THE KOREAN OPEN U2TTER
636 NORTH EAIN STREET
AKRON 10, OHIO, U. S. A.
PUBLISHER MRS. IDA M. CHOO
EDITOR YOUNG HAN CHOO
Korean Leader Asks:
JANUARY 1948 FEBRUARY 6
VOL. 5 NO.1,2WHOLE NO'. 6
SUBSCRIPTION RATE; $5.00
PAGE 1
U.N. TO HOLD VOTE FREE OF MEDDLERS
On the eve of the arrival in Seoul of a United Nations commission
to supervise an election, the following statement of the Korean
nationalist case was written "by,Dr. Syngman Rhee, head of a
federation of 71 anti-Communist associations in South Korea.
BY DR. SYNGMAN RHEE O
(President, Korean Nationalist Association)
SEOUL, JAN. 6—The Koreans got caught, by no fault of their own,
between the tv/o wheels of conflicting ideologies, democracy and
communism.   The Soviets are pushing ahead whenever and wherever
possible, persistently and ruthlessly.
The Americans, devoid of self-interest and desirous of peace,
seem short-sighted and vacillating.
The Koreans have been, since the early days of their independence movement, upholding the American principle of democracy.
In 1919, inspired by President Wilson's declaration of self-
determination principles, they inaugurated a passive revolution  j
against Japan.,  They declared Korea an  independent republgr, with
a constitution modelled after that of the United States, and
established a provisional government, the first governmeht-inrv
exile known to history. '  / ' -^ ■'■"
But,the Koreans were bitterly disappointed when the U.£U ap~
peased the totalitarian empire of Japan in suppressing thfif democratic spirit of the Korean people. ~/:
This appeasement policy continued until the Pearl Harboj
disaster.  The Koreans, who had repeatedly warned the Americans ^
of such a disaster, \vere once again sadly disappointed. ••     '
ASK MILITARY AID.
They repeatedly requested the State Department officials for*
material assistance to their army in China so that they could help
defeat Japan a.nd prevent the danger of the Communist invasion'of
Korea, but not a single, rifle from "the arsenals of democracy,",
nor a dollar .from -"the lend-lease aid" so freely given to every
other struggling nation, went to the Koreans.
The New Deal statesmen joined with Russia in the arbitrary
division of Korea into two occupation zones.
The very thing against which the Koreans had repeatedly warned
the State Department officialso(those officials are not there now)
orally and in writing, bpth for the sake of Korean independence
and U*S« security, ha.s been/allowed to ta.ke place.
The'Communists rushed into northern Korea from Siberia and Manchuria, together with the Soviet Army, and threatened the south by
anti-American agitations, strikes, riots and terrorism.
If the Koreans, at the time of surrender, ha.d been allowed to
hold a genera*l election and set u,p their own government in the
south, there would have been no Communist problem, at least in
the United States zone.
But unfortunately they were not.
The reason the Koreans in south Korea failed to vote ?.nd set up
a government of their own, .while all the occupied countries and
enemy nations have had elections, was due to the fact that under
the New Deal policy Gen.   Hodge., the occupation commander, had to
appease Russia and hold a neutral attitude toward the Nationalists
and Communists.
I told Gen.   Hodge that I could not support him any longer, and
went to Washington.
He also went to Washington later and promised that a.s soon as
the interim legislature had adopted the election law we would have
the election.
Gen. Hilldring, then as Assistant Secretary of State, told me
that the south Korea interim election should be held at the earliest
possible date and that the government set up by it will represent
both north and south.     '
BEST STEP.
When I was in Tokyo in March, 1947, Gen. MacArthur told me the
election was the best step to take toward the ultimate solution,
and further remarked that Gen. Hodge would cooperate with?me in this.'
I returned to Seoul with high hopes*
ro
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