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GAME THEORETICAL MODELS IN SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT
by
Xiao Huang
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION)
December 2009
Copyright 2009 Xiao Huang
Object Description
| Title | Game theoretical models in supply chain management |
| Author | Huang, Xiao |
| Author email | xiao.huang.2009@marshall.usc.edu; xiao.huang.hedy@gmail.com |
| Degree | Doctor of Philosophy |
| Document type | Dissertation |
| Degree program | Business Administration |
| School | Marshall School of Business |
| Date defended/completed | 2009-07-06 |
| Date submitted | 2009 |
| Restricted until | Unrestricted |
| Date published | 2009-09-01 |
| Advisor (committee chair) | Sosic, Greys |
| Advisor (committee member) |
Bassok, Yehuda Ross, Sheldon Zhang, Hao |
| Abstract | The thesis consists of three projects under the umbrella of competition and cooperation in supply chains using game theory.; The first two projects consider a decentralized framework in which retailers are allowed to transship their inventories after meeting local demand. The first project studies a repeated newsvendor game with transshipments, in which residual profits are allocated through dual allocations. It has been shown that, in a single-shot game, retailers will withhold their residuals in equilibrium. However, the results in this project suggest that, when the discount factor is large enough and the game is repeated an infinite number of times, there is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which retailers would share all of the residuals. Asymptotic behavior in retailers' order quantities and threshold discount factors are analyzed, and the conditions or contract under which a first-best outcome can be achieved are discussed.; The second project compares dual allocations with another method that is used to allocate the profit generated by the transshipment: transshipment prices. While dual allocation is easy to implement with two retailers, it may become intractable when the number of retailers increases; on the other hand, transshipment prices can be applied to any number of retailers. The result suggests that transshipment prices are better at coordinating retailers that are more “alike,” while dual allocations work better on more “asymmetric” retailers. In addition, expected dual prices are found to be equivalent to coordinating transshipment prices when retailers are symmetric. Heuristic transshipment prices for any number of retailers are developed based on this equivalency.; The third project sets up a framework for analyzing industries with sustaining and disruptive technologies. Products based on sustaining technology are perceived to be superior to those based on disruptive technology, but the latter have a broader customer base. Examples include landline services vs. VoIP, and laser printers vs. ink-jet printers. We study two firms, an entrant that can use only disruptive technology and an incumbent that can use both technologies, and characterize equilibria in both deterministic and stochastic games. |
| Keyword | decentralized distribution system; disruptive technology; game theory; supply chain management; transshipment |
| Language | English |
| Part of collection | University of Southern California dissertations and theses |
| Publisher (of the original version) | University of Southern California |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
| Provenance | Electronically uploaded by the author |
| Type | texts |
| Legacy record ID | usctheses-m2580 |
| Rights | Huang, Xiao |
| Repository name | Libraries, University of Southern California |
| Repository address | Los Angeles, California |
| Repository email | http://www.usc.edu/isd/libraries/services/ask_a_librarian/email/ |
| Filename | etd-Huang-1259 |
| Archival file | uscthesesreloadpub_Volume29/etd-Huang-1259.pdf |
Description
| Title | Page 1 |
| Full text | GAME THEORETICAL MODELS IN SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT by Xiao Huang A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION) December 2009 Copyright 2009 Xiao Huang |
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