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78
The first dataset contains 127 issue comments that are randomly selected from
the public comments during the rule formulation stage (1993). 25 letters from
different stakeholders during the rule formation state of RECLAIM are identified, and
2/3 of them (18 letters) were randomly selected for this analysis.17 Each comment
letter contained several issues, and the SCAQMD made specific responses of whether
they agree with this comment and whether to design the rule as suggested. The 18
letters include 512 issues, and I selected a stratified random sample of these issues for
analysis18. 127 issues were finally selected for analysis, and thus the comment
coverage rate is 24.9%.
The second dataset contains 75 issue comments that are randomly selected
from the rule revision stage (1994-2005). From 1994 to 2005, there are 74 rule
revisions to Regulation XX (Figure 4.1).
As far as the author identified, the rule revisions to Regulation XX had
received a total of 33 written letters of public comments submitted by various
stakeholders for RECLAIM’s rule revision between 1994 and 2005. There are also
hundreds of oral comments conveyed and recorded during the public hearing/meeting
activities, but these oral comments do not have any individual or organizational
affiliation information. The 22 letters were randomly selected from the total sample of
17 Regarding the 2/3 principle, this number was an arbitrary decision. Since the comment letters of rule
formation stage (before 1994) contains many more issue comments than those of the rule revision stage
(512 v.s. 75), I further used a stratified random sampling method to collect 127 issue comments from
the rule formation stage.
18 I used an online random number generator to get a random selection of numbers. The generator is
located at: http://www.mdani.demon.co.uk/para/random.htm. The stratified random sample is selected
in this way: for letters with less than 5 issues discussed, all issues were selected for analysis; for letters
with more than 5 issues discussed, either 5 or 20% of the total issues will be selected whichever comes
bigger.
Object Description
| Title | Processes, effects, and the implementation of market-based environmental policy: southern California's experiences with emissions trading |
| Author | Zhan, Xueyong |
| Author email | xzhan@usc.edu; xueyongzhan@gmail.com |
| Degree | Doctor of Philosophy |
| Document type | Dissertation |
| Degree program | Public Administration |
| School | School of Policy, Planning, and Development |
| Date defended/completed | 2008-07-01 |
| Date submitted | 2008 |
| Restricted until | Unrestricted |
| Date published | 2008-10-30 |
| Advisor (committee chair) | Tang, Shui-Yan |
| Advisor (committee member) |
Mazmanian, Daniel A. Henry, Ronald |
| Abstract | This research provides a positive explanation of the implementation processes and effects of market-based environmental policy by conducting a case study on RECLAIM (Regional Clean Air Incentives Market), the first regional emission permits trading program that has been implemented by South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) to address air pollution problems in the Los Angeles air basin since 1994.; Firstly, I developed a game theoretic model of environmental policy implementation. This model integrates theories of administrative rulemaking, policy implementation, institutional rational choice and transaction cost politics. I argue that administrative agency tries to minimize political transaction costs of policy implementation when writing rules.; Based on the formal model, I conducted a quantitative analysis to examine the interactions between SCAQMD and its key stakeholders, such as federal, state and local governments, businesses, and environmental NGOs, during the rulemaking of RECLAIM. I found that SCAQMD is more likely to adopt rule changes suggested by state and federal environmental agencies. This research identifies the dominant role of organized interest groups, the existence of interagency lobbying, and the lack of citizen control over the rulemaking of RECLAIM. Furthermore, I conducted an evaluation of the rules governing the RECLAIM program, and I identify the major distortions of the RECLAIM rules in comparison with an ideal cap-and-trade emissions trading market. Also, I used OLS regression to examine the effects of policy difference on emission level in California between 1990 and 1999. This evaluation fails to reject the null hypothesis that using cap-and-trade (CAT) compared with using command-and-control (CAC) has no different effects on emission of both NOx and SO2 from point sources at the county level in California in the 1990's.; In summary, this research finds that the implementation of emissions trading is political, and interest group politics may distort the regulatory design and implementation of an emissions trading program. While cap-and-trade is promising to better protect our environment and natural resources, its implementation is conditioned by many political and administrative factors. Inadequate rules may come as the results of political compromises, and they may impact the functioning of an emissions trading system. |
| Keyword | emissions trading; rulemaking; RECLAIM; implementation; environmental governance |
| Geographic subject (city or populated place) | Los Angeles |
| Geographic subject (state) | California |
| Coverage date | 1990/2000 |
| Language | English |
| Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
| Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
| Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
| Type | texts |
| Legacy record ID | usctheses-m1719 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Rights | Zhan, Xueyong |
| Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
| Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Filename | etd-Zhan-2335 |
| Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume44/etd-Zhan-2335.pdf |
Description
| Title | Page 89 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Full text | 78 The first dataset contains 127 issue comments that are randomly selected from the public comments during the rule formulation stage (1993). 25 letters from different stakeholders during the rule formation state of RECLAIM are identified, and 2/3 of them (18 letters) were randomly selected for this analysis.17 Each comment letter contained several issues, and the SCAQMD made specific responses of whether they agree with this comment and whether to design the rule as suggested. The 18 letters include 512 issues, and I selected a stratified random sample of these issues for analysis18. 127 issues were finally selected for analysis, and thus the comment coverage rate is 24.9%. The second dataset contains 75 issue comments that are randomly selected from the rule revision stage (1994-2005). From 1994 to 2005, there are 74 rule revisions to Regulation XX (Figure 4.1). As far as the author identified, the rule revisions to Regulation XX had received a total of 33 written letters of public comments submitted by various stakeholders for RECLAIM’s rule revision between 1994 and 2005. There are also hundreds of oral comments conveyed and recorded during the public hearing/meeting activities, but these oral comments do not have any individual or organizational affiliation information. The 22 letters were randomly selected from the total sample of 17 Regarding the 2/3 principle, this number was an arbitrary decision. Since the comment letters of rule formation stage (before 1994) contains many more issue comments than those of the rule revision stage (512 v.s. 75), I further used a stratified random sampling method to collect 127 issue comments from the rule formation stage. 18 I used an online random number generator to get a random selection of numbers. The generator is located at: http://www.mdani.demon.co.uk/para/random.htm. The stratified random sample is selected in this way: for letters with less than 5 issues discussed, all issues were selected for analysis; for letters with more than 5 issues discussed, either 5 or 20% of the total issues will be selected whichever comes bigger. |
