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80
market-orientation, and enforcement flexibility. Finally, this research treats stage as a
major control variable, in addition to public salience and technical complexity. This
strategy is used to capture not only political and technological variations but also the
timing of rulemaking. SPSS was used to conduct a binary logistic regression to
examine the influence of stakeholder comments on SCAQMD’s responses.
Suggested change analysis
Public comments on rulemaking usually call for specific changes in regulatory
language. In the RECLAIM program, most of the comments focus on specific issues,
and SCAQMD has to decide whether to adopt these suggestions. If the commenter
calls for more governmental regulations, its regulatory direction will be coded as “1”.
If the commenter calls for less governmental regulations, it will be coded as “-1”. If a
comment has no specific regulatory direction, it will be coded as “0”. To capture the
complexity of regulatory directions suggested by comments, regulatory direction is
further decomposed into three dummy variables: “Goal” (cap change), “Enforcement”
(enforcement flexibility)”, and “Market” (market-orientation). These three dimensions
cover the major regulatory implications of public comments regarding the regulatory
mechanism of emissions trading implementation.
Bureaucratic response analysis
For almost every oral and/or written comment, SCAQMD has responded with
whether it would proceed to change the rule as suggested by the comment. Thus,
SCAQMD’s response can be categorized into two types: 1) no change; 2) SCAQMD
will go forward with the suggested changes.
Object Description
| Title | Processes, effects, and the implementation of market-based environmental policy: southern California's experiences with emissions trading |
| Author | Zhan, Xueyong |
| Author email | xzhan@usc.edu; xueyongzhan@gmail.com |
| Degree | Doctor of Philosophy |
| Document type | Dissertation |
| Degree program | Public Administration |
| School | School of Policy, Planning, and Development |
| Date defended/completed | 2008-07-01 |
| Date submitted | 2008 |
| Restricted until | Unrestricted |
| Date published | 2008-10-30 |
| Advisor (committee chair) | Tang, Shui-Yan |
| Advisor (committee member) |
Mazmanian, Daniel A. Henry, Ronald |
| Abstract | This research provides a positive explanation of the implementation processes and effects of market-based environmental policy by conducting a case study on RECLAIM (Regional Clean Air Incentives Market), the first regional emission permits trading program that has been implemented by South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) to address air pollution problems in the Los Angeles air basin since 1994.; Firstly, I developed a game theoretic model of environmental policy implementation. This model integrates theories of administrative rulemaking, policy implementation, institutional rational choice and transaction cost politics. I argue that administrative agency tries to minimize political transaction costs of policy implementation when writing rules.; Based on the formal model, I conducted a quantitative analysis to examine the interactions between SCAQMD and its key stakeholders, such as federal, state and local governments, businesses, and environmental NGOs, during the rulemaking of RECLAIM. I found that SCAQMD is more likely to adopt rule changes suggested by state and federal environmental agencies. This research identifies the dominant role of organized interest groups, the existence of interagency lobbying, and the lack of citizen control over the rulemaking of RECLAIM. Furthermore, I conducted an evaluation of the rules governing the RECLAIM program, and I identify the major distortions of the RECLAIM rules in comparison with an ideal cap-and-trade emissions trading market. Also, I used OLS regression to examine the effects of policy difference on emission level in California between 1990 and 1999. This evaluation fails to reject the null hypothesis that using cap-and-trade (CAT) compared with using command-and-control (CAC) has no different effects on emission of both NOx and SO2 from point sources at the county level in California in the 1990's.; In summary, this research finds that the implementation of emissions trading is political, and interest group politics may distort the regulatory design and implementation of an emissions trading program. While cap-and-trade is promising to better protect our environment and natural resources, its implementation is conditioned by many political and administrative factors. Inadequate rules may come as the results of political compromises, and they may impact the functioning of an emissions trading system. |
| Keyword | emissions trading; rulemaking; RECLAIM; implementation; environmental governance |
| Geographic subject (city or populated place) | Los Angeles |
| Geographic subject (state) | California |
| Coverage date | 1990/2000 |
| Language | English |
| Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
| Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
| Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
| Type | texts |
| Legacy record ID | usctheses-m1719 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Rights | Zhan, Xueyong |
| Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
| Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Filename | etd-Zhan-2335 |
| Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume44/etd-Zhan-2335.pdf |
Description
| Title | Page 91 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Full text | 80 market-orientation, and enforcement flexibility. Finally, this research treats stage as a major control variable, in addition to public salience and technical complexity. This strategy is used to capture not only political and technological variations but also the timing of rulemaking. SPSS was used to conduct a binary logistic regression to examine the influence of stakeholder comments on SCAQMD’s responses. Suggested change analysis Public comments on rulemaking usually call for specific changes in regulatory language. In the RECLAIM program, most of the comments focus on specific issues, and SCAQMD has to decide whether to adopt these suggestions. If the commenter calls for more governmental regulations, its regulatory direction will be coded as “1”. If the commenter calls for less governmental regulations, it will be coded as “-1”. If a comment has no specific regulatory direction, it will be coded as “0”. To capture the complexity of regulatory directions suggested by comments, regulatory direction is further decomposed into three dummy variables: “Goal” (cap change), “Enforcement” (enforcement flexibility)”, and “Market” (market-orientation). These three dimensions cover the major regulatory implications of public comments regarding the regulatory mechanism of emissions trading implementation. Bureaucratic response analysis For almost every oral and/or written comment, SCAQMD has responded with whether it would proceed to change the rule as suggested by the comment. Thus, SCAQMD’s response can be categorized into two types: 1) no change; 2) SCAQMD will go forward with the suggested changes. |
