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BELIEVING SOMEONE
THE OMISSION OF THE INTERPERSONAL COMPONENT OF
TESTIMONIAL BELIEF AND THE CONCOMITANT LIMITATIONS OF
MERELY BELIEVING A PROPOSITION
by
Albert Johann Chan
____________________________________________________________________
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(PHILOSOPHY)
May 2007
Copyright 2007 Albert Johann Chan
Object Description
| Title | Believing someone: the omission of the interpersonal component of testimonial belief and the concomitant limitations of merely believing a proposition |
| Author | Chan, Albert Johann |
| Author email | jovcbhann@msn.com |
| Degree | Doctor of Philosophy |
| Document type | Dissertation |
| Degree program | Philosophy |
| School | College of Letters, Arts and Sciences |
| Date defended/completed | 2007-03-09 |
| Date submitted | 2007 |
| Restricted until | Unrestricted |
| Date published | 2007-05-04 |
| Advisor (committee chair) | Van Cleve, James |
| Advisor (committee member) |
Willard, Dallas Crossley, John |
| Abstract | G.E.M. Anscombe introduced the philosophical phenomenon of 'Believing Someone' with scant subsequent fanfare. Certainly the initial prospects of a marginal and mysterious concept -- or worse yet -- an outdated and authoritarian worldview seemed less than alluring. Representing a renewed contemporary attempt to excavate this heretofore neglected notion of believing a 'personal object,' the other person is offered in this dissertation as the missing component in a precise and comprehensive view of testimonial belief. Even though reductionists emphasize the credibility of the believed and non-reductionists lean toward certain propensities of the believer, the focus of work on testimony has traditionally rested on the logical relations between propositions. Persons on both sides of the belief equation, however, react to these propositions and change their minds. Whether exploring its historical or current role in testimonial psychology and / or epistemology, equivocation plagues the concept of testimonial belief because the notion of believing someone calls for elucidation. By explicating the core components of believing another person -- reliance and trust -- we shall discover that reliance is a volitional element of testimonial belief revolving around our specific relational situations and the integrity of the other person while trust incorporates an emergent open-ended attitude toward specific persons and their fields of expertise. The nuanced description of what does it mean and what do we mean in believing someone will take into account our relationships among enemies, strangers, friends, and intimates. Paying attention to a straightforward, robust sense of this notion will lead to considerable application in philosophy, religion, law, and business, and provide clarity to perennial epistemological problems in such matters as basic sources, knowledge and the will. |
| Keyword | epistemology; testimony; believing persons; trust; reliance |
| Language | English |
| Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
| Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
| Type | texts |
| Legacy record ID | usctheses-m484 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Rights | Chan, Albert Johann |
| Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
| Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
| Repository email | http://www.usc.edu/isd/libraries/services/ask_a_librarian/email/ |
| Filename | etd-Chan-20070504 |
| Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume32/etd-Chan-20070504.pdf |
Description
| Title | Page 1 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Full text | BELIEVING SOMEONE THE OMISSION OF THE INTERPERSONAL COMPONENT OF TESTIMONIAL BELIEF AND THE CONCOMITANT LIMITATIONS OF MERELY BELIEVING A PROPOSITION by Albert Johann Chan ____________________________________________________________________ A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (PHILOSOPHY) May 2007 Copyright 2007 Albert Johann Chan |
