Page 59 |
Save page Remove page | Previous | 59 of 160 | Next |
|
small (250x250 max)
medium (500x500 max)
Large (1000x1000 max)
Extra Large
large ( > 500x500)
Full Resolution
All (PDF)
|
This page
All
|
48
sector agencies are more complex, with a “multidimensional, multiprincipal nature”
(Dixit, 2002, p. 722).
Environmental policy implementation faces similar problems. In real world
settings, environmental agencies usually have discretions in regulatory design and
enforcement. Under many circumstances, however, they do not have the full
information of regulated industries and other related stakeholders, and thus they face
considerable technological and legal uncertainties. Therefore, they still need to tackle
incentive compatibility problems in regulatory design and enforcement. The
formulation and implementation of market-based environmental policy is a good case
for the application of theory of political transaction costs. The design of a market is a
complex task that usually requires more expertise, information and resources than
making a contract in economic markets.
The implementation agency and stakeholders have to work together to
establish specific rules, and it is also natural that even after the policy is enacted, there
are still difficulties of collecting information, monitoring regulated parties and
enforcing rules in an environmental market. Negotiations and renegotiations happen in
many cases, and they may entail rule revisions. Use the cap-and-trade emissions
trading as an example. Theoretically, if emission permits are allocated and policy
target (cap) is set, the participants will automatically enter into trading activities
(buying or selling emission permits) based on the marginal abatement cost curve
(Freeman, 2002, Tietenberg, 2006). These assumptions about emissions trading rules
are based on a frictionless world where transaction costs are zero. But the real world
experiences of implementation differ from an ideal scenario. For example, regulatory
Object Description
| Title | Processes, effects, and the implementation of market-based environmental policy: southern California's experiences with emissions trading |
| Author | Zhan, Xueyong |
| Author email | xzhan@usc.edu; xueyongzhan@gmail.com |
| Degree | Doctor of Philosophy |
| Document type | Dissertation |
| Degree program | Public Administration |
| School | School of Policy, Planning, and Development |
| Date defended/completed | 2008-07-01 |
| Date submitted | 2008 |
| Restricted until | Unrestricted |
| Date published | 2008-10-30 |
| Advisor (committee chair) | Tang, Shui-Yan |
| Advisor (committee member) |
Mazmanian, Daniel A. Henry, Ronald |
| Abstract | This research provides a positive explanation of the implementation processes and effects of market-based environmental policy by conducting a case study on RECLAIM (Regional Clean Air Incentives Market), the first regional emission permits trading program that has been implemented by South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) to address air pollution problems in the Los Angeles air basin since 1994.; Firstly, I developed a game theoretic model of environmental policy implementation. This model integrates theories of administrative rulemaking, policy implementation, institutional rational choice and transaction cost politics. I argue that administrative agency tries to minimize political transaction costs of policy implementation when writing rules.; Based on the formal model, I conducted a quantitative analysis to examine the interactions between SCAQMD and its key stakeholders, such as federal, state and local governments, businesses, and environmental NGOs, during the rulemaking of RECLAIM. I found that SCAQMD is more likely to adopt rule changes suggested by state and federal environmental agencies. This research identifies the dominant role of organized interest groups, the existence of interagency lobbying, and the lack of citizen control over the rulemaking of RECLAIM. Furthermore, I conducted an evaluation of the rules governing the RECLAIM program, and I identify the major distortions of the RECLAIM rules in comparison with an ideal cap-and-trade emissions trading market. Also, I used OLS regression to examine the effects of policy difference on emission level in California between 1990 and 1999. This evaluation fails to reject the null hypothesis that using cap-and-trade (CAT) compared with using command-and-control (CAC) has no different effects on emission of both NOx and SO2 from point sources at the county level in California in the 1990's.; In summary, this research finds that the implementation of emissions trading is political, and interest group politics may distort the regulatory design and implementation of an emissions trading program. While cap-and-trade is promising to better protect our environment and natural resources, its implementation is conditioned by many political and administrative factors. Inadequate rules may come as the results of political compromises, and they may impact the functioning of an emissions trading system. |
| Keyword | emissions trading; rulemaking; RECLAIM; implementation; environmental governance |
| Geographic subject (city or populated place) | Los Angeles |
| Geographic subject (state) | California |
| Coverage date | 1990/2000 |
| Language | English |
| Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
| Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
| Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
| Type | texts |
| Legacy record ID | usctheses-m1719 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Rights | Zhan, Xueyong |
| Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
| Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Filename | etd-Zhan-2335 |
| Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume44/etd-Zhan-2335.pdf |
Description
| Title | Page 59 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Full text | 48 sector agencies are more complex, with a “multidimensional, multiprincipal nature” (Dixit, 2002, p. 722). Environmental policy implementation faces similar problems. In real world settings, environmental agencies usually have discretions in regulatory design and enforcement. Under many circumstances, however, they do not have the full information of regulated industries and other related stakeholders, and thus they face considerable technological and legal uncertainties. Therefore, they still need to tackle incentive compatibility problems in regulatory design and enforcement. The formulation and implementation of market-based environmental policy is a good case for the application of theory of political transaction costs. The design of a market is a complex task that usually requires more expertise, information and resources than making a contract in economic markets. The implementation agency and stakeholders have to work together to establish specific rules, and it is also natural that even after the policy is enacted, there are still difficulties of collecting information, monitoring regulated parties and enforcing rules in an environmental market. Negotiations and renegotiations happen in many cases, and they may entail rule revisions. Use the cap-and-trade emissions trading as an example. Theoretically, if emission permits are allocated and policy target (cap) is set, the participants will automatically enter into trading activities (buying or selling emission permits) based on the marginal abatement cost curve (Freeman, 2002, Tietenberg, 2006). These assumptions about emissions trading rules are based on a frictionless world where transaction costs are zero. But the real world experiences of implementation differ from an ideal scenario. For example, regulatory |
