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COMPUTATIONAL MODEL OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR
IN SECURITY GAMES
WITH VARYING NUMBER OF TARGETS
by
Mohit Goenka
A Thesis Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC VITERBI SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
MASTER OF SCIENCE
(COMPUTER SCIENCE)
May 2011
Copyright 2011 Mohit Goenka
Object Description
| Title | Computational model of human behavior in security games with varying number of targets |
| Author | Goenka, Mohit |
| Author email | mgoenka@usc.edu; mohitgoenka@gmail.com |
| Degree | Master of Science |
| Document type | Thesis |
| Degree program | Computer Science |
| School | Viterbi School of Engineering |
| Date defended/completed | 2011-03-30 |
| Date submitted | 2011 |
| Restricted until | Unrestricted |
| Date published | 2011-04-19 |
| Advisor (committee chair) | Tambe, Milind |
| Advisor (committee member) |
John, Richard S. Maheswaran, Rajiv T. |
| Abstract | Security is one of the biggest concerns all around the world. There are only a limited number of resources that can be allocated in security coverage. Terrorists can exploit any pattern of monitoring deployed by the security personnel. It becomes important to make the security pattern unpredictable and randomized. In such a scenario, the security forces can be randomized using algorithms based on Stackelberg games.; Stackelberg games have recently gained significant importance in deployment for real world security. Game-theoretic techniques make a standard assumption that adversaries' actions are perfectly rational. It is a challenging task to account for human behavior in such circumstances.; What becomes more challenging in applying game-theoretic techniques to real-world security problems is the standard assumption that the adversary is perfectly rational in responding to security forces' strategy, which can be unrealistic for human adversaries. Different models in the form of PT, PT-Attract, COBRA, DOBSS and QRE have already been proposed to address the scenario in settings with fixed number of targets. My work focuses on the evaluation of these models when the number of targets is varied, giving rise to an entirely new problem set. |
| Keyword | artificial intelligence; behavioral sciences; game theory; human behavior; COBRA; DOBSS; PT; PT-Attract; QRE; Stackelberg |
| Language | English |
| Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
| Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
| Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
| Type | texts |
| Legacy record ID | usctheses-m3757 |
| Rights | Goenka, Mohit |
| Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
| Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
| Repository email | http://www.usc.edu/isd/libraries/services/ask_a_librarian/email/ |
| Filename | etd-Goenka-4204 |
| Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume62/etd-Goenka-4204.pdf |
Description
| Title | Page 1 |
| Full text | COMPUTATIONAL MODEL OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN SECURITY GAMES WITH VARYING NUMBER OF TARGETS by Mohit Goenka A Thesis Presented to the FACULTY OF THE USC VITERBI SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree MASTER OF SCIENCE (COMPUTER SCIENCE) May 2011 Copyright 2011 Mohit Goenka |
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