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JUST IMAGINING THINGS:
HUME’S CONCEPTION-BASED ACCOUNT OF COGNITION
by
Lewis Michael Powell
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(PHILOSOPHY)
May 2011
Copyright 2011 Lewis Michael Powell
Object Description
| Title | Just imagining things: Hume's conception-based account of cognition |
| Author | Powell, Lewis Michael |
| Author email | lmpowell@usc.edu; lewis.powell@gmail.com |
| Degree | Doctor of Philosophy |
| Document type | Dissertation |
| Degree program | Philosophy |
| School | College of Letters, Arts and Sciences |
| Date defended/completed | 2011-03-01 |
| Date submitted | 2011 |
| Restricted until | Unrestricted |
| Date published | 2011-03-28 |
| Advisor (committee chair) | Van Cleve, James |
| Advisor (committee member) |
Yaffe, Gideon Paterson, Scott |
| Abstract | Philosophers have routinely taken a pessimistic view of the account of cognition offered by David Hume in his Treatise of Human Nature, claiming that Hume's limited explanatory resources cannot capture the rich complexity of our thought, judgment, and reasoning. I provide a qualified defense of Hume's attempt to analyze a cognitive activity in terms of objectual conception, i.e. conceiving or imagining an object. I defend Hume from objections offered by his contemporary Thomas Reid (and echoed by various recent Hume scholars), presenting an interpretation of the account that resolves these worries.; One theme that emerges is the way in which these concerns about Hume's views presuppose deep parallels between linguistic and mental structures, parallels which Hume clearly and unequivocally rejects. While Hume's rejection of these parallels may give us grounds for general concern, these specific worries are far from sufficient to topple Hume's system. |
| Keyword | David Hume; theory of cognition; Thomas Reid; conception; denial; imagination; objects and propositions |
| Language | English |
| Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
| Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
| Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
| Type | texts |
| Legacy record ID | usctheses-m3698 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Rights | Powell, Lewis Michael |
| Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
| Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@dots.usc.edu |
| Filename | etd-Powell-4388 |
| Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume14/etd-Powell-4388.pdf |
Description
| Title | Page 1 |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Repository email | cisadmin@dots.usc.edu |
| Full text | JUST IMAGINING THINGS: HUME’S CONCEPTION-BASED ACCOUNT OF COGNITION by Lewis Michael Powell A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (PHILOSOPHY) May 2011 Copyright 2011 Lewis Michael Powell |
