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THOMAS REID: MOTIVES AND THE ANATOMY OF THE MIND by Esther Kroeker A dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (PHILOSOPHY) December 2007 Copyright 2007 Esther Kroeker
Object Description
Title | Thomas Reid: motives and the anatomy of the mind |
Author | Kroeker, Esther |
Author email | kroeker@usc.edu |
Degree | Doctor of Philosophy |
Document type | Dissertation |
Degree program | Philosophy |
School | College of Letters, Arts and Sciences |
Date defended/completed | 2007-10-25 |
Date submitted | 2007 |
Restricted until | Unrestricted |
Date published | 2007-11-22 |
Advisor (committee chair) | Yaffe, Gideon |
Advisor (committee member) |
Van Cleve, James Heidsieck, Arnold |
Abstract | For Thomas Reid the careful study of the human mind, the anatomy of the mind, involves the study of all the operations and faculties of the mind. So far, most of the literature on Reid has focused on perception, the principles of common sense, and Reid's account of active power or moral liberty. In my dissertation, therefore, I examine Reid's account of motives or principles of action and their relation to the different faculties of the mind and I situate and evaluate it in the context of 18th century moral philosophy.; The first two chapters deal with the nature of the different kinds of motives. In the first chapter I try to understand the difference between Reid's animal and rational motives. I argue that rational judgments require intention, will and judgments, not only about present objects but also about ends that we naturally value. In the second chapter I argue that there is a difference between Hume's calm passions and Reid's rational motives since for Reid the mere conception of some end, without any feeling necessarily associated, is a desire or principle of action. In the third chapter, I examine the relation between active power, reason and the moral sense. I show that active power implies having reasoning abilities. However, having active power and hence reasoning abilities does not imply that one has a functioning moral sense.; The next two chapters deal with the relation between principles of action and moral liberty. In chapter four, I examine two arguments Reid uses to argue that motives function as advice and not as necessary causes. In chapter five, I defend and evaluate Reid's possible answer to the problem of explaining the agent's choice between motives.; I argue, in chapter six, that Reid is more truly a moral sense theorist than his predecessors. In chapter seven, I show that moral perception involves the three different kinds of natural signs and hence it involves but cannot be reduced to perception by our external senses. I conclude by examining how motives are related to the self as a whole. |
Keyword | Reid; motives; action; Hume |
Coverage date | circa 1700/1800 |
Language | English |
Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
Type | texts |
Legacy record ID | usctheses-m940 |
Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
Rights | Kroeker, Esther |
Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
Filename | etd-Kroeker-20071122 |
Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume35/etd-Kroeker-20071122.pdf |
Description
Title | Page 1 |
Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
Full text | THOMAS REID: MOTIVES AND THE ANATOMY OF THE MIND by Esther Kroeker A dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (PHILOSOPHY) December 2007 Copyright 2007 Esther Kroeker |