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71
they ignore the information asymmetry between industry and regulator and ignore the
“supply side” of regulations.
Compared with economists, political scientists have a more active research
agenda on bureaucratic institutions, the supply side of regulations. It has been well
acknowledged that there are formal institutions that can exert control over the
bureaucracy. For example, Congress usually uses administrative procedures to exert
political control over bureaucracy during the policy implementation process
(McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, 1987, Ringquist et al., 2003). Political scientists
have also extensively investigated the roles various interest groups play in the
policymaking process, such as agenda setting, and issue definition, which have been
well established in the theory of public policy process (Baumgartner and Leech, 1996,
Wilson, 1980). Since special interest groups may impact public policy making at
public expense, interest groups’ tendency to influence public policy is likely to be
blamed (Lowery and Brasher, 2004). Yet public participation in policy making is also
regarded as a method to address the “democracy deficit” in current political
institutions (Halpin, 2006, p. 919).
Scholars in public administration usually hold a more sympathetic attitude
toward the role of public participation in democratic governance, and they have
examined the collaborative role of stakeholders’ participation in public policy making
and implementation. Environmental policy has been one of the areas with the highest
level of public participation in American public life. Since the 1970’s, public
administration scholars have attempted to explore the role of stakeholders in
democratic governance from the perspective of environmental policy implementation,
Object Description
| Title | Processes, effects, and the implementation of market-based environmental policy: southern California's experiences with emissions trading |
| Author | Zhan, Xueyong |
| Author email | xzhan@usc.edu; xueyongzhan@gmail.com |
| Degree | Doctor of Philosophy |
| Document type | Dissertation |
| Degree program | Public Administration |
| School | School of Policy, Planning, and Development |
| Date defended/completed | 2008-07-01 |
| Date submitted | 2008 |
| Restricted until | Unrestricted |
| Date published | 2008-10-30 |
| Advisor (committee chair) | Tang, Shui-Yan |
| Advisor (committee member) |
Mazmanian, Daniel A. Henry, Ronald |
| Abstract | This research provides a positive explanation of the implementation processes and effects of market-based environmental policy by conducting a case study on RECLAIM (Regional Clean Air Incentives Market), the first regional emission permits trading program that has been implemented by South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) to address air pollution problems in the Los Angeles air basin since 1994.; Firstly, I developed a game theoretic model of environmental policy implementation. This model integrates theories of administrative rulemaking, policy implementation, institutional rational choice and transaction cost politics. I argue that administrative agency tries to minimize political transaction costs of policy implementation when writing rules.; Based on the formal model, I conducted a quantitative analysis to examine the interactions between SCAQMD and its key stakeholders, such as federal, state and local governments, businesses, and environmental NGOs, during the rulemaking of RECLAIM. I found that SCAQMD is more likely to adopt rule changes suggested by state and federal environmental agencies. This research identifies the dominant role of organized interest groups, the existence of interagency lobbying, and the lack of citizen control over the rulemaking of RECLAIM. Furthermore, I conducted an evaluation of the rules governing the RECLAIM program, and I identify the major distortions of the RECLAIM rules in comparison with an ideal cap-and-trade emissions trading market. Also, I used OLS regression to examine the effects of policy difference on emission level in California between 1990 and 1999. This evaluation fails to reject the null hypothesis that using cap-and-trade (CAT) compared with using command-and-control (CAC) has no different effects on emission of both NOx and SO2 from point sources at the county level in California in the 1990's.; In summary, this research finds that the implementation of emissions trading is political, and interest group politics may distort the regulatory design and implementation of an emissions trading program. While cap-and-trade is promising to better protect our environment and natural resources, its implementation is conditioned by many political and administrative factors. Inadequate rules may come as the results of political compromises, and they may impact the functioning of an emissions trading system. |
| Keyword | emissions trading; rulemaking; RECLAIM; implementation; environmental governance |
| Geographic subject (city or populated place) | Los Angeles |
| Geographic subject (state) | California |
| Coverage date | 1990/2000 |
| Language | English |
| Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
| Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
| Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
| Type | texts |
| Legacy record ID | usctheses-m1719 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Rights | Zhan, Xueyong |
| Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
| Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Filename | etd-Zhan-2335 |
| Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume44/etd-Zhan-2335.pdf |
Description
| Title | Page 82 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Full text | 71 they ignore the information asymmetry between industry and regulator and ignore the “supply side” of regulations. Compared with economists, political scientists have a more active research agenda on bureaucratic institutions, the supply side of regulations. It has been well acknowledged that there are formal institutions that can exert control over the bureaucracy. For example, Congress usually uses administrative procedures to exert political control over bureaucracy during the policy implementation process (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, 1987, Ringquist et al., 2003). Political scientists have also extensively investigated the roles various interest groups play in the policymaking process, such as agenda setting, and issue definition, which have been well established in the theory of public policy process (Baumgartner and Leech, 1996, Wilson, 1980). Since special interest groups may impact public policy making at public expense, interest groups’ tendency to influence public policy is likely to be blamed (Lowery and Brasher, 2004). Yet public participation in policy making is also regarded as a method to address the “democracy deficit” in current political institutions (Halpin, 2006, p. 919). Scholars in public administration usually hold a more sympathetic attitude toward the role of public participation in democratic governance, and they have examined the collaborative role of stakeholders’ participation in public policy making and implementation. Environmental policy has been one of the areas with the highest level of public participation in American public life. Since the 1970’s, public administration scholars have attempted to explore the role of stakeholders in democratic governance from the perspective of environmental policy implementation, |
