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44
Barry's response to Kymlicka is to engage in a robust defense of the principles of egalitarianism that I have outlined above (p 15) He is firmly convinced that the kind of group rights claimed in the name of diversity amount to permitting oppressive practices within groups.
The defining feature of a liberal is, I suggest, that it is someone who holds that there are certain rights against oppression, exploitation and injury to which every single human being is entitled to lay claim, and that appeals to 'cultural diversity' and pluralism under no circumstances trump the value of basic liberal rights. On this criterion, Kukathas is not a liberal - but no more is Kymlicka, despite his protestations to the contrary[.](Barry, 132-3)
Barry believes that Kymlicka, like Walzer, is a cultural relativist. "A liberal is a liberal, not a chameleon," he asserts, and on this count, both Walzer and Kymlicka would be chameleons. He holds that Kymlicka is “spellbound” by sub-state nationalities. The fact that Kymlicka believes that national minorities should have self-government and that self-governing national minorities should not have measures imposed on them by a liberal state indicates that he "buys into the idea that human rights are a form of “cultural imperialism." (138)
A theory that has the implication that nationalities (whether they control a state or a sub-state polity) have a fundamental right to violate liberal principles is not a liberal theory of group rights. It is an illiberal theory with a bit of liberal hand-wringing thrown in as an optional extra. (Barry, 140)
He adds, with some malice: “Kymlicka's idea that the liberal answer is in some sense the universally correct one is like one of Wittgenstein's levers
Object Description
| Title | Negotiating pluralism and tribalism in liberal democratic societies |
| Author | Sadagopan, Shoba |
| Author email | sadagopa@usc.edu; shobasadagopan@gmail.com |
| Degree | Doctor of Philosophy |
| Document type | Dissertation |
| Degree program | Philosophy |
| School | College of Letters, Arts and Sciences |
| Date defended/completed | 2008-08-22 |
| Date submitted | 2008 |
| Restricted until | Unrestricted |
| Date published | 2008-10-15 |
| Advisor (committee chair) | Lloyd, Sharon |
| Advisor (committee member) |
Dreher, John Keating, Gregory |
| Abstract | My aim in this dissertation is to enquire whether toleration as a practice is achievable. It is prior to the question of how it can be grounded as a virtue. I argue that in liberal democratic societies where there are struggles for recognition on the part of ethnocultural groups, it is possible to negotiate pluralism and tribalism in a way that a stable pluralist society can be maintained. My core thesis rests on a theory of interdependence based both on a theory of human nature and on the material fact of globalization. Insofar as we affirm our nature as human beings engaged in productive activity with other human beings, insofar as we value a world that facilitates that activity, toleration is desirable. It is achievable because with globalization there is a tendency towards homogenization that erodes cultural differences. There is less reason for conflict because what we have in common, our interdependence, goes far deeper than culture. A further sufficient condition may be found in well thought-out policies that are executed through education and dialogue. |
| Keyword | toleration; value pluralism; liberalism; cultural homogenization; globalization; common citizenship |
| Language | English |
| Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
| Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
| Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
| Type | texts |
| Legacy record ID | usctheses-m1658 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Rights | Sadagopan, Shoba |
| Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
| Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Filename | etd-Sadagopan-2395 |
| Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume26/etd-Sadagopan-2395.pdf |
Description
| Title | Page 47 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Full text | 44 Barry's response to Kymlicka is to engage in a robust defense of the principles of egalitarianism that I have outlined above (p 15) He is firmly convinced that the kind of group rights claimed in the name of diversity amount to permitting oppressive practices within groups. The defining feature of a liberal is, I suggest, that it is someone who holds that there are certain rights against oppression, exploitation and injury to which every single human being is entitled to lay claim, and that appeals to 'cultural diversity' and pluralism under no circumstances trump the value of basic liberal rights. On this criterion, Kukathas is not a liberal - but no more is Kymlicka, despite his protestations to the contrary[.](Barry, 132-3) Barry believes that Kymlicka, like Walzer, is a cultural relativist. "A liberal is a liberal, not a chameleon," he asserts, and on this count, both Walzer and Kymlicka would be chameleons. He holds that Kymlicka is “spellbound” by sub-state nationalities. The fact that Kymlicka believes that national minorities should have self-government and that self-governing national minorities should not have measures imposed on them by a liberal state indicates that he "buys into the idea that human rights are a form of “cultural imperialism." (138) A theory that has the implication that nationalities (whether they control a state or a sub-state polity) have a fundamental right to violate liberal principles is not a liberal theory of group rights. It is an illiberal theory with a bit of liberal hand-wringing thrown in as an optional extra. (Barry, 140) He adds, with some malice: “Kymlicka's idea that the liberal answer is in some sense the universally correct one is like one of Wittgenstein's levers |
