OOfrf COPY
"^ THE ^OllEAM-iaiERICAN COUNCIL *^
Colorado Building
Washington, D.C*
Hon*James H.Re Cromwell, Telephone
President Republic 6ll9
Mr*James W*Farmer, May 5, 19I42
Secretary
Honorable Cordell Hull
Secretary of State "
Washington, De C.
Dear Mr. Secretary:
I was glad to learn of your return to the active direction
of ttoe State Department, for in my capacity as President of the
Korean»American Council, I am anxious to *oall your attention to the
vital Importance to the United States of immediate recognition of
the de facto government of the Republic of Korea.
Under your direction It has been the policy of the State
Department to refuse to acknowledge the suzerainty of any nation
over any territory acquired by aggression* Prior to December 7, 19i+l#
however, the American people were so appeasement minded and Congress
eo anxibus to avoid offending Japan that even measures urged by our
armed services as being indispensable to American security in the
Orient were rejected. Under sueh circumstances wer who are devoted
to the cause of liberty for th* Korean people, knew it was useless
to request the implementation of your policy in so far as the
Japanese subjugated Nation of Korea.was concerned*
The same situation held trine with respect to the Atlantic
Charter, for Its annunciation by the President of the United States
and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, was obviously an extension
and a confirmation of the aforesaid fixed and fundamental policy of
the State Department, to wit:
^ te choose the
fosm of government under which they will live; and they
wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored
to those who have been f orolbly €eprived of them.11
Hope was momentarily kindled In our hearts and in the
hearts of our Korean friends by thes$ words, but in view of the state
of American public opinion at the time the Charter was annunciated,
i.e., August, 19H1, we soon came to realize that it necessarily
represented only the desires and promises of the great chieftains of
democracy* In short* we came to realize that the Atlantic Charter
was, in August of 19*11* a thing of words rather than of deeds.
On December 7, 19i*l# however, we of the Korean-American
Council believed all this was changed. We believed the necessity
of ignoring our policies and premises for fear of offending the
Japanese no longer existed, and we further believed the implementation of these policies and premises, without delay, had become a
matter of winning or losing this war, lh other words, a matter of
life or death to the United States*
Because, Mr. Secretary, I have had the honor of serving
under you and because'I therefore respect your broad-minded comprehension of foreign affairs, I venture to think you will agree with
my associates and myself in the belief that the outceme of .'this
conflict of ideologies may be determined more by the weapons of
psychology than by the weapona of war*
With this balief being substantiated daily befbre our very
eyes how, indeed* could any lJ3cfcellIgent person think otherwise?
While the British and the Dutch were losing possessions considered
Impregnable In the span of a few weeks, the prolonged death struggle
of the Filipino soldiers against overpowering odds has become an
Inspiration tq this Nation and an epic in military history. We need
only compare the story of Filipino bravery with that of Burmese
treachery to prove beyond any question of doubt the inestimable
power of the weapon of psychology.