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26
China’s emissions trading experiment was triggered by its policy change in the
middle of 1990’s when “Total Emission Control” was adopted by the State Council
(Ellerman, 2002). Since the late 1990’s, China has initiated a series of experiments
with emissions trading. With the assistance from Resources for the Future, an
environmental NGO based in Washington D.C., a regional emissions trading system
has been implemented in Taiyuan, Shanxi. As a major industrial city and the No. 1
coal production center in China, Taiyuan is one of the most polluted cities (Shunwen,
2004). For example, its SO2 concentration level in 2001 was three times higher than
the national standard (Wang et al., 2004). When this city formulated a goal of 50% of
emission reduction from 2000 to 2005 (Wang et al., 2004), emissions trading system
became an attractive and acceptable option. In this program, the State Environmental
Protection Administration (SEPA) and the City Government have delegated a lot of
authority to local EPA to implement this program (Wang et al., 2004). At the national
level, the SEPA has cooperated with the U.S. EPA and Environmental Defense, also a
U.S.-based environmental NGO, to conduct feasibility analysis of national emissions
trading system and to experiment in Nantong and Benxi, two industrial cities in
eastern China (Shunwen, 2004).
While it is still too early to identify the effects of these two programs, it is
apparent that Chinese policy experiences of adopting emissions trading share the U.S.
experience. Firstly, a significant change in environmental goal may provide some
strong incentives for adoption of emissions trading. As an effort to meet the goal of
Total Emission Control set by the State Council (Shunwen, 2004), the highest
administrative entity in China, the embracement of emissions trading system by
Object Description
| Title | Processes, effects, and the implementation of market-based environmental policy: southern California's experiences with emissions trading |
| Author | Zhan, Xueyong |
| Author email | xzhan@usc.edu; xueyongzhan@gmail.com |
| Degree | Doctor of Philosophy |
| Document type | Dissertation |
| Degree program | Public Administration |
| School | School of Policy, Planning, and Development |
| Date defended/completed | 2008-07-01 |
| Date submitted | 2008 |
| Restricted until | Unrestricted |
| Date published | 2008-10-30 |
| Advisor (committee chair) | Tang, Shui-Yan |
| Advisor (committee member) |
Mazmanian, Daniel A. Henry, Ronald |
| Abstract | This research provides a positive explanation of the implementation processes and effects of market-based environmental policy by conducting a case study on RECLAIM (Regional Clean Air Incentives Market), the first regional emission permits trading program that has been implemented by South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) to address air pollution problems in the Los Angeles air basin since 1994.; Firstly, I developed a game theoretic model of environmental policy implementation. This model integrates theories of administrative rulemaking, policy implementation, institutional rational choice and transaction cost politics. I argue that administrative agency tries to minimize political transaction costs of policy implementation when writing rules.; Based on the formal model, I conducted a quantitative analysis to examine the interactions between SCAQMD and its key stakeholders, such as federal, state and local governments, businesses, and environmental NGOs, during the rulemaking of RECLAIM. I found that SCAQMD is more likely to adopt rule changes suggested by state and federal environmental agencies. This research identifies the dominant role of organized interest groups, the existence of interagency lobbying, and the lack of citizen control over the rulemaking of RECLAIM. Furthermore, I conducted an evaluation of the rules governing the RECLAIM program, and I identify the major distortions of the RECLAIM rules in comparison with an ideal cap-and-trade emissions trading market. Also, I used OLS regression to examine the effects of policy difference on emission level in California between 1990 and 1999. This evaluation fails to reject the null hypothesis that using cap-and-trade (CAT) compared with using command-and-control (CAC) has no different effects on emission of both NOx and SO2 from point sources at the county level in California in the 1990's.; In summary, this research finds that the implementation of emissions trading is political, and interest group politics may distort the regulatory design and implementation of an emissions trading program. While cap-and-trade is promising to better protect our environment and natural resources, its implementation is conditioned by many political and administrative factors. Inadequate rules may come as the results of political compromises, and they may impact the functioning of an emissions trading system. |
| Keyword | emissions trading; rulemaking; RECLAIM; implementation; environmental governance |
| Geographic subject (city or populated place) | Los Angeles |
| Geographic subject (state) | California |
| Coverage date | 1990/2000 |
| Language | English |
| Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
| Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
| Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
| Type | texts |
| Legacy record ID | usctheses-m1719 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Rights | Zhan, Xueyong |
| Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
| Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Filename | etd-Zhan-2335 |
| Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume44/etd-Zhan-2335.pdf |
Description
| Title | Page 37 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Full text | 26 China’s emissions trading experiment was triggered by its policy change in the middle of 1990’s when “Total Emission Control” was adopted by the State Council (Ellerman, 2002). Since the late 1990’s, China has initiated a series of experiments with emissions trading. With the assistance from Resources for the Future, an environmental NGO based in Washington D.C., a regional emissions trading system has been implemented in Taiyuan, Shanxi. As a major industrial city and the No. 1 coal production center in China, Taiyuan is one of the most polluted cities (Shunwen, 2004). For example, its SO2 concentration level in 2001 was three times higher than the national standard (Wang et al., 2004). When this city formulated a goal of 50% of emission reduction from 2000 to 2005 (Wang et al., 2004), emissions trading system became an attractive and acceptable option. In this program, the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) and the City Government have delegated a lot of authority to local EPA to implement this program (Wang et al., 2004). At the national level, the SEPA has cooperated with the U.S. EPA and Environmental Defense, also a U.S.-based environmental NGO, to conduct feasibility analysis of national emissions trading system and to experiment in Nantong and Benxi, two industrial cities in eastern China (Shunwen, 2004). While it is still too early to identify the effects of these two programs, it is apparent that Chinese policy experiences of adopting emissions trading share the U.S. experience. Firstly, a significant change in environmental goal may provide some strong incentives for adoption of emissions trading. As an effort to meet the goal of Total Emission Control set by the State Council (Shunwen, 2004), the highest administrative entity in China, the embracement of emissions trading system by |
