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35
4). As Hempel (1996) indicates, market-based solutions cannot resolve environmental
problems, and a combination of different instruments “may indeed be optimal”
(Hempel, 1996, p. 197). Since governmental agencies have always played a major role
in environmental governance, it is important to have a facilitative government in a
well-functioning emissions trading system.
2.4.2 The Role of Stakeholders
A major weakness of the existing literature on emissions trading systems is
that it fails to identify the new roles of governments, businesses and NGOs in
emissions trading systems. While a handful of articles have identified the changes of
participants’ behavior in this innovative regime, most of them are descriptive work.
There is a lack of understanding of the institutional context of emissions trading
systems. What kind of circumstances will facilitate/impede the implementation of an
emissions trading system? In this regard, we need to better understand new roles of
government, businesses and NGOs in market-based environmental governance.
2.4.3 Market-based Environmental Governance
The implementation of emissions trading programs can be better understood
within the context of environmental governance. With the introduction of governance
into political science and public policy research, the concept of environmental
governance has also drawn a lot of attention from policy-makers and political
scientists in recent years (Durant et al., 2004, Hempel, 1996, Kettl, 2002). In other
words, implementation of emissions trading programs may require favorable political
climate, adequate regulatory capacity and appropriate market design.
Object Description
| Title | Processes, effects, and the implementation of market-based environmental policy: southern California's experiences with emissions trading |
| Author | Zhan, Xueyong |
| Author email | xzhan@usc.edu; xueyongzhan@gmail.com |
| Degree | Doctor of Philosophy |
| Document type | Dissertation |
| Degree program | Public Administration |
| School | School of Policy, Planning, and Development |
| Date defended/completed | 2008-07-01 |
| Date submitted | 2008 |
| Restricted until | Unrestricted |
| Date published | 2008-10-30 |
| Advisor (committee chair) | Tang, Shui-Yan |
| Advisor (committee member) |
Mazmanian, Daniel A. Henry, Ronald |
| Abstract | This research provides a positive explanation of the implementation processes and effects of market-based environmental policy by conducting a case study on RECLAIM (Regional Clean Air Incentives Market), the first regional emission permits trading program that has been implemented by South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) to address air pollution problems in the Los Angeles air basin since 1994.; Firstly, I developed a game theoretic model of environmental policy implementation. This model integrates theories of administrative rulemaking, policy implementation, institutional rational choice and transaction cost politics. I argue that administrative agency tries to minimize political transaction costs of policy implementation when writing rules.; Based on the formal model, I conducted a quantitative analysis to examine the interactions between SCAQMD and its key stakeholders, such as federal, state and local governments, businesses, and environmental NGOs, during the rulemaking of RECLAIM. I found that SCAQMD is more likely to adopt rule changes suggested by state and federal environmental agencies. This research identifies the dominant role of organized interest groups, the existence of interagency lobbying, and the lack of citizen control over the rulemaking of RECLAIM. Furthermore, I conducted an evaluation of the rules governing the RECLAIM program, and I identify the major distortions of the RECLAIM rules in comparison with an ideal cap-and-trade emissions trading market. Also, I used OLS regression to examine the effects of policy difference on emission level in California between 1990 and 1999. This evaluation fails to reject the null hypothesis that using cap-and-trade (CAT) compared with using command-and-control (CAC) has no different effects on emission of both NOx and SO2 from point sources at the county level in California in the 1990's.; In summary, this research finds that the implementation of emissions trading is political, and interest group politics may distort the regulatory design and implementation of an emissions trading program. While cap-and-trade is promising to better protect our environment and natural resources, its implementation is conditioned by many political and administrative factors. Inadequate rules may come as the results of political compromises, and they may impact the functioning of an emissions trading system. |
| Keyword | emissions trading; rulemaking; RECLAIM; implementation; environmental governance |
| Geographic subject (city or populated place) | Los Angeles |
| Geographic subject (state) | California |
| Coverage date | 1990/2000 |
| Language | English |
| Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
| Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
| Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
| Type | texts |
| Legacy record ID | usctheses-m1719 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Rights | Zhan, Xueyong |
| Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
| Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Filename | etd-Zhan-2335 |
| Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume44/etd-Zhan-2335.pdf |
Description
| Title | Page 46 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Full text | 35 4). As Hempel (1996) indicates, market-based solutions cannot resolve environmental problems, and a combination of different instruments “may indeed be optimal” (Hempel, 1996, p. 197). Since governmental agencies have always played a major role in environmental governance, it is important to have a facilitative government in a well-functioning emissions trading system. 2.4.2 The Role of Stakeholders A major weakness of the existing literature on emissions trading systems is that it fails to identify the new roles of governments, businesses and NGOs in emissions trading systems. While a handful of articles have identified the changes of participants’ behavior in this innovative regime, most of them are descriptive work. There is a lack of understanding of the institutional context of emissions trading systems. What kind of circumstances will facilitate/impede the implementation of an emissions trading system? In this regard, we need to better understand new roles of government, businesses and NGOs in market-based environmental governance. 2.4.3 Market-based Environmental Governance The implementation of emissions trading programs can be better understood within the context of environmental governance. With the introduction of governance into political science and public policy research, the concept of environmental governance has also drawn a lot of attention from policy-makers and political scientists in recent years (Durant et al., 2004, Hempel, 1996, Kettl, 2002). In other words, implementation of emissions trading programs may require favorable political climate, adequate regulatory capacity and appropriate market design. |
