 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Rights | Zhan, Xueyong |
| Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
| Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Filename | etd-Zhan-2335 |
| Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume44/etd-Zhan-2335.pdf |
Description
| Title | Page 99 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Full text | 88 businesses, environmental groups, and governmental agencies from local, state and federal levels. It seems that individual citizen participation does not happen a lot in this process. Second, the agency has bias towards different groups. While comments from governmental agencies are more likely to lead to rule changes or agency actions in rulemaking, comments from businesses and NGOs are relatively disfavored. Stated differently, this special-purpose government is not easily captured by either businesses or NGOs. Third, as suggested by the sign and significance of variable “Market” in Model B2 and B3, it seems that SCAQMD was attentive to market-oriented suggestions. Finally, the sign of “Stage” suggests that SCAQMD was less likely to change the rules during the rule revision stage. The second finding is especially intriguing. The allegation (Drury et al., 1999) that businesses are favored by SCAQMD is not supported by this research. Unlike previous studies on rulemaking (Yackee and Yackee, 2006), this research fails to identify that regulators have a favorable bias towards business groups during rulemaking, an argument strongly supported by traditional capture theory. This research also confirms Thompson’s finding that environmental groups are not favored by SCAQMD (Thompson, 2000). This research concurs with Kamieniecki’s finding that environmental agency has not been significantly impacted by business groups during the rulemaking process (Kamieniecki, 2006). Also, as suggested by the third empirical finding, when there are conflicts between democratic principle and market principle, this implementation agency has chosen to defend the market principle, which is the foundation of emissions trading systems. This is a fact that economists may want to applaud. |
