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7
If pluralism is a valid view, and respect between systems of values which are not necessarily hostile to each other is possible, then toleration and liberal consequences follow, as they do not either from monism (only one set of values is true, all the others are false) or from relativism (my values are mine, yours are yours, and if we clash, too bad, neither of us can claim to be right). (Berlin, 1997)
I discuss the concept of value pluralism as put forward by Isaiah Berlin and then take up the implications for the debate on toleration and pluralism. I point to the significance of the fact that Berlin, who is considered to be the foremost defender of liberalism, is actually a source of inspiration for multiculturalists such as Bhiku Parekh. Parekh, in Rethinking Multiculturalism (2006) explicitly acknowledges his debt to Berlin. Parekh’s critique of liberalism is on the grounds that the Enlightenment model of liberalism is a monist view of human goals and values. I present the views of Charles Taylor and Bhiku Parekh on the subject of multiculturalism. I then take up Brian Barry's procrustean defense of the Enlightenment ideal in Culture and Equality (2001). On Barry’s view, multiculturalism is merely a “benign” version of nationalism and particularism, which, in their more extreme forms lead to ethnic cleansing and the like. Barry does not conflate multiculturalism with the latter, but argues that the group rights model of democracy denies individual freedom and is profoundly inegalitarian. He believes that unitary citizenship is the only guarantee of equality.
Object Description
| Title | Negotiating pluralism and tribalism in liberal democratic societies |
| Author | Sadagopan, Shoba |
| Author email | sadagopa@usc.edu; shobasadagopan@gmail.com |
| Degree | Doctor of Philosophy |
| Document type | Dissertation |
| Degree program | Philosophy |
| School | College of Letters, Arts and Sciences |
| Date defended/completed | 2008-08-22 |
| Date submitted | 2008 |
| Restricted until | Unrestricted |
| Date published | 2008-10-15 |
| Advisor (committee chair) | Lloyd, Sharon |
| Advisor (committee member) |
Dreher, John Keating, Gregory |
| Abstract | My aim in this dissertation is to enquire whether toleration as a practice is achievable. It is prior to the question of how it can be grounded as a virtue. I argue that in liberal democratic societies where there are struggles for recognition on the part of ethnocultural groups, it is possible to negotiate pluralism and tribalism in a way that a stable pluralist society can be maintained. My core thesis rests on a theory of interdependence based both on a theory of human nature and on the material fact of globalization. Insofar as we affirm our nature as human beings engaged in productive activity with other human beings, insofar as we value a world that facilitates that activity, toleration is desirable. It is achievable because with globalization there is a tendency towards homogenization that erodes cultural differences. There is less reason for conflict because what we have in common, our interdependence, goes far deeper than culture. A further sufficient condition may be found in well thought-out policies that are executed through education and dialogue. |
| Keyword | toleration; value pluralism; liberalism; cultural homogenization; globalization; common citizenship |
| Language | English |
| Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
| Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
| Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
| Type | texts |
| Legacy record ID | usctheses-m1658 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Rights | Sadagopan, Shoba |
| Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
| Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Filename | etd-Sadagopan-2395 |
| Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume26/etd-Sadagopan-2395.pdf |
Description
| Title | Page 10 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Full text | 7 If pluralism is a valid view, and respect between systems of values which are not necessarily hostile to each other is possible, then toleration and liberal consequences follow, as they do not either from monism (only one set of values is true, all the others are false) or from relativism (my values are mine, yours are yours, and if we clash, too bad, neither of us can claim to be right). (Berlin, 1997) I discuss the concept of value pluralism as put forward by Isaiah Berlin and then take up the implications for the debate on toleration and pluralism. I point to the significance of the fact that Berlin, who is considered to be the foremost defender of liberalism, is actually a source of inspiration for multiculturalists such as Bhiku Parekh. Parekh, in Rethinking Multiculturalism (2006) explicitly acknowledges his debt to Berlin. Parekh’s critique of liberalism is on the grounds that the Enlightenment model of liberalism is a monist view of human goals and values. I present the views of Charles Taylor and Bhiku Parekh on the subject of multiculturalism. I then take up Brian Barry's procrustean defense of the Enlightenment ideal in Culture and Equality (2001). On Barry’s view, multiculturalism is merely a “benign” version of nationalism and particularism, which, in their more extreme forms lead to ethnic cleansing and the like. Barry does not conflate multiculturalism with the latter, but argues that the group rights model of democracy denies individual freedom and is profoundly inegalitarian. He believes that unitary citizenship is the only guarantee of equality. |
