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34
did not lead to what he called ‘emancipation’, his equivalent of what Parekh and others would call justice.
Bruno Bauer had written that Jews who sought emancipation could only be emancipated if they abandoned their religion. Only by abolishing religion, through political emancipation, could one achieve true emancipation. Marx argues that this is not so. He points out that one may be politically emancipated without being emancipated in a real way. He cites France and the United States as examples of political systems which instantiate this point.
The droits de l’homme, the rights of man, are, as such, distinct from the droits du citoyen, the rights of the citizen. Who is homme as distinct from citoyen? None other than the member of civil society. Why is the member of civil society called “man,” simply man; why are his rights called the rights of man? How is this fact to be explained? From the relationship between the political state and civil society, from the nature of political emancipation.
Above all, we note the fact that the so-called rights of man, the droits de l’homme as distinct from the droits du citoyen, are nothing but the rights of a member of civil society – i.e., the rights of egoistic man, of man separated from other men and from the community (Early Political Writings, 44 )
For Marx, the ‘rights of man’ alienate man, and make of him an egotistical being. For the communitarians too, the idea of individual rights seems to privilege the individual alienated from his cultural community. For Marx, “community” would mean something quite different from what it means in communitarian parlance, namely, civil society. From the standpoint both of class (Marx) and culture (the communitarians), the
Object Description
| Title | Negotiating pluralism and tribalism in liberal democratic societies |
| Author | Sadagopan, Shoba |
| Author email | sadagopa@usc.edu; shobasadagopan@gmail.com |
| Degree | Doctor of Philosophy |
| Document type | Dissertation |
| Degree program | Philosophy |
| School | College of Letters, Arts and Sciences |
| Date defended/completed | 2008-08-22 |
| Date submitted | 2008 |
| Restricted until | Unrestricted |
| Date published | 2008-10-15 |
| Advisor (committee chair) | Lloyd, Sharon |
| Advisor (committee member) |
Dreher, John Keating, Gregory |
| Abstract | My aim in this dissertation is to enquire whether toleration as a practice is achievable. It is prior to the question of how it can be grounded as a virtue. I argue that in liberal democratic societies where there are struggles for recognition on the part of ethnocultural groups, it is possible to negotiate pluralism and tribalism in a way that a stable pluralist society can be maintained. My core thesis rests on a theory of interdependence based both on a theory of human nature and on the material fact of globalization. Insofar as we affirm our nature as human beings engaged in productive activity with other human beings, insofar as we value a world that facilitates that activity, toleration is desirable. It is achievable because with globalization there is a tendency towards homogenization that erodes cultural differences. There is less reason for conflict because what we have in common, our interdependence, goes far deeper than culture. A further sufficient condition may be found in well thought-out policies that are executed through education and dialogue. |
| Keyword | toleration; value pluralism; liberalism; cultural homogenization; globalization; common citizenship |
| Language | English |
| Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
| Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
| Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
| Type | texts |
| Legacy record ID | usctheses-m1658 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Rights | Sadagopan, Shoba |
| Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
| Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Filename | etd-Sadagopan-2395 |
| Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume26/etd-Sadagopan-2395.pdf |
Description
| Title | Page 37 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Full text | 34 did not lead to what he called ‘emancipation’, his equivalent of what Parekh and others would call justice. Bruno Bauer had written that Jews who sought emancipation could only be emancipated if they abandoned their religion. Only by abolishing religion, through political emancipation, could one achieve true emancipation. Marx argues that this is not so. He points out that one may be politically emancipated without being emancipated in a real way. He cites France and the United States as examples of political systems which instantiate this point. The droits de l’homme, the rights of man, are, as such, distinct from the droits du citoyen, the rights of the citizen. Who is homme as distinct from citoyen? None other than the member of civil society. Why is the member of civil society called “man,” simply man; why are his rights called the rights of man? How is this fact to be explained? From the relationship between the political state and civil society, from the nature of political emancipation. Above all, we note the fact that the so-called rights of man, the droits de l’homme as distinct from the droits du citoyen, are nothing but the rights of a member of civil society – i.e., the rights of egoistic man, of man separated from other men and from the community (Early Political Writings, 44 ) For Marx, the ‘rights of man’ alienate man, and make of him an egotistical being. For the communitarians too, the idea of individual rights seems to privilege the individual alienated from his cultural community. For Marx, “community” would mean something quite different from what it means in communitarian parlance, namely, civil society. From the standpoint both of class (Marx) and culture (the communitarians), the |
